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The Significance of the Armenian
Genocide after Ninety Years
Roger W. Smith

Each genocide provides a foundation for subsequent horrors. Each historical
misrepresentation of efforts to exterminate a particular ethnic group increases the
likelihood that such efforts will be undertaken again in another time and place.
That over one million Armenian men, women, and children could have been
subjected to genocide by the Young Turk government in 1915 and that the world for
many years would not remember is profoundly disturbing. Not to remember the
suffering of the victims is, above all, a failure of humanity and compassion on our
part—a lack of respect and care for fellow humans who have fallen victim to the
ultimate outrage against justice, the death of a people. We do not ordinarily think
of the dead as having rights, but there is at least one they possess: the right to have
the world ‘‘hear and learn the truth about the circumstances of their death.’’1 This
is the one right that, ninety years later, can still be restored to them, and surely we
can do no less.
But genocide is not only a crime against a particular people; it is also a crime
against humankind. Its inherent potential is to distort and alter the very meaning of
‘‘humankind,’’ erasing for all time particular biological and cultural possibilities.
Furthermore, for a particular group to claim for itself a right to determine what groups
are, in effect, human, possessing the right to life, is a threat to the existence of all other
humans. In a period in which genocide has claimed an enormous number of victims,
with no end to the carnage in sight, the prevention of future acts of genocide becomes a
task for all human beings and governments throughout the world.
Yet without remembrance of past examples of genocide, there will be no sense of
urgency in the present, no perceived need to prevent future atrocities. Further, we will
cut ourselves off from the knowledge of the causes and sequences of genocide,
knowledge that might help prevent other peoples from being subjected to this crime
against humanity. The Armenian Genocide is particularly instructive in that it is the
prototype for much of the genocide in the twentieth century and the new millennium.
However, when governments look the other way or actively cover up genocide
out of short-term self-interest, a signal is sent to would-be perpetrators that they
can resolve political and social issues through massive destruction without danger
of outside intervention and, through a continual denial of the atrocities, can expect
the world to forget these events entirely. Not remembering is not a neutral act—not
to remember is to side with the executioners of whole groups and peoples.
The Armenian Genocide, in fact, illuminates with special clarity the dangers
inherent in the political manipulation of truth through distortion, denial, intimidation,
and economic blackmail. In no other instance has a government gone to such extreme
lengths to deny that a massive genocide took place. That democratic governments
(the United States and Israel) have supported Turkey in that effort raises significant
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questions about governmental accountability and the role of citizenship in a world in
which truth increasingly comes in two forms—‘‘official’’ and ‘‘alleged.’’
Finally, by helping us to recognize genocide for the radical evil it is, the Armenian
example makes possible a transformation of consciousness, one that rejects every
manifestation of genocide, including denial, as an instrument of state policy.
Rulers in an earlier age boasted of their annihilation of whole peoples and erected
monuments to commemorate their deeds. More recently, however, denial of genocide
has become the universal strategy of perpetrators. Those who initiate, or otherwise
participate in, genocide typically deny that the events took place, that they bear any
responsibility for the destruction, or that the term ‘‘genocide’’ is applicable to what
occurred. Denial, unchecked, turns politically- imposed death into a ‘‘non-event’’: in
place of words of recognition, indignation, and compassion, there is, with time, only
silence. But denial can enter into the very fabric of a society, so that those who come
after sustain and even intensify the denial begun by the perpetrators. The most
strident and elaborate denial of genocide in history follows this pattern. The Turkish
Republic, established in 1923, may not be guilty of physical genocide against
Armenians, but it continues today to deny that the Young Turk government engaged
in massive destruction of Armenians from 1915 to 1918, resulting in the death of
over one million persons and in the elimination of the Armenian people from its
homeland of nearly 3,000 years.
Turkey, of course, has also made special efforts in recent years to recognize
the Jewish Holocaust and to show compassion for its victims. Yet it has gone to
extraordinary lengths to prevent Jews from learning about the Armenian Genocide.
The tactic of appealing to moral sentiment, self-interest, and fear has not been without
some effect, but Jews might well be suspicious of overtures by a government that is
engaged in the massive fabrication of history while the Holocaust itself is being
subjected to major distortions and, among ‘‘revisionists,’’ its very existence is denied.
Turkey’s goal, however, is to prevent recognition of the fact that what was done to
the Jews and what was done to the Armenians belong to a common category: genocide.
It is especially important for Turkey to stifle this awareness among Jews because for
victims of Nazism to state publicly that Armenians and Jews alike have been subjected
to genocide carries a kind of moral persuasiveness that non-victims may lack, a power
to authenticate the common victimage.
The distortion of history for political ends has significant implications for both the
practice of democracy and the protection of human rights. Whatever else democracy
means, it means that the government is accountable to the public. But if a government
lies to its citizens, acquiesces in the intimidation of scholarship, suppresses freedom of
speech, and tolerates attempts by the successor state to control what is taught in
public schools, we have entered an Orwellian world where power dictates reality: truth
is simply what the government says it is. Under these conditions, accountability is,
at best, a fiction—a subversion of democracy on behalf of a regime unwilling to
confront its country’s past and accept its responsibilities in the present.
Unless genocide is seen as a serious problem, no action will be taken to prevent it.
And if previous examples of genocide are consigned to oblivion, the problem of
prevention (a complicated and difficult task at best) will lack urgency—distraction,
narrow conceptions of interest, and a politics that is blind to the fate of others will take
over. Oblivion, however, contributes neither to the role of ‘‘innocent bystander’’ nor to
neutrality: if one forgets the atrocities against the Armenians, the Cambodians, the
people of East Timor, and others, one is, in effect, rewarding those who have managed
ii
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successfully to use genocide as an instrument of state policy. Oblivion not only reduces
the incentive to action, it cuts us off from the very knowledge that might help us to
anticipate genocidal situations and to act before the destruction of life begins. If we
were aware of the history of genocide in the past ninety years, we might be led to ask,
for a range of cases, How did this genocide begin? What were its warning signs? What
was the sequence of events? How might this genocide have been prevented or, once in
progress, stopped?
The Armenian Genocide is instructive with respect to each of these issues: the
question of political will, the reward for successful genocide, and the extraction of
useful knowledge from the study of crimes against a subject population. Had the
international community focused more on the Armenian case, more active steps to
prevent genocide might have been taken. On the other hand, would-be perpetrators of
genocide have seen what has happened with the Armenians: they think they can
commit genocide and get away with it, and, through denial, eventually erase any
recollection of their crime. And by ignoring the Armenian Genocide, we have lost,
for too long, knowledge important to the prevention of genocide. No one, including the
Jews, foresaw the Holocaust, yet the signs now look inescapable; when mounting
evidence of mass death in extermination centers was presented to the Allies and to the
media of the day, it simply was not believed. This, after all, was the twentieth century;
no government would destroy a people en masse. But, of course, one already had—the
trouble was that the Armenian tragedy had become, within only a few years, an
‘‘unremembered genocide.’’
Recognition and remembrance involve more than regard for truth: they express
compassion for those who have suffered, respect for their dignity as persons, and revolt
against the injustice done to them. In the deepest sense, recognition and remembrance
are related not only to what happened but to questions of who we are, what society
is, and how life and community can be protected against the visions that would
destroy both.
Faced openly, the Armenian Genocide may lead not only to recognition and
remembrance but to a deeper awareness of the nature of genocide. The accounts of
suffering and brutality that are available to us, especially those of women and children
in the caravans of death moving toward the Syrian desert, have the capacity to evoke
in the least sentimental of us a sense of rage and shame at what human beings are
capable of. From such accounts we gain knowledge that is both existential and
cognitive, allowing us to recognize genocide as not only cruelty but radical evil.
In the next stage of awareness one realizes that genocide is a crime not only
against a particular group but against humankind itself. Thus, out of solidarity with
the victims and consciousness of the nature of genocide, one reaches a third stage in
which mass murder as an instrument of state policy is rejected under any and all
circumstances, whether attempted by one’s own government or by those who have no
claim to one’s loyalty. The commitments of the third stage of consciousness have
important consequences, for they imply that one must not lend support under any
circumstances, including denial, to genocide. Further, one must attempt to prevent
genocide where possible and, failing in that, must oppose it to the extent that one
can. Where past genocides are denied, one has a responsibility to point out and
correct such distortions of fact. Where physical genocide ceases but genocide continues
at the cultural level, one must oppose it. Where reparation and restitution for
past acts of genocide are rejected, one has an obligation to seek justice to the extent
possible.
iii
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Faced openly, the Armenian Genocide can also provide knowledge that may assist
directly in saving lives in the future. For the Armenian case is the prototype for much
of the genocide that followed it, especially that arising from what genocide scholars
refer to as the ‘‘plural society.’’ These are societies characterized by sharp divisions
between ethnic, racial, or religious groups; different degrees of power; and inequality
of rights. In such societies, genocide is often resorted to when struggle breaks out
over a demand, real or imaginary, for greater equality, partial autonomy, or complete
separation. Analyzed from the perspective of a theory of pluralistic genocide, the
Armenian example could be particularly suggestive about why a certain type of
genocide (the most common form in recent history) occurs and how it might be
prevented. In a little over a century in which state-sponsored mass murder has already
claimed the lives of some sixty million human beings, the importance of this kind
of inquiry speaks for itself.
Yet the scale and frequency of genocide since 1915 can make us feel that the task of
prevention is futile. Despair stands in the way of action; knowledge leads to a sense of
hopelessness. We cannot bring back to life the dead of the past century or those who
have been victims of political mass murder throughout the ages, but, through
courage as well as knowledge, we can act to bring about a world free from the scourge
of mass killing. In committing ourselves to creating a world of peace, freedom, and
mutual respect, we honor the memory of those who have fallen victim to the ultimate
crime.

Note
1.

Representative Henry Waxman, speaking for House Joint Resolution 132 for a National
Day of Remembrance of the Armenian Genocide of 1915–1923, on 7 August 1987, to
the US House of Representatives, 100th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record 133
(7 August 1987): H7333.
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The ‘‘Odious Scourge’’: Evolving
Interpretations of the Crime of Genocide
William A. Schabas
National University of Ireland, Galway,
and Irish Centre for Human Rights
The crime of genocide was defined in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in reaction to the concept of crimes against
humanity developed at Nuremberg, which insisted upon a connection with
aggressive war in prosecutions for atrocity crimes. The convention stated genocide
could be committed in time of peace, but it also narrowed the scope of the crime
itself to the intentional destruction of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.
Cultural genocide was intentionally excluded. Although the text of the definition
remains unchanged, judicial interpretation has broadened it significantly. Recent
decisions have held that there is no requirement of a state plan or policy. They have
also set out a subjective approach to identification of the protected group. Although
cultural genocide in an extensive sense is still not recognized within the definition,
there is a definite tendency to extend the concept to what is colloquially called
‘‘ethnic cleansing.’’ These broadening definitions influence determinations about
genocides, even those committed many years ago.

When hundreds of thousands of Armenians living within the Ottoman Empire
perished in 1915,1 the governments of France, Great Britain, and Russia responded
with an unprecedented declaration. Dated 24 May 1915, it asserts that ‘‘in the
presence of these new crimes of Turkey against humanity and civilization, the allied
Governments publicly inform the Sublime Porte that they will hold personally
responsible for the said crimes all members of the Ottoman Government as well as
those of its agents who are found to be involved in such massacres.’’2 It has been
suggested that this constitutes the first use, at least within an international law
context, of the term ‘‘crimes against humanity.’’3
According to the Treaty of Sèvres, signed on 10 August 1920, Turkey recognized
the right of trial ‘‘notwithstanding any proceedings or prosecution before a tribunal
in Turkey’’ and was obliged to surrender ‘‘all persons accused of having committed
an act in violation of the laws and customs of war, who are specified either by name
or by rank, office or employment which they held under Turkish authorities.’’4
This formulation is similar to the war crimes clauses in the Treaty of Versailles.5 But
the Treaty of Sèvres contains a major innovation, contemplating prosecution for
the massacres committed within Turkey by the Turkish regime, as well as of war
crimes committed against Allied soldiers or civilians within occupied territories.
Pursuant to article 230,
The Turkish Government undertakes to hand over to the Allied Powers the persons
whose surrender may be required by the latter as being responsible for the massacres
committed during the continuance of the state of war on territory which formed part of
the Turkish Empire on the 1st August, 1914. The Allied Powers reserve to themselves

William A. Schabas, ‘‘The ‘‘Odious Scourge’’: Evolving Interpretations of the Crime of Genocide.’’ Genocide
Studies and Prevention 1, 2 (September 2006): 93–106. ß 2006 Genocide Studies and Prevention.

Genocide Studies and Prevention 1:2 September 2006

the right to designate the Tribunal which shall try the persons so accused, and the
Turkish Government undertakes to recognise such Tribunal. In the event of the League
of Nations having created in sufficient time a Tribunal competent to deal with the said
massacres, the Allied Powers reserve to themselves the right to bring the accused
persons mentioned above before the Tribunal, and the Turkish Government undertakes
equally to recognise such Tribunal.6

Though signed by all the parties, including Turkey, the Treaty of Sèvres was never
ratified and never, therefore, came into force. As Kay Holloway writes, the failure of
the signatories to bring the treaty into effect ‘‘resulted in the abandonment of
thousands of defenceless peoples—Armenians and Greeks—to the fury of their
persecutors, by engendering subsequent holocausts in which the few survivors of the
1915 Armenian massacres perished.’’7 The Treaty of Sèvres was replaced on 24 July
1923 by the Treaty of Lausanne,8 an instrument that contains a ‘‘Declaration of
Amnesty’’ for all offences committed between 1 August 1914 and 20 November 1922.
When the Armenian massacres took place, the term ‘‘genocide’’ did not yet exist.
It was not devised until three decades later, in 1944, by a Polish-Jewish law professor,
Raphael Lemkin, by then living in exile in the United States, in his book Axis Rule in
Occupied Europe.9 Rarely has a neologism had such rapid success.10 Within little more
than a year of its introduction into the English language,11 the word ‘‘genocide’’ was
being used in the indictment of the International Military Tribunal, and within two,
it was the subject of a UN General Assembly resolution.12 But the resolution spoke in
the past tense, describing genocide as crimes that ‘‘have occurred.’’ By the time the
General Assembly had completed its initial standard setting in this area, with the 1948
adoption of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (UNCG), ‘‘genocide’’ had a detailed and quite technical definition as a crime
against the law of nations. The preamble of that instrument recognizes ‘‘that at all
periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity.’’ Genocide is
described as ‘‘the odious scourge.’’13

‘‘Crimes against Humanity’’ or ‘‘Genocide’’
When the term ‘‘crimes against humanity’’ was initially used by the Allies in 1915 to
describe the Armenian massacres, it had no recognized definition. In 1945, the London
Conference, composed of the four victorious powers (the United States, France,
the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union), codified the term as a basis for the
prosecution of Nazi criminals. They defined it as follows:
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population,
before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in
execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,
whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the court where perpetrated.14

The term was meant to cover atrocities committed within Germany against
Germans, as distinction from war crimes, which were committed against non-German
combatants or against civilians in occupied territories. The concept of ‘‘war crimes’’
had long been recognized as customary international law and was codified in the
regulations annexed to the fourth Hague Convention of 1907.15 It was more than
adequate to deal with the atrocities committed by the Nazis in occupied territories. But
the idea that a government and its own officials could be held responsible for atrocities
committed within their own borders against their own nationals was a bold leap
forward in international law. This helps us to understand the guarded remarks of US
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Secretary of State Robert Lansing, who, in 1915, admitted what he called the ‘‘more or
less justifiable’’ right of the Turkish government to deport the Armenians to the extent
that they lived ‘‘within the zone of military operations.’’ But, he said,
it was not to my mind the deportation which was objectionable but the horrible
brutality which attended its execution. It is one of the blackest pages in the history of
this war, and I think we were fully justified in intervening as we did on behalf of the
wretched people, even though they were Turkish subjects.16

In 1945, although the victorious great powers accepted that the post-war
prosecutions should include crimes committed within Germany against German
civilians, they were nervous about the extent of the concept of ‘‘crimes against
humanity,’’ because, in recognizing that application of international law to atrocities
committed against a state’s own civilian population, they left themselves vulnerable
to eventual prosecution as well. At the time, lynching of African-Americans was
relatively widespread within the United States, and several American jurisdictions
imposed a form of apartheid whose features are well known. The British and the
French, with their colonial territories in Africa and Asia, and the Soviets, who had just
deported millions from Chechnya and Ingushetia, were similarly exposed. For this
reason, the four parties at the London Conference imposed what has come to be known
as the ‘‘nexus,’’ namely, a requirement that crimes against humanity be committed
‘‘in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.’’ Consequently,
crimes against humanity, as defined at Nuremberg, could be committed only within
the context of war crimes or crimes against peace. They could not, pursuant to the
definition, be committed in peacetime.17
Robert Jackson, the head of the US delegation at the London Conference, speaking
of the proposed crime of ‘‘atrocities, persecutions, and deportations on political, racial
or religious grounds’’ (this was how the concept of ‘‘crimes against humanity’’ was first
identified in the debates), revealed the lingering concerns of his government:
Ordinarily we do not consider that the acts of a government toward its own citizens
warrant our interference. We have some regrettable circumstances at times in our own
country in which minorities are unfairly treated. We think it is justifiable that we
interfere or attempt to bring retribution to individuals or to states only because the
concentration camps and the deportations were in pursuance of a common plan or
enterprise of making an unjust or illegal war in which we became involved. We see no
other basis on which we are justified in reaching the atrocities which were committed
inside Germany, under German law, or even in violation of German law, by authorities
of the German state.18

The International Military Tribunal, sitting at Nuremberg in 1945 and 1946,
confirmed the limited scope of crimes against humanity in its final judgment.
Although there was frequent reference to the preparations for the war and to the Nazi
atrocities committed in the early years of the Third Reich, no conviction was registered
for any act committed prior to 1 September 1939.19 Despite what has sometimes been
suggested as an ambiguity in the Nuremberg Charter, the judges of the International
Military Tribunal were faithful to the intent of the drafters. They entrenched the
nexus between crimes against humanity and aggressive war.

Defining Genocide
Dissatisfaction and frustration with this limited concept of ‘‘crimes against humanity’’
emerged in the final months of 1946, within days of the judgment at Nuremberg.
The initiatives came from states in what would later be called the Third World,
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specifically India, Cuba, Panama, and Saudi Arabia. Unlike the great powers, who
feared that a broad scope for the term ‘‘crimes against humanity’’ might ultimately
rebound to challenge repressive acts committed by them within their far-flung
empires, the vulnerable emerging states of the underdeveloped world contemplated
an instrument that would protect them. For the latter, it was a priority to recognize
international criminalization of atrocities in peacetime, that is, applicable during
the banal everyday reality of colonial and postcolonial societies. They sought
and obtained this recognition, but only for a more narrowly described form of
crime against humanity: genocide. Article II of the 1948 UNCG defines genocide
as follows:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,
as such:
(a)

Killing members of the group;

(b)

Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

(c)

Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;

(d)

Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

(e)

Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

This was not the first attempt to define the term. In 1944, Lemkin had proposed
the following definition:
a co-ordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential
foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups
themselves. The objective of such a plan would be disintegration of the political and
social institutions of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic
existence of national groups and the destruction of the personal security, liberty,
health, dignity and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups. Genocide
is directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed
against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national
group.20

In a sense, Lemkin’s definition is narrow, in that it addresses crimes directed against
‘‘national groups’’ rather than against ‘‘groups’’ in general. At the same time,
it is broad, to the extent that it contemplates not only physical genocide but also
acts aimed at destroying the culture and livelihood of the group.
When Cuba, India, and Panama proposed that the question of genocide be put on
the agenda of the first session of the UN General Assembly, in late 1946,21 they did not
have a full-blown definition to suggest. Their draft resolution states that ‘‘genocide is a
denial of the right to existence of entire human groups in the same way as homicide is
the denial of the right to live for individual human beings.’’22 The result of this
initiative, Resolution 96(I), adopted on 11 December 1946, went somewhat further in
defining the crime:
Genocide is a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, as homicide is the
denial of the right to live of individual human beings; such denial of the right of
existence shocks the conscience of mankind, results in great losses to humanity in the
form of cultural and other contributions represented by these human groups, and is
contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations. Many instances
of such crimes of genocide have occurred when racial, religious, political and other
groups have been destroyed, entirely or in part . . .23
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These efforts at definition were taken into account during the subsequent work of
drafting the UNCG, but none was adopted. Lemkin’s emphasis on what would be
called ‘‘cultural genocide,’’ that is, the destruction of the group’s institutions rather
than of its physical existence, was bluntly dismissed,24 although a shadow of the idea
reappeared in the final version, which lists the forcible transfer of children from one
group to the other as a punishable act.25 As for the 1946 resolution of the General
Assembly, its inclusion of political groups was not reaffirmed. The result, in Article II
of the 1948 convention, is a definition that is exceedingly narrow. Arguably, it covers
only physical (and biological) destruction, with the minor exception of transferring
children. Moreover, the enumeration of targeted groups is limited to four cognate
concepts: race, religion, ethnicity, and nationality. For example, political and ‘‘other’’
groups are excluded, a tragic ‘‘blind spot’’ according to some critics.26 Other
commentators have proposed new definitions in order to enlarge the scope of the
term, especially the list of protected groups; among them are Stefan Glaser,27 Israel W.
Charny,28 Vahakn Dadrian,29 Helen Fein,30 and Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn.31
The most extreme position applies the term ‘‘genocide’’ to any and all groups.
According to Pieter Drost, one of the early advocates of this view, ‘‘a convention on
genocide cannot effectively contribute to the protection of certain described minorities
when it is limited to particular defined groups . . . It serves no purpose to restrict
international legal protection to some groups; firstly, because the protected members
always belong at the same time to other unprotected groups.’’32
This is not, however, the course that international law has followed. The 1948
definition has stood the test of time. Recently, it was included without significant
change in such instruments as the statutes of the ad hoc criminal tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda,33 the International Law Commission’s Code of Crimes
against the Peace and Security of Mankind,34 and the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court.35 Implementing legislation of the Rome Statute adopted
in many countries has confirmed the dominance of the 1948 definition in national
criminal law as well. To a large extent, the push to amend the definition became less
important with the parallel evolution in the definition of crimes against humanity,
principally in its extension to atrocities committed during peacetime. But if the
definition of genocide has remained unchanged, in recent years its interpretation has
undergone a process of considerable dynamism and radical evolution.

The Evolving Definition of Genocide
The decisions of the Israeli courts in Eichmann were the only significant judicial
interpretations of the definition in the 1948 UNCG for nearly five decades.36 On
4 September 1998, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) issued its
first major judgment, convicting the bourgmestre of Taba commune of genocide for his
role in the 1994 slaughter of Tutsi civilians, including the systematic rape of women
and girls.37 Many similar judgments were to follow, as one by one the architects of
the 1994 genocide were brought to book. The case law of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) developed more slowly, to a large extent
because of a cautious policy on the part of the prosecutor in the indictment of suspects
for genocide, in addition to the ubiquitous counts of crimes against humanity and
war crimes. The hesitation was not misguided, because, of the handful of ICTY
prosecutions that proceeded in which genocide has been alleged, the majority has
resulted in acquittals on that count.38 But even the acquittals have provided important
judicial guidance as to the parameters of the concept. In August 2001, an ICTY Trial
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Chamber registered a first conviction for genocide, condemning a Bosnian Serb general
who had participated, albeit in a secondary role, in the massacre of 7,000 Muslim men
and boys at Srebrenica in July 1995.39 The conviction was subsequently upheld on
appeal.40 In January 2005, an ICTY Trial Chamber issued the second conviction for
genocide in what is arguably the most expansive interpretation yet.41 This now
relatively rich reservoir of judicial interpretation of the definition of genocide indicates
a tendency to enlarge the scope of the crime so as to cover cases of ‘‘ethnic cleansing,’’
which some jurists might think is better described under the rubric of ‘‘crimes against
humanity.’’ This trend toward a large and liberal interpretation may ultimately dilute
the terrible stigma that is attached to the crime of genocide. At the same time, it can
only complicate the attempts of those who attempt to challenge the use of the term
‘‘genocide’’ to characterize the 1915 massacres of the Armenian minority within
Turkey.

State Plan or Policy
It may seem self-evident that genocide cannot be committed without the existence of a
state plan or policy to physically exterminate the targeted group. Certainly, in the
cases of all three of the major genocides of the twentieth century—those of the
Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, the Jews in occupied Europe, and the Rwandan
Tutsi—there is ample evidence of and little argument about the role played by the
state. Nevertheless, if this factor is implicit in the definition in the 1948 convention,
nothing in the text actually requires it. The ICTY has ruled that proof of a plan or
policy is not a legal ingredient of the crime of genocide. The Appeals Chamber has
noted, nevertheless, that ‘‘in the context of proving specific intent, the existence of a
plan or policy may become an important factor in most cases. The evidence may be
consistent with the existence of a plan or policy, or may even show such existence, and
the existence of a plan or policy may facilitate proof of the crime.’’42 Thus, at least
theoretically, an individual acting alone, without any state involvement, may still
perpetrate the crime of genocide, provided that he or she intends to destroy a protected
group in whole or in part.

Groups Protected
In Akayesu, the ICTR provided an imaginative and somewhat radical construction of
the groups protected by the 1948 definition, which uses the adjectives ‘‘national,
ethnical, racial or religious.’’ Concerned that none of the four terms of the definition
might apply to Rwanda’s Tutsi minority, the principal victim of the 1994 atrocities, the
tribunal concluded that the UNCG could still extend to certain other groups, although
their precise definition was elusive. Pledging fidelity to the convention’s drafters,
the Akayesu judgment declares,
On reading through the travaux pre´paratoires of the Genocide Convention (Summary
Records of the meetings of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly,
21 September–10 December 1948, Official Records of the General Assembly), it appears
that the crime of genocide was allegedly perceived as targeting only ‘‘stable’’ groups,
constituted in a permanent fashion and membership of which is determined by birth,
with the exclusion of the more ‘‘mobile’’ groups which one joins through individual
voluntary commitment, such as political and economic groups. Therefore, a common
criterion in the four types of groups protected by the Genocide Convention is that
membership in such groups would seem to be normally not challengeable by its
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members, who belong to it automatically, by birth, in a continuous and often
irremediable manner.

The Trial Chamber continues,
Moreover, the Chamber considered whether the groups protected by the Genocide
Convention, echoed in Article 2 of the Statute, should be limited to only the four groups
expressly mentioned and whether they should not also include any group which is
stable and permanent like the said four groups. In other words, the question that arises
is whether it would be impossible to punish the physical destruction of a group as such
under the Genocide Convention, if the said group, although stable and membership is
by birth, does not meet the definition of any one of the four groups expressly protected
by the Genocide Convention. In the opinion of the Chamber, it is particularly important
to respect the intention of the drafters of the Genocide Convention, which according to
the travaux pre´paratoires, was patently to ensure the protection of any stable and
permanent group.43

The same ICTR chamber, in a subsequent decision, seems to hedge its remarks
somewhat: ‘‘It appears from a reading of the travaux pre´paratoires of the Genocide
Convention that certain groups, such as political and economic groups have been
excluded from the protected groups, because they are considered to be ‘‘mobile groups’’
which one joins through individual, political commitment. That would seem to suggest
a contrario that the Convention was presumably intended to cover relatively stable
and permanent groups.’’44
This interpretation appeared to many at the time to be creative and progressive,
but it has not been confirmed by the Appeals Chambers of the tribunals, and it looks
increasingly idiosyncratic as time goes by. Nevertheless, other authorities confirm
that the list of groups in the UNCG definition should receive a large and liberal
interpretation. In January 2005, a non-judicial commission of inquiry established by
the United Nations to investigate allegations of genocide in Darfur, in western
Sudan, wrote that ‘‘the principle of interpretation of international rules whereby one
should give such rules their maximum effect (principle of effectiveness, also expressed
by the Latin maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat) suggests that the rules
on genocide should be construed in such a manner as to give them their maximum
legal effects.’’45

‘‘In whole or in part’’
The 1948 definition of genocide speaks of the destruction of a group ‘‘in whole or in
part.’’ It was a noble attempt by the drafters to reach consensus, but in reality the
General Assembly used ambiguous terms and left their clarification to judges in
subsequent prosecutions. The 1995 Srebrenica massacre confronted the ICTY with the
need to expound upon the meaning of ‘‘in whole or in part.’’ According to the ICTY
Appeals Chamber, a perpetrator of genocide must intend to destroy a substantial part
of the group. The chamber explains,
The determination of when the targeted part is substantial enough to meet this
requirement may involve a number of considerations. The numeric size of the targeted
part of the group is the necessary and important starting point, though not in all cases
the ending point of the inquiry. The number of individuals targeted should be evaluated
not only in absolute terms, but also in relation to the overall size of the entire group.
In addition to the numeric size of the targeted portion, its prominence within the group
can be a useful consideration. If a specific part of the group is emblematic of the overall
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group, or is essential to its survival, that may support a finding that the part qualifies
as substantial.46

The Appeals Chamber notes that the Bosnian Muslim population in Srebrenica, or the
Bosnian Muslims of Eastern Bosnia, a group estimated to comprise about 40,000
people, met this definition. Though numerically not very significant compared to the
Bosnian Muslim population as a whole, it occupied a strategic location and was thus
key to the survival of the Bosnian Muslim nation as a whole.47

Ethnic Cleansing
The expression ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ may have been used for the first time immediately
after World War II by Poles and Czechs intending to ‘‘purify’’ their countries of
Germans and Ukrainians. But if this is the case, the language is the direct descendant
of expressions used by the Nazis in their racial ‘‘hygiene’’ programs. The term for the
latter was sauberung (‘‘cleaning’’), and their goal was to make Germany territory
judenrein, that is, clean of Jews.48 ‘‘Ethnic cleansing’’ resurfaced in 1981 in Yugoslav
media accounts of the establishment of ‘‘ethnically clean territories’’ in Kosovo.49 The
term entered the international vocabulary in 1992 when it was used to describe
policies pursued by the various parties to the Yugoslav conflict in order to create
ethnically homogeneous territories.50 There have been several attempts at definition.
According to the Security Council’s Commission of Experts on violations of
humanitarian law during the Yugoslav war, ‘‘the expression ‘ethnic cleansing’ is
relatively new. Considered in the context of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia,
‘ethnic cleansing’ means rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or
intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area.’’51 The commission
considered techniques of ethnic cleansing to include murder, torture, arbitrary arrest
and detention, extrajudicial executions, sexual assault, confinement of civilian
populations in ghetto areas, forcible removal, displacement and deportation of
civilian populations, deliberate military attacks or threats of attacks on civilians
and civilian areas, and wanton destruction of property.52
In Krstic´, the ICTY Trial Chamber said ‘‘there are obvious similarities between a
genocidal policy and the policy commonly known as ‘ethnic cleansing.’’’53 The Trial
Chamber seemed to understand that it was necessary to expand the scope of the term
‘‘destroy’’ in the introductory sentence, or chapeau, of the definition of genocide in
order to cover ‘‘acts that involved cultural and other non-physical forms of group
destruction.’’54 But the judgment also states,
Customary international law limits the definition of genocide to those acts seeking the
physical or biological destruction of all or part of the group. An enterprise attacking
only the cultural or sociological characteristics of a human group in order to annihilate
these elements which give to that group its own identity distinct from the rest of the
community would not fall under the definition of genocide.55

The Appeals Chamber appeared to endorse this approach.56
Nevertheless, in a very recent decision, another trial chamber has ruled that
genocide occurs when there is deportation or some other forced displacement of
populations, even in the absence of evidence of a plan for physical extermination.
Although the Srebrenica massacre involved the summary execution of approximately
7,000 men and boys, the women, children, and elderly were moved from the area
in buses, raising questions about whether the Bosnian Serb forces really intended
the physical extermination of the entire group or whether they only sought to
eliminate persons likely to be enemy combatants. A massacre of prisoners would not,
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in and of itself, amount to genocide. In Blagojevic´, the ICTY Trial Chamber concluded
that the forced displacement of women, children, and elderly people amounted to
genocide:
The Trial Chamber is convinced that the forced displacement of women, children,
and elderly people was itself a traumatic experience, which, in the circumstances of this
case, reaches the requisite level of causing serious mental harm under Article 4(2)(b) of
the Statute. The forced displacement began with the Bosnian Muslim population
fleeing from the enclave after a five-day military offensive, while being shot at as they
moved from Srebrenica town to Potočari in search of refuge from the fighting. Leaving
their homes and possessions, the Bosnian Muslims did so after determining that it was
simply impossible to remain safe in Srebrenica town . . . Having left Srebrenica to escape
from the Bosnian Serbs, the Bosnian Muslim population saw that they must move
farther than Potočari to be safe. As they boarded the buses, without being asked even
for their name, the Bosnian Muslims saw the smoke from their homes being burned
and knew that this was not a temporary displacement for their immediate safety.
Rather, this displacement was a critical step in achieving the ultimate objective of the
attack on the Srebrenica enclave to eliminate the Bosnian Muslim population from
the enclave.57

The Trial Chamber concludes the discussion of this point by stating that ‘‘the
perpetrators intended that the forcible transfer, and the way it was carried out, would
cause serious mental harm to the victims’’ and that this fulfills the requirements of
Article II of the 1948 definition, set out without significant change in Article 4(2) of the
ICTY Statute.58

Complicity in Genocide
The ad hoc tribunals have addressed cases in which senior officials played a secondary
role in genocidal acts but there were doubts that these people actually intended to
destroy the group. In prosecuting these officials as accomplices rather than principal
perpetrators, the ICTY and ICTR Appeals Chambers have held that a conviction may
be entered for ‘‘aiding and abetting’’ genocide,59 or for ‘‘complicity’’ in genocide,60 even
in the absence of sufficient evidence that the accused person possessed criminal intent
to commit genocide. These decisions are not exactly elegant in their legal reasoning,
and they strongly hint at compromises among a divided bench. Nevertheless, they
now stand as the state of the law, and they provide a further demonstration of the
general trend toward enlargement of the definition of genocide that appears in
the 1948 UNCG.
The ICTY Appeals Chamber has also found that it is possible to commit genocide as
part of a ‘‘joint criminal enterprise.’’ The expression ‘‘joint criminal enterprise’’ is used
to describe the liability of an individual who participates in a criminal activity with
others. As a member of this ‘‘joint criminal enterprise,’’ the accused may be convicted of
acts that he or she did not actually intend, to the extent that these were reasonably
foreseeable consequences of the criminal activity. To some judges, it appeared that a
conviction for genocide, which requires proof that the offender committed acts ‘‘with
intent to destroy’’ the group, in whole or in part, was theoretically incompatible with
the entire concept of the joint criminal enterprise.61 However, the prosecutor
successfully challenged one of these rulings, and the ICTY Appeals Chamber has
established that convictions for genocide are possible under the ‘‘joint criminal
enterprise’’ mode of liability.62
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Conclusions
The definition of genocide adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1948
represents a dilution of a relatively broad concept proposed by Raphael Lemkin four
years earlier. The narrowness of the definition must be appreciated in the context of
the time. States were being asked to accept an unprecedented encroachment on their
sovereignty, namely, the existence of international obligations with respect to their
treatment of civilians of their own nationality within their own borders. The only
comparable commitments with respect to human-rights abuses committed in peacetime are the 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime of Apartheid63 and the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.64 Both apartheid and torture may
constitute crimes against humanity, but a more general undertaking with respect to
crimes against humanity in their broad sense had to wait until 1998, with the adoption
of the Rome Statute.
Had the Nuremberg trial taken a larger view of crimes against humanity by
acknowledging that they could be committed in peacetime as well as in wartime, there
might never have been a UNCG. Work on that convention was largely an initiative to
correct the lacuna in the Nuremberg definition of crimes against humanity. But the
tension that existed between genocide and crimes against humanity in the post-war
years no longer exists, given recognition under contemporary international law that
crimes against humanity, like genocide, may be committed in time of peace.
Debates about historic cases of genocide need to be reassessed in light of evolving
case law. In a series of recent decisions, the international criminal tribunals have
broadened the reach of the 1948 definition; it has been held to apply to a somewhat
more expansive category of groups than is listed in the text of the definition. No proof
of state involvement, or of a policy or plan, is necessary to establish that genocide has
been committed; it may even be perpetrated by an individual acting alone. As for those
who participate in the crime of genocide, prosecutors need not establish that they
actually had a genocidal intent, as long as they were in some way accomplices to
the crime. Finally, and perhaps most importantly of all, the concept of genocide has
been extended to acts that compromise the survival of a group, such as forced
displacements, even when there are doubts about the intent to physically exterminate
the group.
None of this can be particularly comforting to those who have tried to deny that the
massacres of Armenians within Turkey in 1915 constituted one of the great genocides
of the twentieth century.
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The Agency of ‘‘Triggering Mechanisms’’
as a Factor in the Organization of the
Genocide Against the Armenians of
Kayseri District
Vahakn N. Dadrian
Zoryan Institute
Using the notion of a ‘‘triggering mechanism’’ as a guidepost, this article details the
sequence of events precipitated by the accidental explosion of a bomb a young
Armenian was tinkering with in anticipation of a new round of massacres he hoped
to obviate. The ensuing massive and indiscriminate arrests throughout the length
and breadth of the district, the attendant use of a variety of methods of torture, and
the eventual eradication of the bulk of the district’s Armenian population through
courts-martial, followed by serial executions through hanging, deportation, and
massacre, are depicted and analyzed to demonstrate the exterminatory thrust
of the ensemble of the counter-active governmental measures. The study concludes
that the accidental explosion of the bomb was a welcome opportunity for the
perpetrators, directed by the local leaders of the monolithic political party, the
Committee for Union and Progress (CUP), to proceed with their pre-existing
germinal plan of regional genocide.

Introduction
Generally, in conflictual intergroup relations, powerful perpetrators facing relatively
weak victims tend to rely on a number of standard techniques to either rationalize or
justify their criminal acts. One such technique is provocation.1 The victims’ patience
and endurance is insidiously taxed to the limit, forcing them, if possible, to resist
the provocation effectively. Another technique relates to the sudden commission of
a violent act by a member of the victim group, which signals ominous intent to the
perpetrator group and is seized by it as a pretext for repression. Absent an existing and
simmering conflict between these two antithetical groups, the incident, as a rule,
might lend itself to localization and be handled accordingly. But that very simmering
conflict and the advantage of the huge power differential accruing to the potential
perpetrator group favor the latter’s resort to opportunism. Deliberate acts of
provocation by powerful antagonists always involve calculations, seeking favorable
vantage grounds for projected future actions; hence, they are driven by goal-directed
opportunism. Within the context of perpetrator–victim conflicts, such acts of
provocation tend to acquire a circular thrust that is propelled by the perpetrator.
By way of aggressive and threatening behavior, the potential perpetrator intentionally
produces a level of provocation strong enough to drive the potential victim to respond,
in turn, in a way that is conveniently defined by the former as provocation. Conditions
of acute crisis in interethnic or international relations afford just such opportunities,
whereby the more powerful party to the conflict can proceed to provoke in order to
be provoked subsequently. In brief, the welcome eruption of a crisis combines with
Vahakn N. Dadrian, ‘‘The Agency of ‘‘Triggering Mechanisms’’ as a Factor in the Organization of the
Genocide Against the Armenians of Kayseri District.’’ Genocide Studies and Prevention 1, 2 (September
2006): 107–126. ß 2006 Genocide Studies and Prevention.
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the substantial vulnerability of the group with which the precipitator of the crisis is
identified to create the triggering mechanism for a magnified response to it.
The initiation of a genocidal campaign in the Kayseri district exemplifies the
lethal role such triggering mechanisms can play, especially under conditions of
acute international conflict. An outlying district of Ankara province in central Turkey,
at the foot of snow-capped Mt. Erciyas and bestriding the course of Kızılırmäk River
immediately below Sivas, Kayseri first emerged in history as Caesarea when Emperor
Tiberius took possession of Cappadocia in 17 CE. In 1419, Sultan Selim I incorporated
Kayseri into the Ottoman Empire. In this context it is tempting to refer to the
assassination by a Jewish youth of Ernst vom Rath, a third secretary in the German
embassy in Paris, on 7 November 1938. This incident unleashed a violent antiJewish campaign that eventually culminated in the World War II Jewish Holocaust.
Central to that genocidal response was the way the Nazis chose to define the
crisis precipitated by the assassination. An editorial in Völkischer Beobachter, the
organ of Nazi Propaganda Minister Joseph Göbbels, declared on 9 November 1938,
one day after the death of Rath, ‘‘The German people are entitled to identify the
Jews in Germany with this crime.’’ Three days later at a conclave attended by
top Nazi leaders, including Göbbels, Reinhard Heydrich, Interior Minister Wilhelm
Frick, and Economics Minister Walther Funk, Herman Göring, who was chairing
the meeting, made a dramatic announcement. Göring declared that in the course of
lengthy discussions that he had held with Hitler for two days following the antiJewish Kristallnacht riots of 10 November, Hitler had issued an order ‘‘requesting that
the Jewish question be now, once and for all, coordinated or solved one way or
another.’’2 Even though the Final Solution (Endlösung) would require nearly three
more years to evolve and to materialize, the incident of the assassination helped
precipitate matters not only in terms of administrative policies but also in terms
of public agitation and incitement. The Nazi co-optation of the German public
is intimately linked with the broader functions of the triggering mechanism at
issue here.
Within this general purview, this study proposes to examine the role of a similar
incident in the precipitation of cataclysmic events that entailed the violent liquidation
of the entire Armenian population of the Kayseri district during World War I. Driven
by personal revenge, like the Jewish youth mentioned above, a young Armenian
who had witnessed the slaughter of his relatives during the Sultan Abdul Hamit-era
massacres was tinkering with a homemade bomb when it suddenly and prematurely
exploded, simultaneously killing him and creating havoc in his Armenian neighborhood. The severity of the authorities’ response is revealed in the draconian measures
they instituted against the entire Armenian population of the district. Everek,
the town where the bomb went off, was but a sub-unit of that district. The mass arrest,
torture, and execution of hundreds of its Armenian inhabitants, on the one hand,
and the murderous deportation of the rest of district’s Armenian population, on the
other, formed part of these measures. The focus of this study will be on assembling
the details of the retaliatory response by the authorities with a view to demonstrating
the underlying genocidal thrust and aim.

Kayseri’s Governmental Set-Up and the Distribution
of Its Armenian Population
Until its final dissolution in 1923, when the new Turkish Republic was inaugurated,
the Ottoman Empire for centuries was run on a system of provincial administration
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whose level and degree of control by a central authority often depended upon the
nature of that authority. The more autocratic or despotic the central authority, the
stricter and more pervasive its control proved to be, especially in the area of conflict
with the national minorities that constituted a large segment of the multiethnic
empire.
Because the bulk of the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire was located
in its Asiatic provinces, the organization and function of this Ottoman provincial
administration bore heavily on the type of treatment the empire’s Armenian
population in general, and Kayseri’s in particular, received during the war. It might,
therefore, be useful to provide here a sketch of that administrative system. The highest
civilian authority was vested in a governor-general (vali) who presided over the
governmental affairs of a province (vilayet). The number of provinces constituting the
empire changed often because the empire kept shrinking, fluctuating between twentyeight and thirty-six. The provinces, in turn, were partitioned into districts (liva or
sancak), which were run by district governors (mutassarrif ). The districts were further
divided into counties (kaza) governed by county executives (kaymakam), who, more
often than not, were religious judges (kadi).3 The counties were further subdivided
into townships (nahiye) comprising groups of small rural villages, each of which
encompassed at least twenty families; these were governed by an administrator
(müdir). The smallest administrative unit was the karye, the village, comprising about
forty or fifty houses and administered by a headman (muhtar).
There functioned as an accessory component of this provincial administrative
system, however, an adjunct group of so-called independent districts. The designation
‘‘independent’’ denoted the idea of a status interposed between a province and a district
and connoted that of an administrative link with either a province or a county.4
On 20 April 1914 (a few months before the outbreak of World War I), Kayseri was
granted the status of an independent district5 by Interior Minister and Committee of
Union and Progress (CUP) ruling party boss Mehmet Talât. Still maintaining some
links with the administration of Ankara province, from which it had been detached
and declared independent, Kayseri district comprised four sub-units (i.e., counties):
its capital, Kayseri, plus the other counties of Bünyan, Develi (also called Everek), and
Incesu. Because of their proximity to each other, Develi (or Everek) and Fenese were
often lumped together as twin cities; Armenians mostly used the Everek-Fenese twin
designation. Combined together, these four counties encompassed some 200 sub-units
(i.e., townships and villages) containing a sizeable Armenian population. Altogether,
Kayseri district had ninety-eight villages, twenty-four of which were attached to
the district’s capital, Kayseri.6
According to official Ottoman statistics released in 1914, Kayseri district’s
total Armenian population was 52,192 persons, of whom 48,659 belonged to the
Gregorian-Apostolic Mother Church; 2,018 were Armenian Protestants; and 1,515
were Armenian Catholics.7 Armenian community life was, by and large, organized
around a network of thirty-two churches and thirty-one affiliated parishes.8

Triple-Layered Authority in Wartime Kayseri
As in every other part of the Ottoman Empire, three distinct kinds of authority
held sway in Kayseri during the war. The principal domain, of course, was civilian
provincial administration, the make-up of which is outlined above. A network
composed of a district governor, four county executives, and several administrators
and headmen was in charge of the mundane affairs of the district. Moreover, because
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of the ongoing war and the incidence of martial law, the military had gained a
foothold in the power structure of the entire district. It not only took care of such
matters as recruitment, logistics, and transport but handled two additional
matters that would have grave consequences for the Armenians: exorbitant
requisitions, of all kinds and at all levels, and the administration of military justice
through courts-martial.
The overall authority for all these matters except court-martial devolved
upon Colonel Şahabeddin, the military commander of Kayseri district as well as the
Deputy Commander of the 15th Infantry Division, with headquarters in Kayseri
city. Moreover, Şahabeddin supervised the operations of the sub-units of the region’s
gendarmerie regiment that served as the principal escort-guards of the many
Armenian deportee convoys. Accordingly, he regularly reported on the massacres
attending these rounds of deportation to Colonel Halil Recayi, his superior, who
was also the Deputy Commander of Ankara’s 5th Army Corps, of which Kayseri’s
15th Division was a sub-unit. As to the Military Tribunal sitting in Kayseri city and
serially court-martialing the hundreds of Armenians of the district in the wake of
the explosion, typically it functioned as an ad hoc instrument of military justice.
As to the third component of the structure of authority in Kayseri district, it may
be readily argued that it represented the most potent and, therefore, the most
formidable matrix of power in the entire configuration. This component was the CUP’s
omnipotent party organization, whose superordinate functionaries had, as in other
parts of the provinces, the final say in determining the collective fate of Kayseri’s
Armenians. They were part and parcel of a kind of power structure akin to an iceberg:
its submerged part packed all the power needed to conspire, organize, and execute
mass murder. In this sense they ultimately proved themselves to be the controlling
agents of the direction of the cataclysmic events triggered by the explosion of the bomb
described above. Indeed, acting in tandem with Atıf, Ankara province’s provisional
governor-general, Hüseyin Necati, CUP’s regional functionary, discreetly transmitted
to the district’s civilian authorities that politburo’s inexorable directive: the objective
of the deportations was the annihilation of the deportee population.9
As will be described below, Kayseri district’s governor, Aziz Zekâi (Apaydın),
himself a CUP functionary, did implement this directive when ordering the
exterminatory liquidation of the hundreds of Armenians court-martialed, convicted,
and sentenced to long terms of hard labor and prison—in addition to the fifty-five
sentenced to death by hanging.
As might be expected, because of turf wars, personality conflicts, and other
discordant variables, the relationships of the three power tiers were not always
smooth. Despite the developing frictions, however, they did, in the main, know how to
coordinate their actions in a cooperative spirit. In the final analysis, the supremacy
of CUP party leverage and the iron discipline flowing from it were factors in ensuring
the optimal success of the central goal of annihilation.

Precipitation of the Sweeping Crisis
The crisis in question was set off on 24 February 1915 (11 February according to the
Ottoman calendar in use at that time) by the accidental explosion of a homemade bomb
with which a young Armenian was tinkering in his home. Having migrated to the
United States some years earlier, Kevork Hampartzoumian, also known as Defjian,
had recently returned to his native town of Everek, located some twenty-five miles
south of Kayseri city. A solitary and melancholy youth, he had witnessed the ghastly
110

‘‘Triggering Mechanisms’’ as a Factor in the Organization of the Armenian Genocide

murders of his brother and uncle during the 18 November 1895 massacre, though he
himself had miraculously survived the carnage. It was reported that the fear of
imminent new massacres had agitated him enough to try to equip himself with the
means of ‘‘defensive resistance.’’ The subsequent 1909 Adana massacre and the
intensification of the anti-Armenian campaign in the pre–World War I period served to
amplify these fears. It appears that exasperation and a measure of despair drove
Hampartzoumian to a recourse that would soon prove as reckless as it was perilous
for the district’s Armenian population. Severely wounded and in excruciating pain,
he eventually succumbed to his injuries.10
Given the solitary and secretive nature of Hampartzoumian’s venture, the
Armenians of the town were both frightened and surprised by the incident. Aware of
the enormous danger hovering over the Armenian community as a whole, its leaders,
for a very brief period, succeeded in hushing up the incident. Even Adil Bey, the
kaymakam on duty in Everek, went along with this initiative, as he did not consider
the matter of critical importance, given the law-abiding reputation and record of the
town’s Armenian population. The understanding was that a reckless individual with
no organizational ties or support whatsoever had indulged in a dangerous adventure.
Nevertheless, it did not take very long for the district’s central authorities to learn
about the explosion, and they intervened immediately and with a vengeance.
A handyman employed in the local bakery (by a remarkable coincidence, the only
Turk residing in that Armenian neighborhood) contacted higher authorities to inform
them about the explosion. The investigation that ensued resulted in an official report,
a copy of which was relayed to Interior Minister Talât. The die was cast. Everek’s
kaymakam was immediately dismissed and was replaced by Salihzeki, who was not
only his deputy but also the kaymakam of the neighboring smaller town of Incesu.
After taking up his position on 4 March 1915, Salihzeki launched a fierce and sweeping
investigation. Starting with the arrest of the bomb-maker’s family members, relatives,
and even casual acquaintances, and continuing with the arrest of Armenians who had
returned from America for short visits, Salihzeki extended the number of arrests to
include hundreds of other Armenians in neighboring villages and towns, the district’s
capital city, and other major cities of the empire, including its capital, Constantinople.
The Armenians arrested were from all walks of life, including many priests and even
the prominent Armenian parliamentarian Mourad (Hampartzoum Boyajian), a
member of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies, the parliament’s lower house—in
total disregard of his parliamentary immunity.
What followed was an intense regime of torture manifested in various forms. As
one survivor averred, Everek’s prison was transformed into ‘‘Dante’s Inferno.’’11
Within a short time the other prisons of the district, such as Incesu, Çomakhlu, and
especially the dungeon of Cafer Bey police station in the district’s capital, Kayseri city,
followed suit.12 Ostensibly, the main purpose of this regime of terror was to extract
as many confessions as possible regarding substantial caches of arms, weapons, and
explosives. The main technique was the gradual intensification of pain. Using the
bastinado method, for example, 300 slashes would be administered to the soles of the
victim’s feet; in cases of sustained resistance and recalcitrance, however, that number
would be doubled. Among the victims were some who lost their minds, while others
committed suicide in prison and still others were crippled beyond repair. The torture of
Deputy Mourad is noteworthy in this respect:
Thrown to the ground, he was administered slashes to his feet, his back, his ribs until
such time as, unconscious, he would end up resembling a cadaver. After having been
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revived through the application of cold water, he vainly would be warned—and the
tortures would be resumed and continued for three days, until his ravaged body was
thrown into the prison’s hospital . . . Mourad was adamant about his rights and his
refusal to yield to violence.13

His superhuman endurance led one of the chieftains of the brigand bands participating
in the massacre of Kayseri’s Armenian population to express his admiration of such
uncommon intrepidity.14
An ancillary and perhaps equally potent driving force in the resort to torture was
the insistence of Salihzeki and his cohorts on obtaining lists and names of presumed
accomplices. In one case, the subject, unable to endure
the torture hour and after hour, for so many days on end, that . . . blurted out,
‘‘Yes, that is the way it was.’’ But this confession did not bring respite. The
tortures continued. The aim was to get [him] to reveal the names of
accomplices . . . The resulting brutality knew no bounds. At one point he became so
exasperated that he exploded. ‘‘Take me to him [Salihzeki]. I have things to confess.’’
When the police ushered him into the latter’s room, he smashed one of the windows
with his fist, and with a morsel of broken glass slashed his own stomach and fell
down unconscious.15

When the same procedure similarly failed to elicit information from another subject,
likewise totally unconnected with the bomb and related acts of conspiracy, Salihzeki,
unable to contain his frustration and rage, ‘‘had the prisoner bound up hands and feet
and had him thrown from the prison roof to the cobblestone yard below.’’16
The sequence of events demonstrated nevertheless that Everek’s governor had a
plan of his own. He was determined to show his superiors—thereby receiving the
requisite accolades and rewards—that he had uncovered a widespread Armenian
conspiracy to sabotage the Ottoman-Turkish war effort in pursuit of certain goals
set forth by the two Armenian political parties, the Hunchaks and the Dashnaks.17
The crisis precipitated by the above-described explosion afforded wide-ranging
opportunities to pursue and successfully carry out this agenda. Foremost among
these opportunities was the atmosphere of pervasive hostility directed against the
Armenians, which had been prevalent in the district since before World War I. As
one historian of Kayseri Armenians points out, with the outbreak of World War I,
the Turkish authorities began doing everything they could to provoke the Armenians
of Kayseri:
In order to agitate the Turkish mobs, they needed to disseminate the story of an
Armenian uprising. The ruinous requisitions, the brutal treatment of Armenian
conscripts, the scandalous methods of house searches, and the severity of attendant
punitive methods had pushed the victim population to paralyzing despair. We, the
Armenians, were bracing ourselves for the terrible fate awaiting us.18

However, the conditions described above were necessary but not sufficient for the
implementation of the plan of wholesale liquidation of the district’s Armenian
population. Other contingencies also need to be considered.

The Devastating Role of Armenian Informers
One of these contingencies involved the successful co-optation of Armenian informers.
Given religious, linguistic, and related cultural differences that often served to
maintain cleavages between Armenian and Turkish communities, the authorities had
very little access to the inner workings of Armenian community life. But the terror
applied in Everek by Salihzeki, the new kaymakam, soon yielded unexpected results.
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Two prominent local Armenians were co-opted to serve as informers for Salihzeki.
In order to enshrine their loyalty and their fidelity to the state, both of them converted
to Islam and adopted Turkish names.19
With the active and eager help of these two convert-informers, the authorities
first obtained a list of all members of Kayseri district’s Hunchak political party.
They then secured the membership list of the Armenian General Benevolent
Union, an organization solely and entirely dedicated to charity work and, in this
sense, a decidedly apolitical body. Based on the information in these lists, a program
of massive arrests was launched, and it was carried out with inexorable severity.
The grip of the arrests extended to such other villages as Incesu, Çomakhlu,
and Tomarza and, inevitably and ultimately, to Kayseri city itself. Hundreds of
Armenians from all walks of life were taken into custody and, without any formalities
or even the pretense of formalities, were cast into the dungeons of the district’s
various prisons.
This act of co-optation was replicated in Kayseri city itself when the head of
that city’s Hunchak party agreed to hand over to the authorities all the party’s records
and registers. Because the Hunchak party had been recognized by the Ottoman
government as a legitimate political party, its leadership, unlike that of the rival
Dashnak party, did not have a sense of urgency relative to the need for secrecy and
concealment. Contrary to expectations, however, the authorities proceeded to arrest
not only the officially registered members of the Hunchak party but also their male
and female relatives, including their children.20 They were assisted in this task by
three additional informers in Kayseri.21
The fate of all those taken into custody was in fact sealed when the two original
informers from Everek signed a statement declaring that there was a definite plan of
Armenian conspiracy. Its aim was, they asserted, an uprising to be spearheaded by
the leaders of the two political parties, Hunchak and Dashnak. This declaration
prompted Salihzeki to push for the adoption by the Turkish government of a radical
policy of persecution and subsequently the framing of a major criminal charge against
the Armenians. The essence of the accusation was that the caches of arms uncovered
during the investigation were intended for an organized rebellion against the
government.22
Despite their persistent and massive investigations, however, the authorities could
not move beyond the discovery of arms caches to establish, by any credible or
substantive evidence, that there was any plan of insurgency on the part of any
Armenian faction or party. Nor could they establish any link at all between the
incident of the bomb and either of the political parties. Perhaps the most bizarre and
wanton aspect of the anti-Armenian campaign at this stage was the arrest and torture
of multitudes of Armenians, including women and children, who had absolutely no
connection with politics, let alone with conspiracy of any sort. But as the discussion
below will indicate, these draconian measures were the signposts of an insidious
covert scheme targeting the entire Armenian population of the district.

Escalated Incrimination: The Government Plants Bombs
in Armenian Residences
The government’s firm resolve to implicate Armenians collectively in the discovery
of concealed caches of arms and explosives was pursued in the twin cities of EverekFenese with such ferocity that some Armenians resorted to an unusual step: they
began to pay exorbitant prices to Turkish neighbors for handguns, only to surrender
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the weapons to the authorities tormenting them.23 The authorities in Kayseri city,
emulating the procedures followed in the twin cities, proved equally ferocious. Like
Salihzeki, they too were trying to impress Interior Minister Talât in Istanbul. But the
value of these acts of overzealousness hinged on tangible results.
Accordingly, A. Midhat, then the mutassarrıf of Kayseri district, embarked
on a plan to secure, one way or another, caches of arms. He approached and persuaded
Bishop Khosrov, the district’s Armenian primate, to have the caches surrendered
in return for ‘‘a benevolent treatment by the government.’’ Enthused by this
proposal, the bishop convened the district’s Armenian Provincial Council, urging
the delegates to comply. But the two Hunchak and Dashnak leaders, who were
invited to the meeting for consultation, advised against such compliance. They
argued that this was a Turkish trap into which Armenians had fallen time and
again, each time paying dearly as a result. Notwithstanding, the council unanimously
voted for compliance to demonstrate its loyalty to the government. In line with
this attitude, Garabed Camjian, the council’s president, went so far as to threaten
to assist the government in challenging all those who might dare to contravene the
collective will of the Armenian community, as duly represented by the council.24
Nevertheless, for a variety of reasons, the council’s decision could not be carried
out effectively.
Irrespective of all these Armenian efforts to comply with the demands of Turkish
authorities, however, the district’s central government evidently had its own plan.
Straight compliance by the Armenians might disrupt, if not pre-empt, that plan.
Accordingly, a plot was hatched with a view to gravely incriminating the Armenians as
lethal conspirators. The district governor, along with Kayseri’s police chief, Zeki, and,
equally important, CUP’s regional representative, Cemil Yakub, conspired to have a
number of bombs planted in the residence and vineyards of a local Armenian.25 The
ensuing explosions produced the intended results.26
As the Armenians, bewildered and frightened, sought refuge in their homes, the
house where the bomb had been planted was immediately surrounded by prepositioned police and gendarmes, led by the police chief, Zeki. Nothing incriminating
was found in the house, which was thoroughly searched following the explosion. But
the other bombs, planted in the vineyards, were ‘‘discovered.’’ The Turkish mobs,
already aroused by inflammatory stories about the previous bomb explosion in Everek,
were ready to pounce upon the Armenians. A similar scheme was brought to bear
upon the above-mentioned Garabed Camjian, the chairman of Kayseri’s Armenian
Provincial Council (see note 24). Having surreptitiously entered the basement of his
house, a team of policemen planted a bomb and a handgun there. By pre-arrangement,
a second team then proceeded to ‘‘discover’’ these weapons, following a search that
caused the desired pandemonium.27
What is so remarkable about these two men who were so deceitfully incriminated
is that neither was politically active, not to mention involved in anti-Turkish political
activity. As one contemporary author observed of the first case, ‘‘In reality the poor
man was a totally ignorant person, quite indifferent toward national affairs and,
therefore, unaware even of the existence of revolutionary activity.’’28
As Salihzeki had done in Everek, Zeki prepared an invidious report in which this
totally apolitical man was depicted as an integral part of an Armenian conspiracy.
The stage was now set to implement a plan of massive arrests. Because of their
pre-eminence among the arrestees, it is necessary to review briefly the attitudes
and related actions of the district’s Armenian political leaders.
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The Stance of Armenian Political Leaders
The episodes of anti-Armenian massacres predating World War I left their imprint
on many Kayseri Armenians. The main lesson they drew from these episodes
was the realization that defenselessness creates all the conditions of perilous
vulnerability, which, in turn, emboldens potential perpetrators. During the
1894–1896 Sultan Abdul Hamit–era massacres, and subsequently during the 1909
two-tier Adana massacres, which together claimed some 200,000 Armenians, directly
and indirectly, this condition of total vulnerability proved decisive. However, Kayseri
Armenians had sustained relatively minor losses during the November 1895 massacre
and completely averted a similar massacre in 1909 for which ‘‘thousands of
slaughterers in baggy pants armed to the hilt . . . were poised, ready to strike. The
Armenians were not idle, however.’’29 Armenian volunteer squads, likewise armed,
strategically deployed, and ready to die in self-defense, had succeeded in deterring the
potential massacrers.
Thus, the memory of these historical experiences had prompted a significant
number of Kayseri Armenians, including members of the two political parties, to
procure caches of arms, handguns, and explosives, many of them quite old and
rusty. These were stored in well-concealed locations. Neither the volume of the
weapons nor their uneven quality, as far as their actual usefulness was concerned,
nor the scant number of volunteers poised for self-defense were such as to tip
the balance in case of a real clash with regular units of the Turkish armed and
security forces. This being the case, the evident purpose of all these measures of
arming was the hope of disabusing potential perpetrators of the notion that the
Armenians, as usual, would be easy prey, and thereby to avert a great massacre—as
had been done in the past.30 Of all those Armenian leaders subjected to excruciating
tortures, one from Chomakhlou village ended up admitting this. ‘‘The torturers
detailed for this job had stuffed excrement into his mouth, had shackled his body with
iron hoops, and had lit a fire upon his chest.’’ When he succumbed to these atrocities,
he exclaimed, ‘‘We made these acquisitions [of arms] in order to avoid dying
like despicable dogs.’’31
Despite their turbulent history of rivalry and strife, the Dashnaks and
Hunchaks, facing an imminent national calamity, set aside their differences to form
a united front32 for purposes of defensive resistance. Accordingly, a joint committee
was established for cooperation, while the parameters were left to be determined
by the higher echelons of both parties. It is of utmost significance that the
Hunchak leadership in Istanbul and that of the Dashnaks in Sivas both
advised their cohorts in Kayseri ‘‘not to resort to any uprising and to comply with
the demands of the government.’’33 The sequence of events indicates, however,
that such compliance was not what the authorities wanted. Rather, the execution
of their plan hinged on resistance and confrontation capable of producing violent
clashes and bloodshed. The consummation of such clashes required the arousal,
enlistment, and active participation of Turkish mobs, and the authorities
went out of their way to attain this goal. As one chronicler writes, ‘‘The Turkish
government set out to incite the Turkish people in order to secure its support in
its exterminatory designs. It needed the Armenians to dare to provoke the Turks
by way of an insurrection, or even a plain act of disobedience.’’34 As the war progressed,
in addition to the devastating military requisitions described above, the level
of general depredations and the attendant verbal abuses and insults escalated
ominously.
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The Resort to Summary Proceedings through Court-Martial
The central purpose of the elaborate measures of interrogation and torture detailed
above was to pave the way for criminal prosecutions against those in custody.
The ultimate purpose, however, appears to have been to establish a legal framework
for the justification of the draconian measures soon to be launched against Kayseri’s
entire Armenian population. The authorities therefore needed a plethora of
confessions of a particular type. All those taken into custody for possessing arms, or
for presumed possession of arms, had a simple but basic justification: the CUP regime
had granted to non-Muslims the right to possess such arms. When crushing the 1909
counter-revolution, the guardians of that regime had significantly benefited from
the help of armed Armenian support groups. As one Kemalist deputy recalls in his
memoirs, ‘‘Whether in the market, the streets, or in stores, all kinds of weapons were
freely available for sale . . . Town criers and traveling salesmen peddling their arms
with loud voices were part of this picture.’’35
The Armenians incurred a legal liability, however, when many of them failed to
comply with the government’s wartime order to surrender their arms and weapons,
including knives.36 Disregarding the inveterate anxieties and premonitions about
impending new massacres with which the Armenians were suffused, the authorities
deliberately chose to interpret this reluctance to surrender their arms as a clear
indication of an insurrectionary plan. By this time between 800 and 900 Armenians
from all walks of life were incarcerated in Kayseri’s notorious Depot prison. In this
large, spacious, three-story military barracks that could hold as many as a thousand
prisoners, the incarcerated Armenians were arranged there according to provenance.37
The Military Tribunal, an expanded version of the small court-martial instituted
in Kayseri by the proclamation of general mobilization to handle minor offenses
committed by the military, was formed for the express purpose of prosecuting the
Armenians. It consisted of a president (retired Lieutenant-Colonel Tevfik), Major
Şahab, two other military officers, the deputy public prosecutor, and a record-keeper.
Except for a six-month interval in the second half of 1912, the CUP had been
maintaining throughout the empire a state of siege, and hence martial law, since
19 August/1 September 1910.38 The requisite indictments were prepared, on the one
hand, by Everek’s kaymakam, Salihzeki, and, on the other, by Kayseri city’s police
chief, Zeki. The Armenians were uniformly charged with premeditated conspiracy
against the Turkish army. More specifically, the two Armenian political parties of
Kayseri district were, as collective entities, identified as principal agents of conspiracy;
on account of their presumed consent to this conspiracy, on the other hand, the
regional Armenian notables (eşraf) were charged as accessories.
The proceedings had all the characteristics of a kangaroo-court set-up. No defense
counsel was allowed; the defendants were tried in groups of various sizes, each court
session lasting an average of three to four hours. The standard procedure was as
follows: the prosecutor would pose an accusatory question, and before the defendant
could complete his answer, he would be dressed down with a torrent of new accusatory
questions. The common line of defense of the accused was that their acquisition of
weapons and arms was a legitimate act, since it was allowed by the new constitution.
Moreover, they all maintained, these arms had come in handy when the Armenians
had come to the defense of the imperiled CUP regime in 1909. But this line of defense
was typically twisted by the prosecutor, when he intoned,
Against whom would you have to defend the Constitution? Of course against the other
Turks. And how would you proceed? Of course by massacring the regime’s opponents,
116

‘‘Triggering Mechanisms’’ as a Factor in the Organization of the Armenian Genocide

who happen to be all Turks also. There it is. Your own explicit confession of your
conspiratorial plan.

Allowed to articulate his defense, Kevork Vişabian, the top Dashnak leader among the
accused, made, among others, the following statement:
Do not exaggerate the practical value of a few obsolescent and antiquated handguns
and rusty bombs. They all served a mere precautionary purpose . . . Don’t be carried
away by the exertions of haphazard imagination . . . Is it a sin for a father or brother to
be tempted to think of self-defense when he sees with his own eyes his child or sister
being mutilated and butchered? Can the law ever forbid that elemental right that is
granted by God, is sanctified by religion, and is found enshrined in the annals of
history? Some may counter by saying, ‘‘Don’t you trust the government enough to dare
to organize your own defense?’’ The government can surely protect, provided it can jar
itself loose from confusion and paralysis while it tries to maintain its authority and
attends to the needs of its citizens. But we have already seen that with the outbreak of
revolutionary unrest even cabinet ministers tried to save their heads. As you all know,
one of the most influential one among them had sought refuge in the home of an
Armenian and thereby escaped a tragedy. Esteemed judges, remain true to your calling,
follow the path of justice and stop persecuting the Armenians.39

Neither this oratorical plea nor the discreet religious services held daily in the
Depot barracks prison yielded any tangible results. With predictable regularity the
court found the overwhelming majority of the defendants guilty as charged. The text of
the verdict was published in the district’s official journal in connection with the courtmartial of the first batch of defendants.40 All twelve of them were sentenced to death
by hanging. The other thirty-two defendants were sentenced to various terms of hard
labor and prison. In addition to the official Turkish publication of the record of
conviction and sentencing, the official files of the foreign ministry of allied Imperial
Germany contain the same record in German translation.41
The serial convictions, sentence renditions, and associated hangings of eventually
fifty-five Armenians were staggered during the subsequent weeks, and the hangings
were carried out at a locale called the Coal Pit (Kömürlük).42
The core of the verdict is encapsulated in the following two sentences:
With the intent of unleashing a general uprising against the Ottoman Empire, the
revolutionary Hunchak and Dashnak Committees conspired against the government
at a joint meeting convened at Bucharest. Besides resolving to incite parts of the
Armenian population of the Empire against the government, the said committees also
accumulated hand grenades, dynamite and other destructive weapons.43

There are three ingredients in this judgment: conspiracy, public incitement, and the
accumulation of weapons and explosives (but not any use of them). Clearly the last
item cannot be subject to dispute, with the caveat that it applied only to a segment of
Kayseri’s Armenian community. But the other two elements require closer scrutiny.

The Genocidal Sequela of the Courts-Martial
The recurrent harping on the theme of ‘‘conspiracy’’ as a major weapon aimed at the
Armenians lends itself to projective interpretation. As Shakespeare, through Hamlet,
warned with the dictum ‘‘doth protest too much,’’44 the entire pattern of the
exterminatory persecution of Kayseri Armenians indicates that the perpetrators
were merely projecting when accusing the Armenians of conspiracy: in other words,
they were ascribing to the latter plans entertained by themselves. An array of evidence
underscores the relevance and significance of this social-psychological mechanism.
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Here are some examples. By governmental fiat, the matter of the wartime deportation
of the Armenians had been declared a peremptory response to anticipated Armenian
insurrections; as such, they were declared military business and a military
responsibility. The Temporary Law of Deportation of 13/26 May 1915 explicitly
stipulates this in articles 1 and, particularly, 2. Colonel Şahabeddin, referred to above,
emphatically reiterated this point in cipher telegrams he sent to Colonel Recayi, his
superior in Ankara,45 who had expressed his displeasure at the civilian authorities’
intervention in the matter.
In early August 1915, however, at Talât Pasha’s behest, military commanders
were advised by a circular from the High Command that in areas outside the theaters
of war, the responsibility for handling the deportations would henceforth devolve upon
civilian authorities. The emerging cleavage between civilian and military authorities
on this issue found its expression in several reports dispatched by Colonel Şahabeddin
to his superior in Ankara, in which he complained about the instigations alleging
rebellious activities by the Armenians. With special reference to such Kayseri-district
villages as Erkilet and Mancusun, for example, he accused Zekâi, the district’s
governor, of falsely accusing the Armenians of armed assaults. This prompted Colonel
Recayi, Şahabeddin’s superior, to instruct him to henceforth discount civilian sources
and rely only on the military ones. An integral part of these reports, prepared by the
regional military authorities, were references to numerous acts of pillage, plunder,
and robbery committed by the security forces harassing and tormenting the targeted
Armenians.46 However, in the overall picture of a relatively well-coordinated genocide
undertaking, this discordant aspect of the conduct of the region’s military commanders
was but an accidental aberration, due mainly to the CUP’s conspiratorial secrecy.
To emphasize the supremacy of his authority over the matter of Armenian
deportations and to underscore the related urgency of draconian measures, interior
minister and CUP party boss Talât Pasha paid a visit to Kayseri. At a specially
convened meeting to which prominent Turkish-Muslim leaders were invited, he
denounced the Armenians as a disloyal (sadakatsız) internal foe in league with the
Ottoman Empire’s external enemies. Therefore, he said, it had become imperative that
they be expelled and deported as disloyal elements.47
For his part, Enver, minister of war and de facto commander-in-chief of the
Ottoman Armed Forces, rebuked the Kayseri courts-martial for not being harsh
enough, and for not sentencing all the hundreds of defendants uniformly to death by
hanging. He particularly took issue with the text of the verdict, in which the victims
were accused merely of having formed a revolutionary movement and of incitement
against the empire’s Muslims. He wanted the Military Tribunal to focus on a principal
charge, that is, the aim of creating ‘‘an autonomous and independent [sic] Armenia.’’
That charge, the focus of the Istanbul courts-martial that had simultaneously tried,
convicted, and sentenced to death twenty Hunchakist leaders,48 was connected with
the annex of article 54 of the Ottoman Penal Code stipulating the sentence of death.49
Enver ended his directive with the admonition that it had to be treated as a ‘‘secret
matter’’ (sureti mahremane). Irrespective of individual merits and differences,
Armenians being court-martialed within this purview were to be uniformly treated
(tevhidi tatbikat) as candidates for the death penalty.
Nevertheless, the supreme authority, the CUP’s so-called politburo, was growing
impatient with the piecemeal and protracted handling of the 800 to 900 Armenians
remanded to the courts-martial for criminal prosecution and punishment. The
district’s governor, Aziz Zekâi (Apaydın), a CUP leader originally from Bosnia,
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where his Christian ancestors, like so many others, had converted to Islam, was
particularly restive in this respect. In tandem with local CUP functionaries, he began
to agitate against the tribunal’s judges, attacking them as too formalistic and hence
not as efficient as they were expected to be. The CUP’s Kayseri branch had already
prepared a list of those Armenians they wanted liquidated wholesale and swiftly.50 But
most of them were languishing in prison, either awaiting their turn for court-martial
or serving out their sentences. Zekâi decided to pay a visit to the main Depot prison.
Here is the narrative of one of the prisoners there, an eyewitness to that visit:
I still vividly remember his sudden appearance at our prison. Gruff-looking, he
inspected the prisoners in the first and second floors without uttering a single word. As
he was about to exit from the main door of the prison, he turned to his two companions
and with a hateful voice intoned, ‘‘Why keep them here? Make a clean sweep of them
forthwith.’’ We overheard this deadly exhortation with dizzying gloom.51

In defiance of the verdict dispositions of the Military Tribunal, the underlings
of the district governor proceeded to systematically remove almost all of the 1,095
Armenian inmates from their prison cells. Over a period of several weeks, they were
tied together with heavy-duty ropes and were marched out in seventeen separate
batches to the various valleys of neighboring Sivas province, where they were
massacred. Several detachments of brigands (i.e., convicts released from various
prisons) were deployed in the area of Kanlıdere (‘‘Bloody Valley’’), a triangular region
formed by the towns of Gemerek, Şarkışla, and Aziziye, for such massacre duty.52
The final stage in the process of liquidating Kayseri district’s Armenian population
was the official proclamation (actually a decree) of 26 July/8 August 1915, ordering the
wholesale deportation of the rest of the victim population. Like those convicted by the
courts-martial, the overwhelming majority of that population perished in the process,
either through massacres53 or by attrition, dying of exhaustion, disease, or starvation.
In the end, the agency of the triggering mechanism proved pivotal, as the
Armenian presence in Kayseri was terminated through a cataclysm that replicated
itself in many other provinces of the moribund Ottoman Empire in the relatively
brief period between spring 1915 and summer 1916. But there occurred an event
in Kayseri, in the aftermath of this cataclysm, that was both distinct and peculiar:
a criminal investigation was initiated to identify and prosecute the ensemble of
the Turkish leaders responsible for that cataclysm. The man in charge of that
pre-trial investigation was the wartime mayor of Kayseri, who, remarkably, at the
time of the investigation, had remained in his job as mayor. This study will conclude
with an examination of the significance of this post-war Turkish attempt at
retributive justice.

The Aftermath: The Aborted Post-war Initiative of Retributive Justice
Unwilling to concede and confess to a crime, perpetrators tend to resort to denial or,
in other cases, to explanations that aim to justify their actions. This aim becomes most
urgent with respect to the capital crime of genocide. The institution of courts-martial
in Kayseri and the proceedings associated with them were initiatives intended to
justify the crime of genocide in progress. Even the Turkophile Arthur Zimmermann,
at the time foreign minister of Germany, in a ‘‘very confidential’’ communication to
Count Paul Wolff-Metternich, Germany’s ambassador to Ottoman Turkey, conceded
that Turkey’s anti-Armenian campaign, placed under the rubric of ‘‘national security,’’
could conceivably be defended ‘‘with an appearance of legality’’ (‘‘mit einem Schein des
Rechtes verteidigt werden konnte’’).54 Thus, in plain language, what these authorities
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needed were plausible pretexts. The errors that sometimes crept into the process,
however, inevitably revealed the totally false, and even farcical, character of these
pretexts. The following example illustrates this point. In its verdict of 2 June 1915,
pronouncing a sentence of ‘‘death by hanging’’ for the first batch of the fifty-five
doomed Armenians, the court-martial erroneously, or falsely, declared that ‘‘Hunchak
and Dashnak party leaders had decided in a Congress in Bucharest to initiate action
against the Turkish government.’’ The fact is, however, that that congress was
convened only by a faction of Hunchak party and that the Dashnaks had absolutely
nothing to do with it and hence could not have participated. This falsehood found
expression in the two propaganda pamphlets issued by the central government during
the war.55 In commenting on one of them as a ‘‘cleverly framed’’ pamphlet, the veteran
Austrian ambassador to Turkey, Johann Margrave von Pallavicini, wrote the following
to his foreign minister in Vienna:
To massacre the men and to deport women and children who, due to lack of transport
and provisions, arrive in frightfully diminishing numbers, is a procedure which not only
cannot be justified, but forever will remain a blot [Schandfleck] on the reputation of the
Turkish government.56

That reputation would be a test case for a succession of post-war Turkish
governments desperately trying to cope with the consequences of the wartime
Armenian cataclysm. Indeed, the full scale of that cataclysm came into full relief
when courts-martial were established in the Ottoman capital to deal with the problem
legally. (These proceedings have been detailed and analyzed in a previous article).57
Departing from this modus operandi of confining the criminal proceedings to the
Ottoman capital, post-war authorities in Kayseri decided to prosecute in loco the
respective Kayseri officials and their accomplices. The man responsible for this
initiative was Ahmet Rifat (Çalıka), the long-sitting mayor of Kayseri city.
Commenting on the attributes and virtues of this Turkish official, a Kemalist
deputy wrote, ‘‘Rifat was an enlightened jurist; he was free from any kind of
fanaticism . . . scant on words and correct in his behavior . . . he obeyed the dictates of
his conscience allowing to determine that behavior.’’58 After the advent of the Kemalist
regime, Rifat was elected as a deputy to the new Grand National Assembly and was
subsequently appointed to the post of minister of justice. For all these reasons, his plan
to prosecute the wartime Kayseri perpetrators and the specifics of the related charges
acquire inordinate significance.
In a book edited by his son and containing Rifat’s memoirs, these specifics are
embedded in the texts of a series of formal indictments. These legal charges were made
public in 1992 and are exceptionally significant in that the issue involved touched
the taboo subject of the Armenian Genocide, which had been aggressively denied
throughout the entire history of modern Turkey. In separate tables included in this
book one can identify all the names of the principal perpetrators in the Kayseri district,
along with the specific charges and the requisite measures of punishment. Rifat
indicates in a note attached to the indictments that the indictments were framed on
the basis of ‘‘documents secured in the course of pre-trial investigations.’’59 Foremost
among the indictees were the two principal perpetrators of the cataclysm that fully
merits the designation ‘‘Armenian Genocide.’’ One of them, Salihzeki, the inexorable
kaymakam of Develi (Everek), was charged with torture, bribery, and rape. The other,
Zekâi, the governor of the Kayseri district, was charged with multiple murders. Three
dozen other officials, particularly gendarmes of various ranks, ranking police officers,
lower-level governors, CUP party functionaries, and local party leaders, identified by
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name and status, were among the indictees. The punishments proposed variably
referred to articles 45, 103, and 170 of the Ottoman Penal Code, providing for
sentences ranging from death to terms of hard labor.
A noteworthy aspect of this series of indictments is the prominence of charges of
pillage, plunder, robbery, and thievery, not to speak of serial rape, which were depicted
as crimes ancillary to that of organized mass murder. It appears that with very few
exceptions, practically all the perpetrators, from the highest to the lowest rank—
especially Salihzeki, the arch-perpetrator—actively engaged in this type of license,
raising the fundamental issue of the role of personal incentives involving greed and
cupidity in genocide. As the veteran wartime US consul at Aleppo, Jesse Jackson,
reported to Washington, DC, an integral part of the organized, wholesale extermination of the Armenian population involved ‘‘a gigantic plundering scheme.’’60
But, as far as the ultimate decision makers in the Ottoman capital were concerned,
superseding these incentives in the first place was the more basic, pervasive, and
compelling drive to radically exterminate the people subsequently to be disposed of. As
Jackson was trying to inform Washington, the supreme, superordinate goal of the CUP
was to deliver the ‘‘final blow to extinguish the [Armenian] race.’’61 The explanation
and the allied justification for this lethal attitude was provided by Salihzeki. When
a delegation of Armenian notables was pleading with him to relent in his persecution,
he responded thus:
You Armenians are progressive people, you are industrious and productive. I wish we
Turks could be like you. The trouble is that these conditions are inimical with our
national interests. How can we acquiesce to the fact that the Turk, the master of this
land, has become your servant. The Armenians live in comfortable homes, but
the Turks are confined to huts and sheds. The Armenians dress well, eat well, while the
Turks have to contend with rags and dry bread. Now that the opportunity has
presented itself, we are determined to annihilate you. Your sympathies for the Allied
Powers make this even more expedient. Your annihilation will not be carried out
quickly and swiftly but will be accompanied by torment and torture.62

The ascendancy of Kemalism in defeated and prostrate post–World War I Turkey,
and its ultimate triumph, nipped in the bud any and all prosecutorial efforts. As a
result, for example, Zekâi, Kayseri’s district governor, first escaped to his native Bosnia
to avoid prosecution, then proceeded to join the Kemalist movement. He subsequently
rose to such high positions in the new Republic of Turkey as deputy in the new Grand
National Assembly; twice ambassador at London, then at Moscow; and minister of
public works and minister of defense.63 As to the other principal perpetrator, Salihzeki,
he fled to Baku to join a new group of Turkish communists, with the aim of importing
that ideology and movement into Kemalist Turkey.

Conclusion
This study has attempted to show that triggering mechanisms, often intimately
connected with the outbreak of large-scale conflagrations and cataclysms, may under
certain circumstances be considered necessary conditions for the explosion and
consummation of the underlying conflicts. But they are not at the same time sufficient
conditions. The elements of the conflict, the power relations between a potential
perpetrator and a potential victim, and the level of opportunity available for the
consummation of conflict are variables to factor in when assessing the matter of
sufficiency. What happened in Kayseri during World War I was the sanguinary
culmination64 of a protracted historical conflict between an omnipotent state
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organization and a highly vulnerable minority group. Moreover, the advantages of the
resulting power differential were monopolized by a monolithic political party that
reigned supreme in directing the internal and external policies of the state.65 This
exercise of supreme power by a political party could be achieved because the most
powerful CUP leaders were at the same time ministers, Army commanders, and other
state officials, such as provincial governors. Not only were the two pre-eminent
organizers of the Armenian Genocide top CUP leaders, for example, but one of them,
Talât Pasha, was interior minister and subsequently grand vizier (a sort of prime
minister), while the other, Enver, was both deputy commander-in chief of the Ottoman
Armed Forces and minister of defense. Both men played a decisive role in the
organizational and legal arrangements that ensured the wholesale liquidation of the
Armenians.
In brief, the genocide of the Armenians as enacted in Kayseri during the war, just
as in other parts of the Ottoman Empire, was predicated upon such major determinants
as the history of lingering Turko-Armenian conflict; a critical disparity of power
relations between perpetrator and victim, yielding the vulnerability ingredient; and the
optimal opportunity afforded by the war. Above all, however, it was predicated, just as
in Nazi Germany, upon a fusion of government and party machineries, with the latter
holding implacable sway and, accordingly, giving content and direction to that fusion.
The more or less unhindered configuration of these factors was such as to ensure a very
high degree of success in the implementation of the genocide. Ultimately, however, the
genocidal fate of the Kayseri Armenians emerges here as a function of critically
disparate power relations, as noted above. The dominant Turks took full advantage of
their overwhelming power position vis-à-vis a near totally defenseless minority. The
conditions of the war were such as to maximize the statutory vulnerabilities of that
minority, trapped in the vortex of a consuming global war. Problems of prejudice,
discrimination, and exclusion, compounded by the formal declaration of holy war,
jihad, combined to aggravate the plight of the victim population. Determined to avoid
any and all provocations, the bulk of that victim population tried desperately to be as
accommodating as possible toward the authorities and their incremental demands. Yet
all this proved futile. It may be fitting to conclude with a statement in which Henry
Morgenthau, wartime US ambassador to Turkey, succinctly highlights the twin
problems of vulnerability and provocation as twin pivotal factors.
In the organization of the Armenian Genocide as a whole:
Though the air all during the autumn and winter of 1914–15 was filled with
premonitions of trouble, the Armenians behaved with remarkable self-restraint. For
years it has been Turkish policy to provoke the Christian population into committing
overt acts and then seizing upon such misbehavior as an excuse for massacres. The
Armenian clergy and political leaders saw many evidences that the Turks were now up
to their old tactics, and they therefore went among the people, cautioning them to keep
quiet, to bear all insults and even outrages patiently, so as to not give the Moslems the
opening which they were seeking . . . ‘‘even if they burn a few of our villages . . .’’ these
leaders would say, ‘‘do not retaliate, for it is better that a few be destroyed than that the
whole nation be massacred.’’66
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The Ottoman Documents and the
Genocidal Policies of the Committee for
Union and Progress (_Ittihat ve Terakki)
toward the Armenians in 1915
Taner Akçam
University of Minnesota
The author analyzes the Ottoman Archives as a source of information on the
Armenian Genocide of 1915. He discusses the contradictory positions of two broad
groups of scholars on the reliability of these archives, concluding that the Ottoman
Archives agree with the information found in the archives of the United States,
Britain, Germany, and Austria. He discusses the various categories of Ottoman
documents, which mostly came out during the trials related to the Armenian
Genocide, which took place from 1919 to 1921, and makes clear that there was a
wide-ranging cleansing operation of the archives after the armistice in 1918. The
author explores the reliability of this evidence and, based on the existing documents
that remain, tries to reconstruct the structure and implementation of the genocide.
He concludes that the Ottoman documents clearly show the genocidal intent of the
Ottoman authorities and puts the Armenian genocide within the broader context of
an overarching plan to homogenize the ethnic population of Anatolia.

This article seeks to shed light on the issue of the ‘‘cleansing of the Ottoman archives’’
and to summarize some of the remaining documents, which could be classified as direct
evidence illustrating the genocidal intent of the policies enacted by the Committee for
Union and Progress (CUP) against the Armenians in 1915.1

The Categories of Ottoman Materials
Seven categories of Ottoman documents attest that during World War I, the CUP
maintained and executed a policy of extermination toward the Armenians:
(1) The Prime Ministerial Archive (Başbakanlık Arşivi), and especially the
archives of the Ministry of the Interior. When scholars speak commonly of the
‘‘Ottoman Archives,’’ they essentially refer to the archive in Istanbul known
as the Prime Ministerial Archives, or BOA (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri).
The documents of the Interior Ministry there are considered the most
significant.2
(2) Trial transcripts of the cases brought before the Military Tribunal (1919–1921)
against the central and provincial directors of the CUP, as published in the
official register of court cases, the Ottoman Gazette (Takvim-i Vekayi). Of the
twelve chronicled cases, we have complete transcripts of the two trials against
the responsible members of the CUP’s Central Committee, the ‘‘Special
Organization’’ (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa), and the trial of the wartime cabinet
ministers, comprising the minutes of the hearings, indictments, and final
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(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

court rulings, fourteen in all. In one of the trials, that against the Party
secretaries (Katib-i Mesuller), only the first three of thirteen hearings,
along with the final ruling, were published in the Ottoman Gazette.
The remaining nine trials are documented either only as final court
rulings, as in the Yozgat and Trabzon trials, or as Sultan’s Approvals,
as in the Erzincan and Bayburt trials.
The Istanbul press, 1919–1922. Contemporary newspapers published
detailed information about sixty-three separate trials, including complete
transcripts—which appear nowhere else—of the Erzincan and Bayburt trials.3
The criminal charges included the murder and deportation of Armenians
and the misappropriation of their possessions. Presented at length were
eyewitness accounts by such highly placed individuals as Third Army
Commander Vehip Pasha, Governor Celal of Aleppo, and ‘‘Circassian Uncle’’
(Çerkez Amca) Hasan, the officer in charge of Armenian ‘‘resettlement’’
in Syria.4
The Archives of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem are the only known repository
of the documents and trial files of the Commission for the Investigation of
Evil Acts (Tedkik-i Seyyiat Komisyonu),5 along with the Military Tribunals
(Divan-ı Harb-i Örfi). Armenians employed by the Military Tribunals during
the armistice years made handwritten copies of these documents, the originals
of which are missing. Even though the documents in Patriarchate archive are
handwritten copies, they are very valuable and can be considered first-hand
sources, since we can verify their authenticity.6
The Minutes of the Fifth Department’s (Beşinci Şube) Inquiry Commission,
established in November 1918 by the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies (Meclis-i
Mebusani) to investigate the allegations against government officials during
the war years.7
Minutes of the Ottoman Parliament during November and December 1918,
when the Armenian deportation and murders were the subject of intense
debate in the Senate (Meclis-i Ayan) and the Chamber of Deputies.
Memoirs and certain diaries, including those published soon after the event.
There may be memoirs yet to be published.

It is not an exaggeration to say that there exists a double standard among
historians on the assessment of these documents. Just as with the Armenian Genocide
itself, two factions have formed around different assessments of the abovelisted Ottoman materials. Those who defend the ‘‘official Turkish thesis,’’ which
considers the events of 1915 unexpected consequences of the relocation during the war
years, rely exclusively on the Ottoman documents in the Prime Ministerial Archive
(Başbakanlık Arşivi) as the only trustworthy source. This faction not only distrusts the
US, British, German, and Austrian documents as politically motivated distortions of
the events but also considers the documents presented in points (2) through (7) above
unreliable. Most Western scholars, meanwhile, maintain that only the Western
archives are reliable, while the Ottoman archival materials in the Başbakanlık Arşivi
have been sanitized in order to cover up the genocide and are thus unreliable.
These scholars have used the materials presented in points (2) to (7) extensively to
corroborate the thesis of genocide.
My central argument in this article is that there is no major contradiction
either between different Ottoman materials or between Ottoman and foreign
128

The Genocidal Policies of the Committee for Union and Progress

archival materials. It is therefore erroneous to assume that the Ottoman documents
(the term refers here mostly to documents from the Prime Ministerial Archive) were
created solely in order to obscure the actions of the Ottoman government. In fact, as I
will show in a further article intended for this journal, they contain information that
runs completely counter to the official Turkish thesis, elucidating the intent of
Ottoman authorities and how the genocide was organized. Ottoman archival materials
support and corroborate the narrative of the Armenian Genocide as shown in the
Western archival sources. We should therefore change our selective approach to the
Ottoman materials, which is based on the belief that they are trustworthy only when
they confirm our positions, and begin to consider the archival materials as a whole.

The Matter of the Destruction of Documents
The following statement was published in the 7 November 1918 issue of the daily
newspaper Sabah: ‘‘Despite being researched by the government,’’ documents relaying
information about the ‘‘Armenian massacre have not been found’’; before abandoning
his office, ‘‘it is probable that Talât Pasha and the officers under his command
had burned all documentation of the general directives regarding the massacres.’’8
The news was accurate.
The reliable sources cited below indicate that some of the documents from that era
were stolen or destroyed. The most explicit of this information can be pulled from the
indictment of what has come to be called the ‘‘Main Trial,’’ which is the action brought
against the directors of the CUP in the Istanbul Military Tribunal. The prosecutor’s
office stated that three separate groups of documents had been either destroyed
or ‘‘purloined.’’ The first group consisted of documents of the ‘‘Special Organization’’
(Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa), which were nowhere to be found. In the indictment, the words
of the prosecution are as follows: ‘‘Investigation of what had occurred reveals that
important documents pertaining to this office (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa) . . . have been
purloined.’’9
The second group consists of documents belonging to the Central Committee of
the CUP. The prosecution’s indictment states that, again, ‘‘all of the documents and
ledgers of the Central Committee have been purloined.’’ Thus, in various hearings
led by the prosecution, witnesses Midhat Şükrü, K. Talât, and Ziya Gökalp would all
testify that the documents of the CUP had been taken by Central Committee member
Dr. Nazım. From those hearings:
Judge: The Union and Progress Party, which was transformed into the Reformation
Group [Teceddüd Fırkası] at the direction of the Central Committee, were the official
registers and other ledgers belonging to the Central Administration transferred to the
Reformation Group?10
Midhat Şükrü Bey: Of course, sir. However, later I heard that unfortunately
Dr. Nazım Bey had taken them. I learned that from conversations with other officials.
Judge: Was that investigated by the Reformation Group?
Midhat Şükrü Bey: No, sir. At the formation of the Reformation Group, your humble
servant was questioned; I was called before the Central Committee and questioned
about a document. Based upon the testimony of a Records official, it was learned that
the entire document had been taken by Dr. Nazım Bey.11

Another Central Committee member, Ziya Gökalp, was to give similar testimony:
Judge: It is being said that important documents such as these were removed by
Dr. Nazım Bey. Is that true?
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Ziya Gökalp Bey: Your humble servant heard from the office of the general secretary
that Dr. Nazım Bey asked for the documents related to the society’s history. He had
reportedly said that he’d brought them from Europe and that he was taking them
for safekeeping. The office said, ‘‘Fine, then take them.’’ I heard this afterwards from
Midhat Şükrü Bey. However, even later, when I was in prison, I found out that they had
removed the other documents. Apparently, it turns out he’d taken all of the documents
in a trunk. I learned that later.12

The third group is composed of certain documents from the Ministry of the Interior
(Dahiliye Nezareti). In order to understand this category, one need only look at
the indictment: ‘‘Aziz Bey, former Director of General Security, revealed with solid
evidence and testimony that was laid out in a memo from the esteemed Ministry of
the Interior that important reports and information taken from the office by Talât Bey
prior to his resignation were not returned afterwards.’’13 Thus, many memoirs of
the era recite an incident in which Talât Pasha, prior to escaping out of the country,
had gone ‘‘to the shores of Arnavutköy, to the home of a friend . . . with a suitcase full
of documents’’ and ‘‘proceeded to burn them in the furnace on the first floor of the
house.’’14
Removal of documents was not confined to the Unionists; many documents
were taken out of the country by German officers. Despite promising that he ‘‘wouldn’t
take any documents’’ with him when returning to Germany, Hans F.L. Von Seeckt,
president of the Ottoman General Staff during the war years, did exactly that.
On 6 November 1918, Sadrazam Izzet Pasha made a vocal protest concerning the
removal of documents, and Berlin responded with promises to return the records,
but nothing was returned.15
It is also important to note that the removal and destruction of documents did
not occur solely during the post-war period. Directives sent by the CUP leaders by
telegram were ordered to be destroyed. In a telegram dated 22 June 1915, bearing
Talât Pasha’s signature but issued by the Office of General Security, sent to all of the
regional and governor’s offices, instructions are given on how to behave toward those
who, in the process of being expelled, converted to Islam. After this message the
telegram includes the ‘‘demand that the copies of this telegram be seized from the
telegraph office and destroyed after this notice has been confidentially communicated
to those necessary.’’16
There are other sources of information that tell us that the directives sent to
the regional offices were ordered destroyed. For example, the indictment mentioned
earlier, for the trial of the directors of the CUP, states that the telegram sent to
the governor of Der Zor, Ali Suat, was ordered to be destroyed after it was read.17
In another case, during the third hearing for the Yozgat trial, on 10 February 1919, the
judge read out the statement given by the witness, Kemal, mayor of Boğazlayan, before
the investigating committee during the course of his arrest. The statement established
that the telegrams sent to Kemal had been ordered destroyed after being read.18
In the hearing on 24 March, the judge reminded Kemal of his statement ‘‘before the
Commission for the Investigation of Evil Acts [Tedkik-i Seyyiat Komisyonu] that some
of the documents related to the deportation had been ordered to be destroyed after they
were read.’’19
One other piece of evidence that the directives containing orders to annihilate
Armenians were ordered destroyed comes from Ahmet Esat (known today by the name
Esat Uras), director of the Second Precinct of the Office of General Security. Esat, who
was arrested by the British authorities, gave a statement that the many directives
regarding annihilation of the Armenians had been sent out to the regional governors
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by couriers who had been ordered to read the messages and then return with the
originals, which were to be destroyed upon return.20 This information would be
confirmed by similar testimony from Yozgat Governor Cemal. In his written statement
to the aforementioned commission on 12 December 1918, Cemal reported that ‘‘Necati
Bey (Secretary to the Union and Progress party for the region) came to Yozgat . . . [H]e
executed the letter, signed by Governor Atif Bey, which he held in the palm of his
hand . . . I demanded the letter in question from the aforementioned Necati Bey but
he wouldn’t give it.’’21 This statement would be confirmed by similar testimony by
Governor Cemal at the eleventh hearing in the Yozgat trial on 5 March 1919. Cemal
stated that Party Secretary Necati showed him an order for the annihilation of the
Armenians and that, upon his request, Necati refused to hand over the paper; he only
showed it. This was also the written statement of Cemal to the aforementioned
commission.22

The Destruction Continues after the War
Once it became clear that the war would end in defeat, the process of destroying
documents continued unabated. For example, the following testimony is taken from
the Istanbul Military Tribunal hearing that took place on 3 June 1919 for the trial
against members of the cabinet. The witness is the former minister of postal services,
Hüseyin Haşim, and he is testifying as to how the documents from the War Ministry
were destroyed:
Judge: As was understood from the testimony given by the officials from Çatalca,
in their defense regarding the issuance of a directive to burn and destroy all
communications by telegraph, do you have any recollection as to why this directive
was issued?
Hâşim Bey: I cannot remember anything, although there was in fact a notice from
Headquarters about the prevention of military communications falling into the hands
of the enemy. It was done in furtherance of that no doubt. In fact some of the telegrams
weren’t burned but were shredded and sold. It occurred two to three days before your
humble servant was working at the ministry. The ministry was dispatching accounting
department officials to the Military Tribunal and demanding that they be burned.
It’s likely that it’s related to that business. Your humble servant doesn’t recall.
Judge: Sir, it was related only to military communications?
Hâşim Bey: Yes sir, it had to do with military communication and nothing else.
Military communication along with communications with headquarters.23

The individual referred to by the judge, the former deputy director of the Çatalca
Postal and Telegraph Office, Osman Nuri Efendi, would be prosecuted for burning
documents. His trial began on 4 August 1919. The defendant testified that ‘‘I was
following orders when I burned some documents. Under the authority of my
supervisors I was to burn certain documents from one year to another and I did.’’
We know that these documents related to military matters. [It is unknown what the
final judgment was.]24
After the defeat in war, the burning of documents continued during the armistice
period. Upon the resignation of the cabinet of Talât Pasha, the new cabinet under
Ahmet Izzet Pasha was formed on 14 October 1918. Izzet Pasha took on the role of
minister of war. The first action the Pasha took was ‘‘to order the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa
[Special Organization, otherwise known as the ‘Eastern Bureau’ within the Ministry of
War at the time] to stop all activities, destroy their archival records . . . .’’25 Ahmet Esat,
director of the Second Precinct of the Interior Ministry, gave similar testimony to the
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British: ‘‘Just before the treaty to lay down our weapons, the staff went into the
archives at night and cleaned out most of the records.’’26
Nor were documents destroyed only in Istanbul during the armistice period.
Orders were sent out to the regional offices to destroy the documents in their
possession. Refik Halid Karay was the general director of the Postal-Telegraph Office
during that time. When Karay’s memoirs of the period were published in Aydede
magazine in 1948, he received a lengthy letter from H. Sadik Durakan, a longtime
employee of the Postal Telegraph and Telephone Office (PTT). Later, when Karay
compiled his work into a book, the letter was published in full, unedited. Here is an
excerpt:
I wish to recount to your honor, an event which I witnessed at that office during the
armistice period. As you know, following the Mondros Armistice agreement, the armed
forces of the Allied powers, coming in from all directions, began to capture and invade
our land. During this invasion, thinking that the documents and communications which
were in the possession of the PTT Central offices would be targeted, and in an attempt
to prevent those documents from falling into the hands of the enemy, Mehmet Emin
Bey, sending an official telegraphic notice to all of the offices, ordered that all official
documents, copies of telegrams and their originals, which were in our possession,
be completely destroyed.27

It is apparent that some of these telegrams fell into the hands of British forces.
On 24 October 1919, a telegram sent by the Ministry of the Interior to the Antep
regional office was in fact intercepted by the British. The telegram orders that all
original telegraphic messages sent to the region since the mobilization for war began
be destroyed.28 On 17 June 1919, the then minister of foreign affairs, Safa Bey, while
protesting the interception of communications in the presence of the British High
Command, admitted that a notice had been sent to the towns and townships of the
telegraph office of Diyarbekir to destroy all original documents received by them
between 1914 and 1918.29
Despite the fact that there was a systematic effort to cleanse certain documents
from the archive, no matter how thorough the effort may have been, a complete
purging of any trace of Ottoman policies toward its non-Muslim populations was
nearly impossible to achieve. While destroying all the records of the CUP, for example,
might be feasible, doing the same for all the communications that went back and forth
between the Ministry of the Interior and all the regional offices is another thing
altogether. A memo sent to one office was not registered only there but was
disseminated to other offices so often that the probability of its appearance elsewhere
is extremely high.
Although annihilation of the Armenians came onto the agenda as a party policy,
deportation was taken up as a state policy, and the entire state mechanism was put
into play in order to execute that policy. As a result, hundreds and thousands of
written communications were sent between state offices, between the smallest towns
and villages and their regional offices, and between those regional offices and the
highest political decision-making bodies. It would be impossible to destroy all that
documentation.

Measures against Armenians Were Part of a General Population Policy
The available documents from the seven sources listed above lead inexorably to a
single conclusion.30 Before World War I, the CUP formulated a policy that they began
to execute in the Aegean region against the Greeks and, during the war years,
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expanded to include the Assyrians, the Chaldeans, the Syrians, and especially
the Armenians, a policy that eventually became genocidal. The main goal of this
policy was, in the CUP’s own words, ‘‘liquidating the concentrations of non-Turkish
population that had accumulated at strategic points, and which were susceptible
to negative foreign influences.’’31 The origin of this plan (or plans), which I call ‘‘the
homogenization of Anatolia,’’ can be traced to the conclusion of the Balkan Wars.
The concrete preparation of these plans, according to the memoirs of many leading
figures, such as member of the ‘‘Special Organization’’ (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa) Kuşçubaşı
Eşref, leading Unionist leader Halil Menteşe,32 and CUP Izmir Secretary Celal Bayar
(later third state president of Turkey), was made at the beginning of 1914 and
especially with the appointment of Enver Pasha to the Ministry of War in January
1914. Kuşçubaşı Eşref mentions a meeting with Enver Pasha in the Ministry of War on
23 February 1914,33 during which Enver laid out some thoughts about the importance
of getting rid of non-Muslims because ‘‘the non-Muslims had proven that they did
not support the continued existence of the state. The salvation of the Ottoman State
would be linked to stern measures against them.’’ In the words of Kuşçubaşı Eşref,
the non-Muslims were ‘‘an internal tumor’’ whose ‘‘purging’’ was a ‘‘matter of national
importance.’’34 In Kuşçubaşı’s words, ‘‘the first task was to separate the loyal from the
traitors.’’35 Halil Menteşe states in his memoirs that ‘‘Talât Pasha made the removal of
all traitorous sources from the nation a top priority.’’36
For this purpose, according to Kuşçubaşı, the newly established Teşkilat-ı
Mahsusa devised a broad plan to eliminate the long-existing burden posed by dangers
from within the Christian communities of the Empire.37 Detailed reports were
prepared outlining the elimination of the Christian population. These measures were
implemented in the Aegean region in the spring of 1914.38
As in the case of the Armenian Genocide, the first measures against the Greeks
on the Aegean coast followed a two-track communication and operation system.
On the one hand, the Special Organization carried out the illegal operations, including
the ‘‘services which the forces of the government and public organizations could never
hope to perform.’’39 On the other hand, the government had official population
exchange agreements with Greece and Bulgaria, according to which Muslims and
Christians should be exchanged and resettled in their respective villages.
With the beginning of 1913, the Ottoman government, in separate treaties with
Bulgaria and Greece, had agreed to the exchange of ethnic populations across national
borders. The dozens of communiqués that appear in the records of the Ministry of
Interior’s Office of Tribal and Refugee Settlement (hereinafter known as the IAMM)40
prove that the resettlement of Muslim immigrants was organized in a systematic way
without waiting for final agreements with the respective governments in the Balkans.
In a telegram sent from the office of the IAMM to the province of Aydın, for example,
it is ordered that ‘‘even though we, upon the proposal of Venizelos, agreed to exchange
the Greek population in the Province of Aydın with the Muslim population in
Macedonia,’’ since it will take a long time to establish a commission to deal with the
details of the population exchange, it is advised to resettle the Muslims who have been
arriving step by step in the Greek villages.41 This document makes it clear that
measures were taken in a systematic way to settle Muslims in the villages of Western
Anatolia that had been emptied of their Greek inhabitants:
Information is needed as to which villages and towns from the region, the number of
residences and the number of Greeks who emigrated from them thus far, along with the
names of these villages and towns and number of residences and the property that was
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left behind, the general and specific agricultural pursuits they pursued, their
industrial and agricultural trades, in type and kind and following their emigration,
if there have been refugees who have resettled in their place, whether or not they
intend to stay.42

As much as the writers of these communications use the expression ‘‘liquidation
of non-Turkish elements,’’ the real target to be purged was non-Muslims. Coded
telegrams issuing from the Ministry of the Interior made it clear that non-Turkish
Muslims who needed to be resettled were to be ‘‘assimilated.’’ For example, a telegram
sent by Talât Pasha to Diyarbekir on 2 May 1916, after making it clear that the Kurds,
who would continue to maintain their identity in the region, should not be settled
in the areas of Urfa and Zor, states that priority should be given to ensuring that ‘‘they
[Kurds] should not be permitted to continue their tribal existence nor ethnic
identity.’’43 Similarly, on 4 May 1916 , a coded telegram to the governors’ offices in
Urfa, Marash, and Antep urged that the Kurdish refugees be ‘‘discouraged from living
communally’’ and that everything be done to ensure that ‘‘they abandon use of their
language and customs.’’44
It is helpful to think of this plan to create a new state composed primarily of Turks
as having two main goals. The first aim of the plan was to remove all non-Muslims,
regarded as a serious threat to the state, from Anatolia. The second aim was to make
changes in the structure of the population so that non-Turkish Muslims could more
easily be assimilated into the greater body of society.
These policies, which were put into force during the period between 1913 and 1917,
resulted in a complete change in the ethnic makeup of Anatolia.45 The estimated
17.5 million people who lived in Anatolia at the time were so uprooted that at the end
of this period, at least one-third of them had been either resettled somewhere else,
deported, or annihilated.
It is important that a clarification be made here in order to avoid confusion or
misinformation. What is not being claimed is that the deportation or resettlement
of the entire Anatolian population between 1913 and 1917 was the result of a
preconceived comprehensive plan. The coded communications of the Ministry of
the Interior of that period, in particular, point to forty-four different reasons for the
movement in population, among them the following:
(1) For the Greeks in the Aegean region and the Armenians in general, all
of whom were perceived as threats to the nation, forced deportation
was the main tactic of choice. This took the form of threats, looting of
businesses and homes, limited cases of murders, and forced deportation to
Greece; the Armenians were more often subjected to killings en route to
settlements elsewhere or were left for dead on the road, deserted in
remote locations.
(2) (a) The deportations and forced emigration of Christian citizens were justified
on the basis of military objectives; as an example, one can look at the forced
emigrations of Nestorians and Assyrians from the Van region at the end of
1914, while the same tactic was used against the Greeks of Ayvalik and the
Black Sea shore. The first deportations of Armenians that took place between
February and April of 1915 from the Çukurova region would fit into this
category also.
(b) Some Arab families were deported for political reasons. The deportation of
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Arab families and important individuals from Syria by Cemal Pasha fits into
this category.
(3) The settlement of Muslims who had escaped from the war zones into the
regions in the interior was necessitated by the resettlement policies.
There developed a planned policy of resettling the areas that had been emptied
of Armenians with Muslims who had come from the Balkans and Caucasus regions
at different times and were settled mainly in Western Anatolia.
It is undeniable that there were plenty of instances in which the categories
overlapped. For example, in September 1914, from the areas closest to Iran,
‘‘the Nestorians who were ripe for provocation from outside’’ were settled into
Ankara and Konya. In order to prevent them from creating a community in their
new locations, they were settled in Muslim-dominated areas with strict orders
that their settlements must not exceed twenty residences in number.46 When,
as a result of war conditions and the Russian advance, some Kurds were to leave
their places, despite the movement not being planned in advance, they had to
be resettled to the interior regions. In their resettlement special attention was
paid to keeping them from being too numerous in any of the newly settled
locations. A telegram from the Ministry of the Interior demands that attention
be paid to ‘‘ensuring that the Kurdish refugees who have been moved from the
war zones be kept apart from their leaders, Imams and Sheiks, and that they
not exceed 5% of the local populations in the interior of Anatolia where they have
been dispatched.’’47
It is extremely important to observe the parallels in organization and staff between
the forced emigration of Greeks, which began in the summer of 1914 in Western
Anatolia, and the equivalent action of Armenian cleansing from Eastern Anatolia
during the war years. Dozens of examples of similarities were documented and
reported by US Ambassador Henry Morgenthau and Arnold Toynbee, a British
diplomat, from the way the state kept itself in the background while the dirty work
was performed by the Special Organization (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa) to the fact that people
were forced to emigrate under threats of terrorism and murder and the formation of
labor battalions by gun-wielding youths.48

The Decision That Followed Extensive Debate
As the above summary indicates, the decision to deport Armenians did not
arise as an objective of war but was a part of a larger plan. That decision was
also based on a deeper issue, known as the ‘‘Eastern Question,’’ and aimed to put
an end to the fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire. As one element of a
larger problem, the Armenian Reform Agreement signed with Russia in February
1914 for reforms in the eastern provinces can be viewed as the catalyst for a
decision that the Armenians constituted a serious threat to the existence of the
Ottoman state. The most important document to reveal the true intent underlying
the decision for the deportation of the Armenians is an official statement issued by
the Ministry of the Interior on 26 May 1915 and sent to the office of the Grand Vizier.
This document states that deportation of the Armenians needs to be undertaken
so that the Armenian question can be ‘‘brought to an end in a manner that is
comprehensive and absolute [esâslı bir suretde hal ve faslı ile külliyen izâlesi].’’
Although this document has been mentioned in various publications on the subject,
the complete text has not appeared in modern studies, except for an extensive
summary in one of them.49
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This document was published in its entirety in the newspaper Ati during the
armistice period50 and explains the reasoning behind the deportation decision from a
historical perspective:
[A] reform that was entirely related to Ottoman internal affairs turned into an
international issue, wherein by some regions of the Empire coming under the influence
of foreigners certain privileges and special administrative organizational regulations
were demanded. As a matter of fact, it became bitterly clear that this reform and
reorganization, made under duress and foreign influence, caused the fragmentation
of the Ottoman nation. This problem, for which a real solution has been
sought . . . [as a result of various Armenian actions he describes], the state, by necessity,
after consultation with local officials and the military commanders, started . . . an action
believed to be completely within the interest of the state, begun necessarily according to
proper rules and procedures . . . .51

One sentence that carries enormous weight in this passage is the following:
‘‘While the preparations and presentations have been proposed and considered
for a final end, in a manner that is comprehensive and absolute, to this
issue constituting an important matter in the list of vital issues for the State.’’52
Talât Pasha made similar remarks to Henry Morgenthau. In his memoirs,
Morgenthau comments as follows on a meeting he had with Talât on 9 July 1915:
‘‘Talaat said that they had discussed the matter very thoroughly and arrived
at a decision to which they would adhere. When I said they would be condemned by
the world, he said they would know how to defend themselves; in other words, he
does not give a damn.’’53
The fact that the decision about the Armenians was made after a great deal
of thought, based on extensive debate and discussion by the Central Committee
of the CUP, can be understood by looking at other sources of information as well.
The indictment of the Main Trial states as follows: ‘‘The murder and annihilation
of the Armenians was a decision taken by the Central Committee of the Union
and Progress Party.’’ These decisions were the result of ‘‘long and extensive
discussions.’’ In the indictment are the statements of Dr. Nazım to the effect
that ‘‘it was a matter taken by the Central Committee after thinking through all
sides of the issue’’ and that it was ‘‘an attempt to reach a final solution to the
Eastern Question.’’54
In his memoirs, which were published in the newspaper Vakit, Celal, the governor
of Aleppo, describes the same words being spoken to him by a deputy of the Ottoman
Parliament from Konya, coming as a ‘‘greeting of a member of the Central Committee.’’
This deputy told Celal that if he had ‘‘expressed an opinion that opposed the point of
view of the others, [he would] have been expelled.’’55
That the decision regarding deportation went beyond temporary military
expediency and was instead intended to resolve the ‘‘Eastern Question’’ forever can
be seen in a letter written by Bahaeddin Şakir, published by Ahmet Emin Yalman in
his memoirs.56 In his work, Yalman introduces Bahaeddin Şakir as a supporter and
defender of the policy of ‘‘complete annihilation’’ of the Armenians. Şakir’s letter reads,
‘‘It is understood that the presence of Armenians, living as they do straddling the
Russian border, constitutes a major danger to the future of our nation. Our nation’s
salvation depends on doing whatever is necessary to remove this danger.’’57 Yalman
adds that the purpose of the policy was understood by ‘‘some politicians’’ to be
necessary for the ‘‘annihilation of the Armenians in order to create a racially
homogeneous Anatolia.’’58
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The Aim of the Deportation Was the Annihilation of the Armenians
Many of the documents that came out during the trials state that the purpose behind
the deportation was the annihilation of the Armenians. The indictment of the
Main Trial refers to many documents that touch on this subject. Among these, the
testimony of Ihsan Bey, director of special letters of the Ministry of the Interior,
is a good example. While Ihsan Bey was mayor of Kilis, Abdu’lahad Nuri, who had been
sent from Istanbul to Aleppo, relayed to him that the deportation was being executed
for the actual purpose of annihilating the Armenians. Nuri tried to convince
Ihsan Bey of the wisdom of the policy by stating that ‘‘I was with Talât Bey and was
given the orders about annihilation from him personally. The salvation of the nation
is dependent on it.’’59
Vehip Pasha, who had been appointed commander of the Third Army in February
1916, gave this written statement in December 1918 to the Commission for the
Investigation of Evil Acts (Tekdid-i Seyyiat Komisyonu), which had been assigned the
job of investigating the Armenian deportations and killings: ‘‘The massacre and
annihilation of Armenians and the looting and plunder perpetrated by their murderers
was decided and envisioned by the Central Committee of the Union and Progress
Party.’’ According to Vehip Pasha, ‘‘A program that had been pre-ordained and
executed under an absolute and clear intention for atrocities, firstly by the delegates of
the Central Committee of Union and Progress and secondly, pushing the law and
conscience aside, using the leaders of the state like tools for the furtherance of the
wishes and intentions of that party, having their orders and judgments and
persecutions performed.’’60 The Pasha added that the fact that government officers,
despite seeing and hearing of the crimes committed, did nothing to stop them
and, in fact, often aided and abetted the crimes shows without a doubt that the actions
were planned.61
Vehip Pasha’s assertion that there was direct involvement of state officials can
also be corroborated. Many governors and mayors who steadfastly tried to limit their
actions to deportation alone were relieved of their duties or, worse, killed. One
particular piece of evidence that the actual aim was the killing of Armenians relates to
an incident witnessed by the Trabzon representative of the CUP, Hazıf Mehmet Emin,
wherein Armenians were loaded onto boats and drowned at sea. During a session of
the Ottoman Assembly on 11 December 1918, when the incident was being debated,
Mehmet Emin Bey, considered an ardent Unionist, commented on the record, ‘‘[y]our
humble servant saw this incident, I mean, I saw an actual Armenian incident.’’
He then added, ‘‘There was a mayor in the Ordu district [a city on the Black Sea]. He
loaded up a boat with Armenians on the excuse that he was sending them to Samsun
and then proceeded to dump them into the sea. I heard that governor Cemal Azmi did
the same thing . . . . As soon as I got here [Istanbul], I relayed what I’d witnessed to the
Ministry of the Interior . . . But I couldn’t get anything done about the governor. I tried
for about three years but nothing. They said it was this, it was that, it was war;
in short, nothing came of it.’’62
What is understood from the dozens of transcribed telegrams issued by Talât
Pasha documented in the indictment of the Main Trial is not that he wanted state
officials to prevent the killings or to initiate investigations but that he wanted all the
dead, the casualties of the policy, who were lining the roadways to be taken away.
In the telegrams he makes clear that anyone not following his orders to have
the corpses cleared from the roads would be punished. For example, a coded telegram
sent on 21 July 1915 to the governor’s offices of Mamuretulaziz, Urfa, and Zor
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demands ‘‘the removal of the dead in the streets, with care taken that they
are not thrown into streams, lakes or rivers, and that their possessions left
behind in the streets be burned.’’ Again, a coded telegram from the governor of
Mamuretulaziz to the governor’s office of Malatya states that ‘‘despite the urgency
of the notice, the presence of so many dead in the streets’’ is being brought to
the attention of officials in Malatya and threatens ‘‘the harshest of punishments to
all officials who express any distress over this fact will be reported by office of the
Ministry of the Interior.’’63
We have other direct evidence to show that the decision to deport
Armenians was ultimately meant to lead to annihilation. A telegram dated
21 June 1915, sent by Bahaeddin Şakir, member of the Central Committee of the
CUP, to the party secretary of Harput, Resneli Nazım, which was published in
the indictment of the Main Trial, contains the following statement: ‘‘Are
the Armenians who have been sent from there being liquidated? Are the troublemakers you told us you had expelled being exterminated, or are they just
being expelled?’’64 This telegram was not only used in the indictment of the Main
Trial but played an important role in the Mamuretulaziz and the party secretaries’
trials as well.
Similar examples of telegrams were read into the record during the Yozgat trial,
which started on 5 February 1919. By the ninth hearing (22 February 1919), twelve
telegrams had been read in court that contained statements related to deportation,
annihilation, and massacres. For example, in a telegram dated 5 August 1915
sent by the Boğazlıyan detachment commander, Mustafa, to 5th Army Corps Deputy
Commander Halil Recayi is the statement that a group of ‘‘troublemaker Armenians
obtained from town and by chance’’ were ‘‘sent to their destinations.’’65 Halil Recayi’s
response of the same date asks for an explanation of what the term ‘‘sent to their
destinations’’ means.66 The gendarmerie commander answered the same day with
‘‘Since the aforementioned Armenians were troublemakers . . . they were killed.’’67
From the same trial, a different telegram, this one from Boğazlıyan Gendarmerie
Commander Hulusiye, uses similar language, stating, ‘‘ ‘sent out’ means they were
exterminated.’’68
One comes across many reports from German officers, as well as from the
German embassy and consulates, documenting their belief that the Unionist leaders’
plan for deportation had as its ultimate purpose the annihilation of all Armenians.69
One of the most damning pieces of evidence is a statement by Talât Pasha
recounted by the head of the Armenian desk at the German embassy in Istanbul,
Dr. Holleg Mordtmann. In a telegram, Mordtmann states that Talât Pasha had
told him, concerning the deportation, that ‘‘the subject of it was the annihilation
of the Armenians.’’70 Additionally, a ‘‘confidential’’ report dated 23 August 1915,
sent by one Colonel Stange, a German officer, to the embassy in Istanbul, is of
utmost relevance. Stange, who had worked with Bahaeddin Şakir in 1914–1915
in the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa (Special Organization), reports that based on his
observations, the deportation and murder of Armenians was not being done for
reasons related to war or to the military; the deportation, which so often
relied on taking advantage of certain circumstances, was the realization of a
‘‘plan that had been thought out over many years.’’ Stange further states
that the ‘‘deportation and annihilation was a decision taken by the ‘Young
Turks’ committee in Istanbul’’ and that Bahaeddin Şakir was coordinating it
from Erzurum.71
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How Were the Deportation and Massacres Organized?
There is no need to discuss in detail the process by which the final decision for
annihilation of the Armenians came about, as this topic has been covered elsewhere.72
However, the matter can be linked to the defeats of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa in the
Caucusus and Lake Van regions and to the defeat of the Ottoman army by the
Russians at Sarıkamış in January 1915. Bahaeddin Şakir, who had lived through this
experience and had barely escaped death, was ‘‘of the opinion’’ that as a result of ‘‘the
behavior which the Armenians had exhibited towards Turkey and the support which
they extended to the Russian army . . . one needed to fear the enemy within as much as
the enemy beyond.’’73 Şakir, who had obtained documents related to the activities of
Armenian gangs in the region, traveled to Istanbul near the end of February 1915
and tried to convince his friends in Istanbul that the country had to rid itself of
this threat.74
There is a very high probability that the decision to exterminate was made during
the debates that took place in Istanbul near the end of March. At the conclusion of
these discussions, ‘‘it was decided that Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir Bey should turn away
from the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa’s work that focused on foreign enemies and start dealing
with the enemies who are within.’’75 In other words, Şakir had been assigned the task
of dealing with the ‘‘internal Armenians.’’ Arif Cemil commented that ‘‘the end result of
all this discussion and debate was that the promulgation of deportation had been
turned into law’’ and that ‘‘when Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir Bey returned to the Caucasian
front, the new agenda completely took over.’’76 In fact, based on a telegram sent by
Talât Pasha on 5 April 1915 from the Special Letters Office of the Ministry of the
Interior, which states that ‘‘Bahaeddin Şakir Bey will be returning soon and special
appropriations will be sent for the refugees,’’ one can conclude that the decision
regarding deportation was made sometime between the end of March and the
beginning of April.77
According to the documents we have, the deportation orders for the complete
and fundamental elimination of this concern were sent to the regions by the Ministry
of the Interior sometime around the end of April or the beginning of May.78
The earliest document available is a telegram dated 24 April 1915 and sent to
Cemal Pasha, ordering that the Armenians who had already been sent to Konya
from the Zeytun and Marash regions be further dispatched in the direction of
Aleppo, Urfa, and Zor.79 Another telegram was sent to some of the regions on
26 April 1915. This telegram stated that the Armenians who are to be sent out of
‘‘Zeytun and Marash, Iskenderun, Dörtyol, and Haçin’’ were to be ‘‘sent to the
‘‘southeast and Zor and Urfa districts.’’80 Another coded telegram sent to
the governor’s office of Marash on 3 May 1915 ordered the Armenians of Zeytun
to be ‘‘completely expelled.’’81
Following these telegrams, Talât Pasha began to send telegrams requesting the
numbers of Armenians who had been expelled and settled elsewhere. For example, a
telegram dated 5 May 1915 was sent to Aleppo, seeking information as to where the
Armenians who had been moved there could be settled.82 Another was sent to Adana,
asking, ‘‘How many Armenians have been expelled from Haçin, Dörtyol, and other
localities since 7 May 1915, and where have they been sent?’’83
When news of an uprising in Van reached Istanbul, the Ministry of the Interior
followed up with a coded telegram to the Van and Bitlis regional offices, dated 9 May
1915, stating that the Armenians in the region of Van were to be deported and that the
action must ‘‘be handled personally.’’ The telegram states that the deportation will
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encompass Bitlis, the south of Erzurum, Mush, and the areas around Sasun and
that a similar telegram has been sent to Erzurum.84
Based on the coded telegram from Talât Pasha on 5 April 1915, eyewitness
accounts, and the reports from German consular offices, it is possible to conclude
that the purging of Armenians from Erzurum and its surrounding villages started
in the second half of April. In his memoirs, Ragıp Bey, a high-ranking
Ottoman bureaucrat, after explaining that he arrived in Erzurum on 14 April 1915
and left on 26 April, states that, ‘‘as a result of the Armenian deportations, the poor
Armenian girls and women in the area were in the most deplorable, wretched and
miserable state. Our hearts were quite wounded at the sight.’’85 According to reports
issued by the German consulate, the emptying-out of the villages surrounding
Erzurum had started in early May: ‘‘by May 15th, all of the villages . . . had been
emptied out.’’86
It is probable that during March and April of that year, the CUP’s Central
Committee had taken two parallel decisions: one for deportation by the Ministry
of the Interior, the second for extermination. The Ministry of the Interior was in
charge of sending out the orders regarding deportation by way of its official lines
of communication to the governors. In contrast, the order to exterminate was
disseminated through the Katib-i Mesuller (Responsible Secretaries). The annihilation
was actually executed with the help of the Ministry of the Interior’s gendarmerie and
the CUP’s Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa (Special Organization) gangs.
The most revealing statement in support of the argument that the decisions
taken in March and April 1915 were on parallel lines comes from Reşit Akif Pasha.
When Talât Pasha resigned in October 1918, and the first government of the armistice
period was formed under Ahmet Izzet Pasha, Reşit Akif Pasha was appointed
president of the Council of State. He gave a very important speech before the newly
formed Assembly on 12 November 1918. According to Reşit Akif Pasha, the Armenian
genocide began with a secret order for deportation that was issued by the Ministry
of the Interior to all regional offices:
While humbly occupying my last post in the Cabinet, which barely lasted 25 to 30 days,
I became cognizant of some secrets. I came across something strange in this respect.
It was this official order for deportation, issued by the notorious Interior Ministry
and relayed to the provinces. However, following [the issuance of] this official order,
the Central Committee [of Union and Progress] undertook to send an ominous circular
order to all points [in the provinces], urging the expediting of the execution of
the accursed mission of the brigands. Thereupon, the brigands proceeded to act and the
atrocious massacres were the result.87

This speech was defined by many of the newspapers as ‘‘extremely remarkable and
noteworthy,’’ and it was published ‘‘in full for its special importance.’’88
The information given by Reşit Akif Pasha was repeated by Vehip Pasha. In the
written statement noted above, Vehip Pasha relates how, based on the statements
of witnesses whom he had interrogated himself, the official orders were distributed
by way of the governors’ offices, while the orders related to the annihilation
were organized by Bahaeddin Şakir. Vehip Pasha began an investigation of the
crimes and arrested the gendarmerie officers and their assistants whom he suspected.
These persons told Vehip Pasha that ‘‘Memduh Bey, from the governor’s office of
Erzincan, had given the order to take action this way, while those who had been
directly involved in the deplorable acts had taken their direct orders from
Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir Bey.’’89
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The mechanism operated in the following way: the official deportation command
moved from the Ministry of the Interior’s channels of communication to the governors,
who then transferred the orders down to the gendarmerie of the security branch of the
Ministry of the Interior. Meanwhile, the attack and annihilation of the caravans of
people were organized by the Central Committee through Bahaeddin Şakir. The most
important service provided was by the Katib-i Mesuller, whose job it was to distribute
the coded orders to all regions.

The Role of the Katib-i Mesuller and Bahaeddin Şakir
The responsible party secretaries (Katib-i Mesuller) played an extremely important
role in the Armenian deportation and killings. With the general mobilization on
2 August 1914, the Katib-i Mesuller were responsible not only for establishing the
units of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa but even for directing the actions of some of the gangs.
Many telegrams read out during hearings of the Main Trial established their role in
these actions.90 During the Main Trial, a statement in the second indictment brought
against the cabinet members refers to the Katib-i Mesuller as acting like erkani
Mahsusa (‘‘special high officials’’) in the party and constituting a secret branch of the
government.91 Because of the special role they played in the events being tried, their
prosecution was separated from that of others, and a separate action was initiated
against them. In the final court ruling for that trial, the Katib-i Mesuller were referred
to as the ‘‘secondary criminals on the side, for the society’s aforementioned criminal
actions.’’92
There is a great deal of evidence that the Katib-i Mesuller were responsible for
disseminating the orders regarding the annihilation of the Armenians to the regions.
For example, during the Main Trial, the presiding judge repeated that there was much
evidence to show that the party’s commands were disseminated to the regions by way
of the secretaries and that there were many instances where governors did not obey
the orders and were removed from office. Additionally, the judge questioned almost
every witness with statements such as, ‘‘The responsible delegates went to Ankara,
Kastomonu, Erzincan, Yozgat, Trabzon, Sivas and similar places, giving the governors
and their offices sometimes confidential instructions. Were you aware of this?’’93
The Ankara governor, Mazhar Bey; the governor of Kastamonu, Reşit Bey; and
the governor of Yozgat, Cemal Bey, all repeated throughout their testimony in
the hearings that they had been removed from their positions upon the application of
the Katib-i Mesuller.94
In fact, these governors all gave testimony before both the Commission for the
Investigation of Evil Acts and the hearings mentioned above to the effect that they had
been removed from their positions for failure to obey orders. For example, Mazhar Bey,
describing his particular situation, stated,
I pretended I didn’t understand the order that was sent from the Ministry of the
Interior for the deportation of the Armenians. As you know, while there were other
provinces that had already completed the deportation, I had never even started it. Atif
Bey came . . . he gave me the order to massacre and kill the Armenians, personally. And
I said, ‘‘No, Atif Bey. I’m the governor, not a criminal. I can’t do it. I’ll get up from this
chair and you come do it if you like.’’95

The story for the governor of Kastamonu, Reşit Bey, was the same. The court ruling
against the Katib-i Mesuller indicates that because Reşit Bey had stated, ‘‘I won’t paint
my hands with blood,’’ he had been removed from the governor’s office upon the
application of Katib-i Mesul Hasan Fehmi.96
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The governor of Yozgat, Cemal Bey, gave a written statement to the Commission
for the Investigation of Evil Acts on 12 December 1918 that contained similar
information. In his statement he explained that Necati Bey, a Katib-i Mesul, had
shown him an official written order demanding that the Armenians be annihilated;
when Cemal asked for the written order, however, the Katib-i Mesul would not give it
to him. Cemal further stated that he told Necati Bey that, ‘‘since you don’t appear to
have official authority, I can’t at this juncture engage in a sinful act,’’ thus refusing to
obey the order. Within a few days Cemal was removed from office.97 At the eleventh
hearing of the Yozgat trial on 11 March 1919, Cemal recounted how Necati Bey had
told him that the order was in furtherance of the wishes of the Central Committee of
the CUP.98
Not only did officials risk of being removed from office, there were mayors
who were killed for failing to obey an order. The mayor of Lice, Hüseyin Nesimi,
did not obey the order to massacre the Armenians. When he demanded that the
order be given to him in writing, he was removed from office and later given orders
to travel to Diyarbekir; he was killed on the way there.99 In his memoirs, the mayor’s
son, Abidin Nesimi, recounts that the removal of state officials was done at
the behest of the governor of Diyarbekir, Dr. Reşit, and that there were others
who were as unlucky. ‘‘Ferit, the governor of Basra, Bedi Nuri, the governor of
Müntefak, Sabit, deputy mayor of Beşiri, [and] Ismail Mestan, the journalist,’’ were
among those who were killed. The reason for the murders was clear: ‘‘the removal
of administrative staff who would oppose [the annihilation of Armenians] was
inescapable. In furtherance of this . . . the removal of the individuals named was
considered absolutely necessary.’’100 The mayor of Midyat was also among the dead,
‘‘by order of the Governor of Diyarbakir, for resisting the command to murder
the Christians living within his township.’’101 During the 11 May 1919 hearing of
the Trabzon trial, Justice Department Inspector Kenan Bey remarked that he
had gone to Samsun to conduct an investigation and, while there, ‘‘was a witness to an
occurrence in the deportation . . . [in which] the mayor of Bafra was killed.’’102
Along with the Katib-i Mesuller, Bahaeddin Şakir ‘‘traveled around the eastern
provinces meeting with governors and others’’ in an effort to publicize the decision of
the CUP’s Central Committee.103 During the hearings of the Main Trial, the judge
declared that Bahaeddin Şakir had become the commander of the body of all units
constituting the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa.104 Additionally, he would question witnesses as to
whether they had knowledge of the fact that both Nail Bey (another Katib-i Mesul) and
Bahaeddin Şakir had gone among some of the brigades of the towns in Trabzon
province and given secret commands.105 During the 2 August 1919 hearing for the
Mamüretülaziz trial, Erzurum Governor Tahsin testified that units of the Teşkilat-ı
Mahsusa under Bahaeddin Şakir’s control were responsible for the annihilation of the
Armenians:
During the deportation of the Armenians I was in Erzurum . . . The caravans which were
subject to attacks and killings resulted from the actions of those who’d assembled under
the name ‘‘Teş-ı Mahsusa.’’ The Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa was composed of two units. When I
came back from Erzurum, the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa had turned into a major power and
they’d become involved in the war. The Army knew about it. Then there was another
Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa, and that one had Bahaeddin Şakir’s signature on it. In other words,
he was sending telegrams around as the head of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa . . . Bahaeddin
Şakir had a code. He’d communicate with the Sublime Porte and with the Ministry
of the Interior with it. During the deportation he communicated with the Army as
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well . . . Bahaeddin Şakir had two different codes with which to communicate with both
the Sublime Porte and the Ministry of War.106

From the telegrams that he issued, which were used extensively to build
prosecution cases during the hearings, one comes to an understanding that
Bahaeddin Şakir was responsible for all actions that took place in the region.
For example, in the following telegram, which was incorporated into the court
ruling of the Mamüretülaziz case, Şakir asks the former governor of Antalya, Sabûr
Sami Bey, ‘‘[s]ince there isn’t a single Armenian left in the vicinity of Erzurum, Van,
Bitlis, Diyar-i Bekir, Sivas, and Trabzon and they have all been sent to Mosul and Zor,
what’s been happening in Antalya?’’107 Another example of such a telegram is the
one from Şakir mentioned earlier, during the discussion of the Main Trial: ‘‘Are the
troublemakers you told us you had expelled being exterminated, or are they just being
expelled?’’108
There is still other evidence to corroborate the fact that the Central Committee’s
decision to annihilate the Armenians was distributed by special couriers. After the
armistice, Ahmet Esat, director of the Second Precinct of General Security, which was
tied to the Ministry of the Interior, tried to sell to the British what he claimed were
the minutes of a meeting having to do with the massacres of Armenians. He gave the
British four separate documents, two of them in his own handwriting. According
to the information he provided, messages were supposed to be disseminated to the
various districts by couriers who were ordered to read them aloud and then return
with the originals, which were to be destroyed.109

Some Orders for Annihilation Were Sent by Telegram
There were instances in which the orders to annihilate had to be sent by telegram. The
final court ruling of the Bayburt trial confirms that the decision to annihilate was sent
by the Central Committee to the regions by way of special couriers. The ruling also
includes the statement of Nusret, who was convicted and executed as a result of this
trial. Nusret’s statement declared that he had received a confidential order from
Istanbul stating that not a single Armenian was to be left alive and that those who did
not obey this order would be executed.110
Evidence clearly shows that the orders sent by telegram were to be destroyed
immediately after they were read. For example, the indictment of the Main Trial
recounts that the governor of Der Zor, Ali Suat, was told to destroy a telegram after it
had been read.111 For another example, during the third hearing of the Yozgat trial
on 10 February 1919, the judge read aloud the statement given by the mayor of
Boğazlıyan, Kemal, before the Commission for the Investigation of Evil Acts. In this
statement, Kemal describes how he was sent telegrams that ordered him to destroy
them after they had been read.112 In the hearing of 24 March 1919, when the judge
read him his statement, Kemal denied the information with the explanation that he
was tired when he wrote it. The prosecutor remarked that Kemal had ‘‘thought over
[the statement] for about three to four hours’’ before writing it down.113 Finally,
I should add that the Katib-i Mesuller did not limit themselves to forming gangs and
disseminating the order for annihilation. Their activities also included putting on
demonstrations that inflamed the locals’ emotions against the Armenians and looting
Armenian properties, enriching themselves in the process. In the action brought
against them, witnesses were questioned on precisely these types of activities. The
final court ruling lists many examples of how the Katib-i Mesuller had inflamed
people’s emotions (as in the meeting organized by Dr. Mithat in Bolu), seized the
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homes of Armenians, taken over their property and their accounts, and generally
organized looting against Armenians.114
These documents, taken mostly from the sources numbered (2) to (7) above, openly
show the genocidal intent of the Ottoman authorities and can be considered direct
evidence of the Armenian Genocide.
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BOA/DH/ŞFR, 63-172, coded telegram from Talât Pasha to the regional office in
Diyarbakir, 2 May 1916.
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J. Lepsius, Der Todesgang des Armenischen Volkes, Bericht über das Schicksal des
Armenischen Volkes in der Türkei waehrend des Weltkrieges (Potsdam: Missionshandlung
und Verlag, 1919), 43.
147

Genocide Studies and Prevention 1:2 September 2006

87.

88.
89.
90.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Meclisi Ayan Zabıt Ceridesi [Register of Assembly Senate Minutes], Devre [Cycle] III,
Assembly year 5, vol. 1, p. 123 (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 1990). I use here the translation
made by Vahakn N. Dadrian, ‘‘The Complicity of the Party, the Government, and the
Military. Selected Parliamentary and Judicial Documents,’’ Journal of Political and
Military Sociology 22, 1 (summer 1994): 29–96, 81.
Ikdam, 5 Kanunievvel 1918 (18 December 1918).
Written statement of Vehip Pasha, 12 December 1918.
An example of this is a telegram sent by Katib-i Mesul Rüştü, from Samsun on 27 May
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The Destruction of the Armenian Church
during the Genocide
Simon Payaslian
Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Clark University
The scholarship on the Armenian Genocide has expanded enormously during
the past three decades. Most of these works have focused on the causes and
consequences of the genocide, Western responses to and Turkish denial of the
genocide, and, more recently, Armenian-Turkish reconciliation. The role of the
Armenian Apostolic Church, however, has received little attention in the literature.
In addition to its ecclesiastical duties, the Armenian Church has over the centuries
performed various secular functions, including, in the Ottoman Empire, acting as
the principal representative agency for the Armenian millet. This article briefly
examines the responses of the Armenian Patriarchate in Constantinople to the
internationalization of the Armenian Question and then focuses on the three
ecclesiastical leaders who played a central role in attempts to address the crises
enveloping the Armenian people during World War I: Patriarch Zaven Der
Yeghiayan of the Armenian Patriarchate in Constantinople, Catholicos Sahag II
Khabayan of the Great House of Cilicia at Sis, and Catholicos Kevork V Surenyants
of the Mother See at Echmiadzin. All three witnessed the destruction of their people
and had the unenviable task of searching for the means to end the human
catastrophe. Indeed, the Armenian Church itself, a most conservative institution
harboring the utmost loyalty to the Ottoman Empire, in the end became a victim of
the genocidal scheme of the Young Turk regime.

Introduction
G. Marcar Gregory prefaces his English translation of The Church of Armenia by
Archbishop Maghakia Ormanian, who served as the Armenian patriarch at
Constantinople from 1896 to 1908, with the following observation: ‘‘The Church of
Armenia has been crushed for centuries between the upper and the nether millstones
of political rivalry and conquest, and during these long ages of ‘religious liberty’ has
had to be secured by sheer independence of character and the shedding of much
blood.’’1 Indeed, since its emergence in the fourth century, the Armenian Church has
played a central role in Armenian community life, and Christianity has remained
deeply intertwined with national institutions and identity. The Church, in addition
to representing spiritual leadership, has also performed various ecclesiastical and
secular functions, including diplomacy between Armenians and other nations and
religious communities.
The Armenian Church was first established at the Holy See of the Mother Church
at Echmiadzin, now in the Republic of Armenia. The vagaries of regional geopolitics
and cycles of Armenian political and cultural awakening and decline led to the
emergence of other ecclesiastical centers, most prominent among them the
Catholicosate of Aghtamar, the Catholicosate of the Great House of Cilicia at Sis,2
the Patriarchate in Constantinople, and the Patriarchate in Jerusalem. By the late
nineteenth century, when historic Armenian lands had been divided between the
Russian and Ottoman empires, the Holy See of Echmiadzin represented Armenians in
Simon Payaslian, ‘‘The Destruction of the Armenian Church during the Genocide.’’ Genocide Studies and
Prevention 1, 2 (September 2006): 149–172.  2006 Genocide Studies and Prevention.
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the former, while the Patriarchate in Constantinople, established in 1461 as the millet
başi (head of the nation) under Sultan Mehmed II, represented Armenians in the
Ottoman Empire. The Catholicosate of Cilicia had emerged as an autonomous entity in
1441 at Sis, once the capital of the Armenian kingdom in Cilicia, but the prominent role
assigned to the patriarchate in the imperial capital reduced its status and limited its
jurisdiction to a handful of dioceses. The Patriarchate in Jerusalem, whose roots are
said to date back to the fourth century, had been closely associated with the authority
of its counterpart in the Ottoman capital but served in a subordinate position until
after World War I. The Catholicosate of Aghtamar, located in the Armenian vilayet
(province) of Van, was founded in the twelfth century by the opponents of the Mother
See. When the last catholicos at Aghtamar, Khachadur Rshduntsi, died in 1895, the
Ottoman authorities left it dormant; by the time war broke out in 1914, vacancy had
bred atrophy.3
After the outbreak of World War I, as the genocidal crises began to envelope the
Ottoman Armenians, Patriarch Zaven Der Yeghiayan of the Armenian Patriarchate
in Constantinople (1913–1922), Catholicos Sahag II Khabayan of the Great House of
Cilicia at Sis (1903–1939), and Catholicos Kevork V Surenyants at the Mother See
of Echmiadzin (1911–1930) witnessed the destruction of their people and had the
unenviable task of searching for the means to end the human catastrophe. Indeed,
the Armenian Church itself, a conservative institution with a long tradition of loyalty
to the Ottoman Empire, in the end became a victim of the genocidal scheme of the
Young Turk regime.

The Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Armenian Question
The Ottoman state was in essence a theocratic political system, whereby the sultan,
as the Caliph (successor to the Prophet Mohammed), represented the supreme political
and religious authority. The political system was based on the millets (religious
communities) that provided for representation and supervision of the ethnoreligious communities in the empire, and within that system the Armenian
Apostolic community constituted a separate millet, headed by the Patriarchate in
Constantinople, where the patriarch served not only as the spiritual leader of the
Armenian Apostolic community in the empire but also as the administrative agency
responsible for Armenian educational and judicial affairs. Following Islamic tenets,
Ottoman society was divided between believers (Muslims) and ‘‘tolerated infidels’’
(non-Muslims), a system that rested on the principle of inequality: Ottoman law
relegated non-Muslim communities to a subordinate status, subject to various officially
sanctioned discriminatory policies. Conditions across the empire deteriorated rapidly
as a result of the economic and military decline experienced by the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries. By the late nineteenth century, the ethno-religious
boundaries had not only hardened but also become an integral part of the escalating
conflict between Turks and Armenians, although the Armenian community had for
centuries represented the exemplary loyal millet (Millet-i Sadıka).4 The role of the
patriarch grew immeasurably more complicated as Ottoman officials and bands of
marauding Kurds and Circassians routinely subjected Armenians to various forms of
officially sanctioned and unofficial brutalities. While the Ottoman government
resorted more frequently to repressive measures toward the Armenian millet,
especially in matters of taxation, the Armenian ecclesiastical leadership nevertheless
continued to advocate cooperation with officials at all levels of government.5
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In the meantime, international and domestic pressures from both
Muslims and non-Muslim communities demanding administrative reforms, liberalization, and democratization had led to the promulgation of the Tanzimat
(reorganization) reforms. Sultan Abdul Mecid (1839–1861) had introduced the
Hatt-ı Şerif of Gülhane (the Noble Rescript) in 1839 and in 1856 the Hatt-ı
Humayun (the Imperial Rescript), promising civil and political rights, physical
security, and equality.6 In 1847, the Sublime Porte had approved the creation
of the Armenian Spiritual Council (religious) and the Supreme Council (lay),
both under the directorship of the Patriarchate in Constantinople; in 1863, the
government had issued an imperial irade´ (decree) also ratifying the Armenian
National Constitution.7
Promises of structural reform and just governance, however, remained confined to
the halls of pomp and ceremony. Armenian calls for security of life and property and
for an end to arbitrary rule, corruption, and heavy taxation went unheeded. The
Ottoman government, increasingly mired in economic and military difficulties,
especially in the aftermath of the Crimean War (1853–1856), was determined to
reverse the course of imperial decline. In fact, rather than implement the promised
reforms, it resorted to repressing and persecuting opposition movements, which, in
turn, instigated further agitation for anti-government action among various groups,
particularly young intellectuals, including Armenians, trained in European universities. Some Armenians also organized self-defense societies for protection against
atrocities.8
Meanwhile, eastern Armenia, which was drawn into the Russian orbit during the
reigns of Peter the Great (1689–1725) and Catherine the Great (1762–1796), was
similarly subjected to repressive government measures in the first half of the
nineteenth century, as the Russian Empire consolidated power in the Caucasus. While
Yerevan and Nakhichevan were granted the status of Armianskaia Oblast—an
‘‘autonomous’’ Armenian province—Czar Nicholas I, in March 1836, instituted the
Polozhenie restricting the activities of the Armenian Church in political matters and
establishing czarist control over the church.9 The Polozhenie required that the
Catholicosate at Echmiadzin conduct its relations with the outside world through the
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Mother See at Echmiadzin nearly lost its
autonomy under czarist pressure.10
In both Russian and Ottoman Armenias, matters had improved little when
the Russo-Turkish war broke out in 1877. In the Ottoman Empire, the outbreak of the
war resulted in the suspension of the constitution of 1876 and the termination of the
Tanzimat in 1878, as the new sultan, Abdul Hamid II (1876–1908/9), deeply distrustful
of people beyond his immediate control, could not countenance even the facade of
reforms. The sultan’s resistance notwithstanding, the San Stefano and Berlin treaties
signed after the Russo-Turkish war led to the internationalization of the Armenian
Question.11 Neither the Mother See at Echmiadzin nor the Catholicosate of Cilicia was
in a position to assume an active role in the process, since they lacked formal
jurisdiction in matters of Ottoman diplomacy. Instead, as had been the case during
most of the nineteenth century, the strenuous responsibility of pursuing the Armenian
Question fell most heavily upon the shoulders of the Patriarchate in Constantinople.
The patriarchate was the only official representative institution for Ottoman
Armenians, but the involvement of the higher clergy in European diplomacy
ineluctably antagonized the Sublime Porte and raised suspicions about the role of
the church in its professions of loyalty.
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In fact, two contradictory patterns were set in motion in the orientation of the
Armenian Patriarchate with the internationalization of the Armenian Question in the
late nineteenth century. On the one hand, despite the deepening crisis, the church
in general remained a conservative institution and rejected association with the
opposition. Only a small minority among the clergy participated in political activities.
On the other hand, the Patriarchate in Constantinople was also compelled to serve as a
conduit for the expression of Armenian grievances before the Sublime Porte, as well as
in international diplomatic relations. Patriarch Nerses Varzhabedian (1874–1884) and
the higher clergy generally encouraged loyalty to the sultan, and during the RussoTurkish war the patriarch issued an encyclical urging Armenians to support the
Ottoman army. However, chronic maladministration on the part of Ottoman officials
at all levels of government and the geopolitical situation created by the Russo-Turkish
war denied the Armenian patriarchate the luxury of facile solutions through
declarations. Growing protests by Armenians in the eastern provinces demanding
protection from their Turkish, Kurdish, and Circassian attackers, coupled with the
Russian military victories during the war, emboldened Patriarch Nerses to travel to
San Stefano to petition the czarist government to include in the post-war peace treaty
a provision granting administrative autonomy and protection for the physical security
of his flock in the Armenian provinces. Russia, after all, Armenians believed, had
repeatedly presented itself as the ‘‘liberator’’ of Christians from the Turkish yoke, and
the convergence of interests might finally lead to the desired outcome.12
Under the Treaty of San Stefano (3 March 1878), Russia gained vast territories in
historic Armenian lands. This treaty also stipulated that the Sublime Porte would
ameliorate conditions in the Armenian provinces ‘‘without further delay’’ and protect
Armenians against Kurdish and Circassian attacks. The Russian military would
withdraw from the conquered territories only after conditions for the Armenians had
improved. European powers, most prominently Britain, viewed the treaty as a Russian
pan-Slavic attempt to dismember the Ottoman Empire and, accordingly, insisted that
it be renegotiated. The Russian government agreed and sent its representatives to
Berlin to meet with the European powers.13
With the blessing of the Patriarchate in Constantinople, an Armenian delegation
of two archbishops and two laymen, led by Archbishop Mgrdich Khrimian, who had
served as patriarch at Constantinople from 1869 to 1873 (later Catholicos at
Echmiadzin, 1892–1907), traveled to Western capitals hoping to garner diplomatic
support for the Armenian cause at the Berlin conference. While representatives of the
major powers met, however, the Armenian delegation was simply ignored and left to
wait outside. Armenian disillusionment at Berlin turned into utter frustration upon
learning the results of the conference. The Russian government had succumbed to
British pressure and signed a new treaty (the Treaty of Berlin, 13 July 1878), thereby
agreeing to withdraw its army from the conquered territories. To save face on the
home front, the European powers included a provision requiring that the Sublime
Porte implement, under European collective supervision, the necessary reforms for
the safety of its Armenian subjects. The Armenian patriarchate and, most notably,
Archbishop Khrimian protested the bankruptcy of Western arbitration regarding
Armenian concerns.14
Growing disillusionment with the European powers and the inability of the
Armenian Church to effect changes led to the radicalization of Armenian nationalist
movements and the emergence of loosely structured groups such as the Union of
Salvation (founded in Van in 1872), the Black Cross Society (Van, 1878), and the
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Protectors of the Fatherland (Erzurum, 1881). This was followed during the same
decade by the founding of the three major political parties: the Armenagan Party
(Van, 1885), the Hnchagian Party (Geneva, 1887), and the Armenian Revolutionary
Federation, or Tashnagtsutiun (Tiflis, 1890).15 While Armenians in general, albeit
with great trepidation, welcomed the party activists to their communities for the
physical security they promised, the socialist and revolutionary ideologies these
parties espoused nevertheless alarmed the more conservative institutions and classes.
The Armenian Church and members of the wealthier classes, who worked as
bankers, merchants, and civil servants in the capital and other major urban centers,
viewed the emerging nationalist movement among their compatriots as a nuisance and
radical revolutionary activities as a direct threat to their status in official circles and
society at large.16 Alarmed by the growing Armenian militancy and determined to
maintain the status quo, Patriarch Nerses Varzhabedian, in a message to the
Armenian National Assembly, pledged loyalty to the sultan, with the expectation that
the Sublime Porte would implement the promised reforms. The patriarchate, for
its part, would continue to direct all efforts to ameliorate the Armenian situation
with allegiance to the Ottoman government in mind.17
No expressions of fidelity, however, could assuage the fears of Sultan Abdul
Hamid II, who viewed all Armenian political activity as subversive. Armenian
demands for administrative reforms and political liberalization and, more to the point,
the involvement of the Armenian Patriarchate in the internationalization of the
Armenian Question further antagonized the sultan, who, growing ever more
suspicious of Armenian intentions, reacted by mobilizing his Muslim subjects against
the Armenian community. When Armenians resorted to armed self-defense,
particularly in Sasun, in the summer of 1894 to repel attacks on their villages and
families by the Hamidiye regiments and Circassians, the government organized
wholesale massacres that, by 1896, resulted in the deaths of more than 100,000
Armenians, with estimates as high as 300,000.18 Johannes Lepsius, a German
Protestant missionary, detailed the atrocities committed against the Armenians. He
reported that a clear pattern emerged in the strategy and method of the massacres,
beginning in early October in the province of Trebizond (Trabzon) and rapidly
spreading across the six Armenian vilayets of Erzurum, Bitlis, Kharpert (Mamuret
ul-Aziz), Sivas, Van, and Diyarbekir, reaching Aleppo, Adana, and Ankara by late
November. Lepsius estimated that 646 villages were forcibly converted to Islam,
645 churches and monasteries were desecrated and destroyed, and 328 churches were
turned into mosques.19 The Patriarchate in Constantinople could not have anticipated
massacres of such magnitude, despite the patently hostile attitude of the Sublime
Porte toward the Armenians.
By 1894, Varzhabedian had been succeeded by the lackluster Patriarch Harutiun
Vehabedian (1885–1888), followed by Khoren Ashegian (1888–1894). Neither
Vehabedian nor Ashegian was prepared for the task at this juncture, and the
patriarchate failed to pursue the Armenian Question. Patriarch Mateos Izmirlian
(1894–1896) sought to reinvigorate the patriarchate after a decade of decline, but his
open support for the Armenian nationalist movement undermined his own authority
in relations with the Sublime Porte.20 The fact that Patriarch Izmirlian had, in the
eyes of the government, maintained close ties with nationalists only exacerbated
the situation and marginalized him. Further, easily swayed by European promises
of support, Izmirlian expected European humanitarian and military intervention to
protect the Armenians. Convinced of that support, Izmirlian demanded that the sultan
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punish all officials and individual Turks and Kurds who had committed atrocities
against Armenians during the massacres. As Maghakia Ormanian has noted, there
was a wide chasm between Izmirlian’s expectations and political realities.
The government finally removed Patriarch Izmirlian from his post in 1896 and
exiled him to Jerusalem.21 His successor, Archbishop Ormanian, who served until
1908, brought to the patriarchate enormous energy in matters of cultural and
educational affairs, as attested by such publications as The Church of Armenia and,
more significantly, by his Azkabadum (‘‘History of the Nation’’). He was ardently loyal
to the sultanate, but his ultra-conservative stance on matters of reforms and socialist
ideology rendered him unpopular among Armenian activists.22
The repressive regime, economic difficulties, and recurring bloodshed convinced
not only Armenians but also the other nationalities in the empire, including Turks,
of the urgent need for fundamental structural improvements and changes in political
leadership. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the Young Turks, composed
of intellectual, political, and military leaders, along with the Armenian and other
Muslim and non-Muslim nationalist movements, agitated for such changes. The
_
Committee of Union and Progress (Ittihad
ve Terakki Cemiyeti), or CUP, created by
the Young Turks, sought to mobilize the revolutionary movement against Sultan
Abdul Hamid.23 The Young Turk revolution in July 1908 was welcomed by both
Christians and Muslims. As British ambassador Sir Gerard Lowther reported from
Constantinople, ‘‘priests met with hodjas in the market place and publicly embraced,
and liberty, equality, and fraternity became the order of the day.’’24 Ormanian, too
closely associated with the sultanate, resigned as patriarch under questionable
circumstances immediately after the revolution, and the new regime, combining its
political victory with the moral, returned Izmirlian from his exile in Jerusalem
as patriarch. Within months, however, Izmirlian was elected as Catholicos of the
Mother See at Echmiadzin.25
The Young Turk revolution and the reinstitution of the constitution of 1876
seemed, albeit briefly, to have inaugurated a period of revival in Armenian cultural
and political life. The liberal faction of the Young Turk leadership advocated the
implementation of civil and political rights within a parliamentary system, but neither
domestic nor international conditions proved conducive to further liberalization.
The nationalist factions emphasized the economic and military revival of the Ottoman
Empire and mounted an insurmountable opposition, and the new government proved
too fragile in its formative stages to counter such challenges, particularly against the
reactionary forces of the sultan. During the ensuing struggle for power in April 1909,
two rounds of massacres were launched against the Armenians, in the region of Adana,
that by the end of the month left more than 20,000 Armenians dead.26 Patriarch
Hovhannes Arsharuni and Catholicos Sahag pleaded for calm and an end to the
bloodshed. After peace was restored, the patriarchate dispatched teams of priests,
doctors, intellectuals, and other community leaders and public servants to help in the
recovery process.27 Such experiences, however, could not prepare the Armenian
leadership for the more sinister schemes yet to unfold.
The ultra-nationalists within the CUP, led by Mehmed Talât, Ismail Enver,
and Ahmed Cemal, gained in power particularly during the Balkan wars as
military defeats forced the Ottoman Empire to make further territorial concessions.
In 1913, Enver and his supporters orchestrated a military coup and established
the Ittihadist military dictatorship. The Ittihadists relied on the ideology
of Pan-Turkism/Pan-Turanism to strengthen their power and political legitimacy,
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as they pressed forward to create an exclusively Turkish state at home and aspired to
eastward expansionism toward Central Asia for the unification of all Turkic peoples.28
Christopher Walker has correctly noted that ‘‘The Armenians failed to grasp the
nature of Turkism. They continued to see themselves as Christians . . .. Religion was an
integral part of being an Ottoman Armenian, so a nonreligious ideology was hard to
comprehend. They found it almost impossible to see what it meant to be up against
a nonreligious, race-based ideology.’’29 The Young Turk regime viewed the Armenian
people as an impediment to the Turkification of the empire and to the regime’s
Pan-Turkic expansionist and unification schemes—policies that contributed to the
Armenian Genocide.

The Genocide
Despite the signs of trouble, most Armenians continued to hope that conditions would
improve. In 1910, Archbishop Ormanian concluded his famous treatise on the
Armenian Church with the statement that the Armenian was ‘‘impressed with the
conviction that the Church, which has protected him in the past, will continue to
protect him in the future.’’30 In a letter dated 19 November 1913 (6 November
according to the Ottoman calendar), the popular Armenian poet Vahan Tekeyan
congratulated the newly elected Armenian Patriarch Zaven Der Yeghiayan at
Constantinople and expressed his belief that the Armenian people had found in His
Holiness a person capable of leading the nation toward a better future.31 Such
expectations were reinforced by the Reform Act of 8 February 1914, initiated by
petitions to the Russian government by Catholicos Kevork V Surenyants at
Echmiadzin, in cooperation with the Armenian National Assembly, the National
Executive, and the Patriarchate in Constantinople. Signed by Ottoman Grand Vizier
Said Halim and the Russian charge´ d’affaires Konstantin N. Gulkevich, the Reform
Act promised administrative restructuring to facilitate better distribution of bureaucratic and political authority.32 The outbreak of World War I in July dashed all such
hopes, however. As the Turkish government began military mobilization (seferberlik),
some Armenian men hesitated and even refused to enter military service. Years of
Muslim hostility toward their communities had made the Armenians suspect that the
mobilization was merely a ploy to remove all able-bodied men from their homes,
leaving their families vulnerable to the incessant attacks by çetes (brigands) and
armed Kurdish bands.
Contrary to the conventional view that the genocide began in April 1915, violence
against Armenians began soon after the outbreak of war, and Armenian ecclesiastical
leaders, clearly troubled by the developing crisis but adhering to the conservative
disposition of the church, insisted on compliance with government demands so as not
to give the authorities the opportunity to exploit refusal to serve in the military, and
similar instances of insubordination, as a pretext for atrocities. In September 1914,
for instance, about eighty Armenian deserters in the region of Maraş and Zeytun
Süleymanl| (the ‘‘i’’ at the end is an-dotted ‘‘i’’ surrendered to the mutassarif (county
governor) of Maraş, Ali Haidar Bey, who had little liking for the Armenians. Armenian
community leaders, represented by the local primate, Hovhannes Vartabed
Karanfilian, were concerned that such tensions could serve as a pretext for the
authorities to resort to military measures against Armenians throughout the region.33
And, as predicted, Haidar Bey, not satisfied with the number of Armenians who had
surrendered to the authorities, urged local Muslims to attack Armenians and ordered
the mass arrests of Armenian men. Catholicos Sahag II Khabayan of Cilicia
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vehemently opposed any Armenian involvement in armed conflict with the troops; he
encouraged the surrender of escapees and intervened to mediate between the local
Armenians and the Turkish authorities. Although, soon thereafter, some of the
arrested men were freed, most were sent into exile or executed, the fate of their
families left to the whims of the local kaimakam (district governor), Husein Husni.34
Conditions were made infinitely worse after Turkey’s entry into the war in October
and the official proclamation of jihad (holy war) in November. Far from serving as
leaders of a theocratic system, the Ittihadists despised religion and religious
institutions. As Henry Morgenthau, US ambassador to Constantinople, observes in
Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story, ‘‘Practically all of them were atheists, with no more
respect for Mohammedanism than for Christianity, and with them the one motive was
cold-blooded, calculating state policy.’’ Referring to Interior Minister Talât, he
comments, ‘‘I can personally testify that he cared nothing for Mohammedanism for,
like most of the leaders of his party, he scoffed at all religions. ‘I hate all priests, rabbis,
and hodjas,’ he once told me—hodja being the nearest equivalent the Mohammedans
have for a minister of religion.’’35 The Ittihadists, like Sultan Abdul Hamid, employed
religion as an instrument of propaganda to mobilize the Muslim masses. The jihad was
aimed at the Allies but also at the Armenians.36
Beginning in November, government policy became increasingly violent, and the
political and economic situation for Armenians across the Armenian provinces and
throughout the empire deteriorated rapidly. Çete bands attacked Armenian villages
near the city of Sivas and farther north in the region of Şebinkarahisar (ShabinKarahisar).37 The newly elected prelate of Sivas, Sahag Odabashian, was killed on his
way to Sivas, the murder carried out, it was suspected, with the tacit approval of, if not
under direct orders from, the vali (provincial governor), Ahmed Muammer Bey.38
On 16 December 1914, an Imperial Rescript nullified the 8 February agreement,39
although the German ambassador to Constantinople, Hans von Wangenheim, hoping
to improve Armenian perception of German involvement in Turkey, sought to convince
Patriarch Zaven that the implementation of the Reform Act would be resumed after
the war.40
Enver’s failed military campaign at Sarıkamış in December 1914 and January
1915 was followed, beginning in February and through the month of March, by
the intensification of organized attacks on Armenians. On 2 February 1915, the
authorities seized the Monastery of the Holy Cross41 near the city of Sivas, and on 18
February, under the pretext of collecting weapons, Turkish soldiers entered Armenian
houses, arrested some Armenian leaders, and attacked their families.42 In early April,
the provinces witnessed the arrest and deportation of Armenian notables in growing
numbers, while orders arrived that Armenians must surrender all arms and
ammunition, and the arrests, deportations, and massacres escalated by the end of
April.43
Armenian community leaders, intimately familiar with the Turkish modus
operandi in times of political turbulence, appealed to the authorities to end the
crisis. Catholicos Sahag pleaded for leniency toward the deserters. Minister of the
Marine and Commander of the Fourth Army in Syria, Ahmed Cemal Paşa, replied that
the authorities would not harm Armenians loyal to the government. Catholicos Sahag
also wrote to vali Celal Bey of Aleppo vilayet regarding the conflict in Zeytun and
requested an investigation of the situation. In a letter to Patriarch Zaven, the griefstricken catholicos wrote: ‘‘How will this tragedy brough upon the Armenian people in
Cilicia be healed? We are told that appeals to Constantinople are useless.44
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On 23 April, a group of Armenian political leaders in Constantinople, including
deputies Krikor Zohrab and Vartkes (Hovhannes Serengulian), met with the patriarch
to assess the situation and agreed to communicate their concerns to the Sublime
Porte.45 But on Saturday 24 April, soldiers were stationed throughout Constantinople,
home to some 150,000 Armenians, and the authorities arrested about 200 Armenian
intellectuals and community leaders, including the renowned musicologist and priest
Gomidas Vartabed Soghomonian. These arrestees were exiled to the interior, and an
additional 600 people were subsequently arrested. Extensive searches for weapons
followed, and within weeks more than 2,300 Armenians had been arrested in
Constantinople. Some of them were sent to the predominantly Muslim town of Ayaş,
west of Ankara city, and others farther east, to Çankırı and Çorum.46
Soon the entire Armenian nation became engulfed in terror, as the Young Turk
regime began the deportations while Turks and Kurds attacked Armenian towns. In
March, Patriarch Zaven, in a brief but anxious message to Catholicos Sahag, expressed
grave concerns about the ominous events unfolding in the empire’s Armenian
communities. The patriarch appealed to the authorities for a peaceful resolution of
the crisis without further bloodshed and requested that the catholicos again petition
the Sublime Porte.47 In late April 1915, Catholicos Kevork V Surenyants of the Mother
See at Echmiadzin sent an urgent telegram to Boghos Nubar,48 whom the catholicos
had appointed in 1912 to lead the Armenian National Delegation to secure European
support in Armenian matters, stating that massacres and ‘‘bloody turbulence’’ had
occurred in Erzurum, Bitlis, Van, and Cilicia. The catholicos further informed Boghos
Nubar that he had appealed to US President Woodrow Wilson, the Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Sazonov, and King Victor Emmanuel of Italy to use their good offices
with Constantinople to find the means to end the persecutions so that at least unarmed
civilians could be protected.49 Referring to the appeal by the catholicos, US Secretary
of State William Jennings Bryan directed Ambassador Morgenthau to call the Sublime
Porte’s attention to this matter. Interior Minister Talât replied that the Sublime Porte
had instructed the authorities in the provinces ‘‘to protect all innocent people from
molestation.’’50
In May 1915, Armenians with no record of political involvement were being
arrested in increasing numbers, condemned to hard labor to die of starvation and
exhaustion, or else killed soon after their forced deportation. The Armenian prelate of
Kayseri, Bishop Khosrov Behrigian, was arrested and handed over to the military
courts; subsequently, accused of favoring Russian military liberation of Armenians,
he was deported, together with a caravan of hundreds of refugees, and murdered along
with several other prominent figures on the road to Diyarbekir.51 During the second
half of May, 200 Armenians in Yozgat, including businessmen, government officials,
intellectuals, and the local primate, Bishop Nerses Tanielian, were arrested, marched
out of town, and finally murdered in a valley some distance away.52 The prelate of
Erzurum, Archbishop Smpad Saadetian, along with a caravan of 7,000 Armenians,
was deported to Malatya and met a similar fate in July.53
Efforts by Armenian ecclesiastical leaders and their supporters to draw the
attention of the Allied Powers to the Armenian crisis seemed to produce a positive
result when, on 24 May 1915, Britain, France, and Russia issued a joint declaration
stating that they ‘‘announce publicly to the Sublime Porte that they will hold all
members of the Government, as well as such of their agents as are implicated,
personally responsible for such massacres.’’54 Boghos Nubar intimated to LieutenantColonel G.M. Gregory, president of the United Armenian Association in London, that,
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upon reading the declaration, he was satisfied that ‘‘the Allies are taking our cause
seriously and are ready to offer us their complete collaboration.’’55
Such declarations had little effect on the Ittihadists’ decisions regarding the
Armenians. In fact, on 29 May 1915, the government instituted the Temporary Law of
Deportation, authorizing the military to oversee the wholesale deportation of
the Armenian population.56 The full ramifications of this law with respect to the
Armenian people, but also with respect to the authority of the Armenian Church, were
amply clear when Patriarch Zaven went to see Talât Pasha in June to plead for
an end to the deportations and killings. The latter refused to see the patriarch
and instead responded in a message stating, ‘‘Let him say whatever he has to
the Minister of Justice; that’s the merji‘ah [place of authority] where he should go.’’57
The patriarch then held a conference with the minister of justice and
religious affairs, Pirizade Ibrahim Bey. Their heartrending conversation is worth
quoting here:
Patriarch: Several [of] our Nation’s Prelates are languishing in jail, and we have no
news from the rest. Priests are suffering in jail and at their places of exile. Churches are
demolished or locked up, and the people are being pushed toward the desert.
Minister Ibrahim Bey: I have no information about the Prelates being jailed.
Patriarch: Yes, I know for a fact that the Prelates of Gesaria, Brusa, Trebizond, and
Dikranagerd have been imprisoned. As for the other Prelates, I do not know what may
have happened to them, because I have not received responses to my telegrams . . .. Now
that I do not have my Prelates, priests, or flock, whose spiritual leader am I?
Minister Ibrahim Bey: As Minister of Justice, I accept the petition that you are
submitting to me concerning religious matters, but the part in it that pertains to the
common people does not fall under my jurisdiction.
Patriarch: A spiritual leader cannot exist without the common people, just like a
shepherd cannot exist without his flock, nor an imam [Muslim priest] without his
jemaat [believers]. It is only natural that I should come to inquire of you as to the
whereabouts of my people, so that I might take care of their needs. When my people are
uprooted and driven toward the mountain and the desert, how can I be their leader any
more?
Minister Ibrahim Bey: Do not say, ‘‘They are driven!’’ Yet, more as a friend than as
an official, I assure you that the government has made and is making all the
arrangements for their comfort.58

During a meeting with Grand Vizier Salim Pasha, Patriarch Zaven pleaded, ‘‘The
exceptional situation in which my Nation finds itself compels me to ask for the State’s
mercy.’’ Salim replied that the government, although confronted with a ‘‘structured
organization’’ and a segment of the population that ‘‘has taken up arms against us,’’
did not intend to annihilate the Armenians but, rather, was ‘‘implementing a tedbir
[precautionary measure] and . . . removing the Armenians from those Provinces.’’
The grand vizier commented that this policy was ‘‘not a jeza’’ (i.e., not a punishment).
The patriarch countered that it was a ‘‘big jeza, and it is not even proportionate [to] the
imputed crimes!’’ His flock, now composed mostly of women and children, was being
deported to the mountains and the desert. ‘‘What will happen to them? May God have
pity on them!’’ The grand vizier inquired, ‘‘Talaata getmedin mi?’’ (Did you not go to
Talât?). When the patriarch replied that Talât had refused to see him, the grand vizier
concluded the conversation thus: ‘‘Bunlar olmamalı idi!’’ (These should not have
happened).59
Unable to move the Young Turk leaders to terminate the deportations and the
bloodshed, Armenian Church leaders intensified their appeals to the Western powers
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and to world public opinion. Patriarch Zaven wrote to the prelate of the Armenian
Church in Bulgaria, Bishop Ghevont Turian, with appeals to disseminate information
about the atrocities being committed by the Young Turk regime against the
Armenians.60 In a number of letters the patriarch implored Bishop Turian to ‘‘find a
remedy to this frightful situation’’ by convincing the Allied Powers to put pressure on
the Young Turk regime to stop further persecution and murder of the Armenians.61
The patriarch informed Turian:
One after the other, populations from Samson and Gesaria all the way to and including
Dikranagerd and Edessa [Urfa] have been put on the road. The Armenian populations
of Trebizond, Sepasdia, Kharpert, Paghesh, Van, and Dikranagerd, from the oldest to
the youngest and excepting not a single person, have been driven to the deserts of
Mesopotamia—from areas south of Aleppo to Mosul and Baghdad.62

In July 1915, Catholicos Kevork V of the Mother See at Echmiadzin appealed to
President Wilson to find a means ‘‘in the name of humanity and our holy Christian
faith’’ to intervene to end the atrocities and massacres.63 He also advised his envoy in
London, Boghos Nubar, ‘‘to protest to the Allies and the neutral states’’ and to appeal
for the prevention of further deportations and annihilation of the Armenians.64 Boghos
Nubar, for his part, informed Bighop Turian that ‘‘unfortunately, the authorities [of
the United States and Italy] have not succeeded in persuading the Sublime Porte to
change its policy toward the Armenians. As Your Eminence had mentioned in the
report, this policy aims at the annihilation of the Armenian nation. Thus, in spite of
these appeals, the persecutions have continued.’’65 Several weeks later, Catholicos
Kevork V sent another appeal to the Western powers to intervene—but to no avail.66
On 26 September 1915, the Ittihadists promulgated the Temporary Law on
Expropriation and Confiscation, permitting the government to seize the goods and
properties of the deported.67 In December, Count Paul Wolff-Metternich, Ambassador
Wangenheim’s successor in Constantinople, commented in a telegram to Berlin that
‘‘protests are useless and Turkish denials that no more deportations are to be
undertaken are worthless.’’68
By the end of 1915, most of the Armenians had been deported from their ancestral
homeland, with only a handful of locations evincing sufficient capability to
demonstrate resistance. These included Van, Şebinkarahisar, Şanlıurfa, Zeytun,
Bitlis, and Musa Dagh, the last immortalized by Franz Werfel’s The Forty Days of
Musa Dagh.69 Most of the local Armenian priests were imprisoned and murdered or,
if left alive, deported; some of them chose to depart from the customary orientation of
the patriarchate and took part in local resistance movements. In a letter to Catholicos
Kevork V, Father Vartan Varteresian, who for years had served as the local priest at
Suedia, noted that four other local priests had participated in the resistance at Musa
Dagh.70
The genocidal policies of the Young Turk regime entered a new phase as the
Ittihadists sought to liquidate the Armenian Church. In December, Talât sent an
urgent telegram to authorities in Aleppo vilayet instructing that those Armenian
clergy who had been able to reach Syria and Jerusalem be annihilated.71 Indeed, as
Morgenthau states in his Story,
Nothing was sacred to the Turkish gendarmes; under the plea of searching for hidden
arms, they ransacked churches, treated the altars and sacred utensils with the utmost
indignity, and even held mock ceremonies in imitation of the Christian sacraments.
They would beat the priests into insensibility, under the pretense that they were the
centres of sedition. When they could discover no weapons in the churches, they would
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sometimes arm the bishops and priests with guns, pistols and swords, then try them
before courts-martial for possessing weapons against the law, and march them in this
condition through the streets, merely to arouse the fanatical wrath of the mobs.72

The Abolition of the Armenian Church73
In early 1916 the central government informed the Armenian Patriarchate in
Constantinople and the Catholicosate at Sis of their intention to terminate both
institutions. Now that nearly the entire Armenian population had been removed from
their homeland, the services of the patriarchate as the representative of the Armenian
millet were no longer needed. In January 1916, the patriarch was notified of the
Ittihadist government’s intention to nullify the Armenian National Constitution, and
on 28 July/10 August of the same year the government abolished the Patriarchate
in Constantinople and the Catholicosate of Aghtamar, ordering the virtually defunct
Catholicosate of Aghtamar to be combined with the patriarchates in Jerusalem and
Constantinople. It further ordered the Catholicosate of Sis to remain permanently in
Jerusalem and to assume the title of Catholicos-Patriarch.74 The Ministry of Justice
and Religion submitted a statement to the Armenian Patriarchate announcing the
abolition of his authority. Addressed to Patriarch Zaven, the communication
concluded: ‘‘Your position and the structure of the Armenian Patriarchate have
come to an end.’’75 The government also ordered the patriarch to move to Baghdad and
thence to Mosul, where he remained until the conclusion of the war. The seminarians
at the Armash Seminary were ordered to Jerusalem or else—very much like their
compatriots—were dispersed, exiled, and murdered.76 Former patriarch Ormanian
was deported to Damascus in 1917.77 Harry Stuermer, wartime correspondent for the
Kölnische Zeitung in Constantinople, commented that
by dissolving the Patriarchate in the Capital, breaking off all relations with the
Armenian headquarters in Etzmiadjin and allowing only a very small remainder of
Patriarchate to be sent up in Jerusalem under special state supervision, the Turks, as a
logical sequence to the Armenian atrocities, simply dealt a death-blow in the summer of
1916 to this important social institution.78

In the meantime, Catholicos Sahag, who had been exiled to Aleppo in late
1915, was notified by Cemal Paşa of the decision regarding the restructuring of the
Armenian Church. In so doing, the government limited what little legal protection
and privileges the Armenian Church had retained during the preceding years.
Immediately after Catholicos Sahag arrived at Aleppo, however, the authorities
demanded that he take up residence at the Patriarchate in Jerusalem, where
he remained, at the St. James Monastery, until the end of August 1916. In
one of his reports to the Armenian patriarchate, Catholicos Sahag describes the
conditions there:
The road from Aleppo to Damascus was lined with thousands of Armenian refugees.
Some were living in tents and others in the open air, begging for bread and water and
asking for news about their friends. We went through places where one tenekeh [tin
can] of water cost six to seven piasters, but still there was no one to give it. Many
refugees—no one knows the exact number—are in the area of Kerek, and in the district
of Salt there are about 400 households. Every village has 100 households of refugees,
and in the sanjak of Serai there are approximately 500 households. These people come
to the monastery, where they receive 30 to 40 loaves of bread a day, which [they]
eat in the kitchen. About 80 refugees from Adana—with the special favor of
Jemal Pasha—have arrived in Jerusalem and are living in the monastery compound.
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There are also many soldiers with their families. Every day, two or three Armenian
amele [laborers] die.79

Catholicos Sahag also lamented the restructuring of the Armenian Church: ‘‘I suppose
I am to be congratulated for the honor bestowed upon me as the Catholicos-Patriarch of
Cilicia, Constantinople, and Jerusalem. This restructuring is nothing but the
destruction of our historic Church, our spiritual center, the heart and soul of our
people.’’80
The deportation of Patriarch Zaven and Catholicos Sahag of Cilicia left only
Catholicos Kevork V of Echmiadzin, among the ecclesiastical leaders, to pursue
matters with the Western governments. After several entreaties to the latter for
some form of intervention, Catholicos Kevork had, during 1915 and 1916, come to
accept the fate of his compatriots across the Ottoman border. He was encouraged,
however, based on communications from his envoy Boghos Nubar, that after the war
the Allied Powers would provide the necessary support for an Armenian homeland free
of Turkish rule. As early as 28 July 1915, Boghos Nubar reported that, having visited
several high-ranking officials in London, he was pleased that ‘‘the British government
will graciously agree to support our national cause until its accomplishment, when the
time will come to decide the fate of the Ottoman Empire, after the victory of the Allies.’’
Boghos Nubar expressed confidence that his ‘‘negotiations have been quite fruitful,
and Russia, France, and England show a friendly disposition toward our cause.’’ His
next letter reiterates this point: ‘‘We can rest assured that after the final victory of the
Allies, we shall have the benefit of their support to accomplish our plan.’’81
While in February 1916, as a result of the Russian capture of Erzurum, Boghos
Nubar urged Catholicos Kevork V to maintain close relations with the czarist
government as the only reliable ally with ‘‘favorable inclination and unanimous
feelings’’ toward the Armenian Question, the Sykes-Picot Agreement signed by the
Allied Powers in April shifted Boghos Nubar’s attention to British and French postwar aims and, particularly, French aspirations concerning Cilicia.82 It was ironic at
best that Boghos Nubar, serving as the personal envoy of the catholicos at Echmiadzin,
would insist on including Cilicia as part of the envisioned Armenian homeland, when
in fact the catholicos, in his capacity, could have exerted little influence in matters
pertaining to the region. The catholicos sought to maintain close relations with
Russia’s provisional government after the revolution that overthrew the
czarist government in February 1917, but hopes for Russian engagement to provide
protection for Armenian refugees began to dissipate after the Bolshevik revolution in
October–November 1917.83
Nevertheless, despite the calamitous events since 1914, what inspired most hope
was the reestablishment, in May 1918, of an Armenian government in the Caucasus,
with the city of Yerevan, about thirteen miles from Echmiadzin, as its capital. The last
Armenian government in the region, the Bagratuni kingdom, had been destroyed by
the Seljuk invasions in the eleventh century. The Allied victory and occupation of
Constantinople and parts of the interior gave rise to expectations that the promises
(such as the 24 May joint declaration) expressed during the war, when there was no
Armenian government, would surely be realized now that a sovereign Armenian
government had formal representation before the victors. Yet, as General Kress von
Kressenstein, head of the German delegation in the Caucasus, reported to the
German foreign ministry in August 1918, the deplorable conditions across the Republic
of Armenia, where thousands of refugees were living in chaos and starving to death,
rendered political and economic normalcy utterly inaccessible to both the government
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in Yerevan and the Catholicosate at Echmiadzin.84 With respect to the role of the
Armenian Church, the Allied victory redirected international attention from the
Catholicosate at Echmiadzin as the center of Armenian ecclesiastical authority to
the Patriarchate in Constantinople and the Catholicosate of Sis as some of the
survivors began their long-awaited return to the homeland.

Reinstitution of the Armenian Church after the War
Immediately after the Mudros Armistice of 30 October 1918, the defeated Turkish
government, on 4 November, repealed the Temporary Law of Deportation,85 and on
20 November the legal status of the Armenian Patriarchate was restored according to
the National Constitution of 1863. The government also reinstituted the Catholicosate
of Cilicia at Sis, although it was to retain the title assigned under the 1916 decree of
Catholicos-Patriarch.86 Patriarch Zaven, known for his pro-British orientation,
returned to Constantinople on the British destroyer Acacia on 19 February 1919.87
Upon resuming his post on 20 February 1919, the patriarch oversaw the
reorganization of the ecclesiastical and secular structures of administration, consisting
of the National General Assembly and administrative assemblies. Thereafter, the
patriarchate and the associated organizations in Constantinople instituted a number
of social services, most prominently to care for the orphans of the massacres. They
established the Orphan Collection Agency, the Orphan Care Agency, and the Society
for Deportees; the latter two merged on 28 February 1919 to form the Armenian
National Trusteeship.88 The National Trusteeship supervised several orphanages and
relocation posts, including, for example, the Beylerbey Orphanage and the Beşiktaş
Orphanage for Girls. Armenian compatriotic societies contributed to their efforts.
Armenians from Kayseri, for example, established the Compatriotic Society of Kayseri
Natives,89 which organized efforts to gather and care for the orphans from the region.
The National Assembly introduced a ‘‘fatherland tax’’ to meet the financial needs of the
orphans. By December 1922, about 3,000 Armenian orphans had been rescued, of an
estimated 4,000 to 5,000 in Constantinople alone. A large number of them emigrated to
Europe, the United States, and Canada. In Cilicia, Syria, Lebanon, and Armenia, tens
of thousands of orphans remained in need of care in several orphanages, as in Adana,
Maraş, Aleppo, Juné, and Gumri.90 The Mother See at Echmiadzin, in cooperation
with the nascent government, spearheaded the relief effort for the refugees in Gumri,
in Yerevan, and across Armenia, but the post–World War I military, economic, and
political chaos plaguing the Caucasus undermined all such efforts.91
In a letter to Catholicos Kevork V in May 1919, Patriarch Zaven listed the names of
twenty-five prelates of the Armenian Apostolic Church who had been imprisoned,
tortured, and murdered. Among them were some of the brightest leaders of the
Armenian Church in the early twentieth century, including Bishop Smpad Saadetian,
prelate of Erzurum; Bishop Khosrov Behrigian, prelate of Kayseri; and Bishop Nerses
Tanielian, prelate of Yozgat. Patriarch Zaven added that as of yet it would be
impossible to prepare a complete list of the clergy who had perished during the
genocide, but he estimated that the total number of Armenian lives lost exceeded 1.25
million. The primary task now was to marshal the financial, human, and organizational resources of Armenian communities to coordinate the revival of Armenian
spiritual, cultural, educational, economic, and political life—the very life that the
Young Turks had sought to destroy.92
Having resumed his post, Catholicos Sahag began the task of reorganizing the
Armenian community in Cilicia as thousands of refugees began their homeward
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journey. In January 1919, he communicated to British General Sir Edmund
H.H. Allenby, then British high commissioner for Egypt and Sudan, the urgent need
to disarm the Muslim population in Cilicia, as the repatriating Armenians feared a
recurrence of wholesale massacres. The catholicos warned that since the architects of
the genocide had thus far gone unpunished, while the repatriating Armenians were
reclaiming their properties, renewed bloodshed appeared inevitable.93 Despite such
warnings, the Allied Powers did little to prevent further Armenian calamities. Instead,
as the catholicos observed in a letter to Boghos Nubar, the Allies allowed Patriarch
Zaven to return to Constantinople merely to be employed in collecting relief funds.94
Repatriation of Armenian refugees from northern Syria began in the summer of
1919, and by early 1920 thousands of Armenians had repatriated to the region of
Cilicia. Armenian life appeared to be on the road to revival as the Armenian Apostolic,
Protestant, and Catholic churches and various organizations, schools, and orphanages
resumed their community activities and served the repatriates.95 The Catholicosate of
Cilicia directed the organizational life of several orphanages, the largest concentrations being in Adana, Aintab, and Aleppo. In September 1919, Catholicos Sahag
returned to Adana and then to Sis to begin the process of reconstruction. Beginning in
March 1920, he traveled to France, England, and Italy to present the Armenian case
before the victorious Allied Powers, but by the time he returned to Adana in November,
a series of peace treaties—the Treaty of London (19 March 1920), the Treaty of San
Remo (18 May 1920), and the Treaty of Sèvres (10 August 1920)—had so altered the
geopolitical situation in Turkey and the Middle East as to render his mission
superfluous. The conferences in European capitals produced much praise for the
Armenians and the Cilician catholicos but little concrete support for the Armenians.
The Kemalist movement and the French refusal to support Cilician Armenians led to
the final destruction of the Cilician Catholicosate in Sis by the end of 1921. Catholicos
Sahag departed from Cilicia for the last time on 25 November 1921, a month after
the signing of the Franco-Turkish treaty (the Treaty of Ankara, 20 October 1921) that
recognized the Kemalist government at Ankara.96 By then, thousands of Muslim
muhajirs (refugees) arriving to Cilicia from different parts of the empire had seized
Armenian homes, and the seminary of the catholicosate in Sis had been converted into
a school for the children of the muhajirs.

The Catholicosate of Cilicia in Exile
For several years, the Catholicosate of Cilicia lacked its own institutional base.97
The ancient city of Aleppo, which had historically been one of the major dioceses of
the Cilician Catholicosate, at first appeared to be the principal candidate for the postgenocide seat. After the removal of the Catholicosate from Sis and the total deportation
and massacres of the Armenians across Cilicia, a considerable proportion of the
refugees arriving from Cilicia and the eastern provinces were in northern Syria, and
the city of Aleppo could play a central role in the organization of relief activities.
The prelacy at Aleppo was already representing the Armenian refugees in official
matters regarding relief funds and directing several committees engaged in the
distribution of goods.98 But it would be some years before the Armenian Church could
recover from the destruction suffered during the genocide.
According to the statistics kept by the Patriarchate in Constantinople, prior
to World War I there were 3,788 churches and 3,909 parishes in Ottoman and
Russian Armenia.99 Four decades later, as Table 1 shows, there was a total of
417 churches and 446 parishes.100 Whereas before World War I there were 2,138
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Table 1: Statistics on Armenian apostolic dioceses

Patriarchate of Constantinople
Catholicosate of Echmiadzin
Catholicosate of Cilicia
Patriarchate of Jerusalem
Catholicosate of Aghtamar
Total
Total in the Ottoman Empire
Total in the Republic of Turkey

Before World War I

1954

Churches

Parishes

Churches

Parishes

1,634
1,650
214
18
272
3,788
2,138
–

1,778
1,660
267
10
194
3,909
2,249
–

38
330
40
9
0
417
–
38

42
354
45
5
0
446
–
42

Source: Maghakia Ormanian, The Church of Armenia, trans. G. Marcar Gregory, 3rd rev. ed.
(New York: St. Vartan Press, 1988), appendices II and III, 239–45.

churches in the Ottoman Empire, the figure had dropped to thirty-eight by 1954.
Equally significant, while prior to the genocide all of the Cilician churches were located
in Cilicia, their number not only declined from 214 to forty as a result of the genocide,
but all of them were found in foreign lands, in diasporan communities hundreds, if not
thousands, of miles from the homeland. The historic Catholicosate of Cilicia at Sis,
once the Holy See within a thriving Armenian kingdom, had witnessed a dramatic
diminution in its authority and jurisdiction under Ottoman tutelage and was, in the
end, completely destroyed under the Young Turk regime. So too did the Catholicosate
of Aghtamar, with its once thriving parishes along the Lake Van basin, perish during
the genocide.
To be sure, the destruction of the Armenian churches during and since the
genocide was representative of the Turkish drive first to annihilate the Armenian
people and then to eradicate all memories of its existence across the ancient Armenian
homeland. Having nearly accomplished the first objective, the Turkish government
has been engaged in a campaign of denial and eradication since the establishment of
the Kemalist regime in 1923. Referring to similar comparative data, Karekin Vartabed
Sarkissian—then the dean of the Armenian Theological Seminary at Antelias,
Lebanon, later Catholicos of Cilicia at Antelias, and subsequently Catholicos of All
Armenians at Echmiadzin—has put it most aptly: ‘‘The simple comparison is more
eloquent about the consequences of the massacres than any comment made by the
most highly gifted historian.’’101
Despite the devastation, the Armenian Church has remained the principal
institution in perpetuating the memory of the nation’s martyrdom; for the past nine
decades, the church has led the commemoration of the genocide. On 24 April 1919, the
reinstituted Patriarchate in Constantinople for the first time organized a commemorative event.102 The following year, author, literary critic, and historian Vrtanes
Papazian, who at the time served as principal of the secondary school in Echmiadzin,
encouraged Catholicos Kevork V to issue a declaration proclaiming 24 April as a
day of national mourning.103 Since then, the Armenian Church has organized,
or co-sponsored with community organizations throughout the diaspora and in
Armenia, commemorations of the genocide.
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When Persecution Bleeds into Mass
Murder: The Processive Nature of
Genocide
Uğur Ü. Üngör
Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Amsterdam
In the rapidly developing historiography of the Armenian Genocide, the processive
character of pre-genocidal persecutions has received less attention than
the genocidal process itself. This article treats the persecution of Ottoman
Armenians as a cumulative process leading up to a mass-murder campaign in
the summer of 1915. It addresses the evolution of CUP policy toward the Armenians
through the prism of escalating persecution and the relationship between center
and periphery. In order to illustrate the concrete implementation of this process,
the province of Diyarbekir will serve as an example to clarify the history of
the persecutions.

Introduction
This article will address the evolution of CUP policy toward the Armenians through
the prism of escalating persecution and the relationship between center and periphery,
within the context of the development of general Ottoman population policies
between 1913 and 1915. In this period, the Ottoman Empire was under the rule of
_
the Committee of Union and Progress (Ittihad
ve Terakki Cemiyeti), or CUP. From
1914 on, a small but radical faction within this semi-official political party,1 having
seized government power, launched empire-wide campaigns of persecution, involving
mass deportation, forced assimilation, and genocidal destruction of various ethnic
communities. Hundreds of Arab, Armenian, Kurdish, Syriac, and other communities
were affected and suffered heavy losses as a result of these forced relocations
and persecutions, which combined with wartime famines due to corruption, failed
harvests due to deportations, and the outbreak of contagious diseases to kill
millions of human beings. The CUP put its policies into practice for the sake of a
thorough ethno-religious homogenization of the empire, resulting in the establishment
of a Turkish nation-state in 1923. In subsequent decades, processes of social
engineering went on, as many CUP potentates remained influential and continued
to formulate and implement new policies of demographic engineering in the
Turkish Republic.
In his book on ethnic cleansing, Norman Naimark notes that ‘‘ethnic cleansing
bleeds into genocide.’’2 More recently, Jacques Sémelin has offered a painstaking
analysis of how precisely this occurs: born out of a political crisis, radical regimes
launch persecutory measures that can subsequently escalate into a genocidal process.3
Scholarly research on the Holocaust has treated this process in great detail and with
sound lucidity.4 In the rapidly developing historiography of the Armenian Genocide,
the processive character of these pre-genocidal persecutions has received less
attention than the genocidal process itself.5 The same may be said of the postgenocidal persecutions and violence.6 This article will address the persecution of
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Ottoman Armenians as a cumulative process leading up to the mass-murder campaign
of the bloody summer of 1915. The province of Diyarbekir will serve as an example to
illustrate this process.
The Ottoman Empire was organized into provinces (vilayet) with governors (vali),
districts (sancak or liva) with district governors (mutasarrıf), counties (kazâ) with
mayors (kaymakam), and communes (nahiye) with directors (müdür). Diyarbekir
was a relatively large province (42,100 km2) locked between the Euphrates in the west,
the Tigris in the east, the plateau in the north, and the desert in the south. Its
continental climate ensured mild winters and extremely hot summers, which at times
paralyzed social life. Historically, Diyarbekir was an administrative center; it
had been the headquarters of the sixteenth-century governorship (beylerbeylişi) from
which large parts of eastern Turkey were ruled.7 On the eve of World War I, the
Second Army was stationed in Diyarbekir city, which also harbored a court-martial
and one of the largest prisons of the Ottoman Empire. Although there were regional
variations in the economic conditions of the province, generally it thrived because of
its favorable location on the ancient Silk Road.8 There were copper mines in
Maden county, and the border regions with Bitlis province were known to be rich in
oil, though no large-scale steps had been taken to exploit either resource. Like the rest
of the empire, Diyarbekir was a pre-industrial region where subsistence farming and
cyclic pastoralism were dominant economic occupations for peasants and nomads
in the countryside.9
Diyarbekir province boasted a formidable diversity of ethnic and religious groups,
whether small or large, scattered or concentrated, urban or rural. Turkish-speaking
Muslims constituted the majority in urban residential areas because they had occupied
most administrative positions for a long time. Armenians inhabiting the cities
made their livings as merchants or craftsmen, and in most bazaars the majority of
tradesmen were indeed Armenian. Some of these were quite prosperous, imbued with
the privilege of having family members abroad and being active in politics. But most
of Diyarbekir’s Armenians were peasants organized in large extended families
(gerdastans) in villages, most specifically in the Lice, Silvan, Beşiri, and Palu
districts.10 The Kurdish population of the province can be divided in several categories:
tribal versus non-tribal Kurds and (semi-) nomadic versus sedentary. The dozens of
large and powerful Kurdish tribes (eşı̂ra) in the region were generally commanded by
chieftains and de facto controlled extensive territories. Many were able to mobilize
thousands, sometimes tens of thousands, of mounted warriors, often to combat each
other in pursuit of power, honor, and booty. Non-tribal Kurds could be powerless
peasants (kurmanc) or Kurds from noted clergy families (meşayih). It is important to
point out that most peasants, irrespective of ethnic or religious background, paid
tribute and taxes to Kurdish chieftains and sometimes to other landlords.11 The mere
1,000 Jews of Diyarbekir province owned one small synagogue and were generally an
inconspicuous ethnic group among the much larger Christian and Muslim populations.
They engaged mainly in small-scale trade and some horticulture.12 The Yezidis,
a Kurdish-speaking monotheist people, inhabited villages in the southeastern regions
of the province. Ottoman state discrimination and oppression against them pushed
them into a marginal social status, as a result of which they frequently engaged in
organized brigandry.13 Most of the province’s Arabs lived in Mardin and in the villages
in and around Midyat, numbering no more than several thousand.14 The Syriacs, an
embracing denomination including all Aramaic-speaking Syrian-Orthodox, SyrianProtestant, Syrian-Catholic, Nestorian, and Chaldean Christians, inhabited many
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Figure 1: A bird’s-eye view of Diyarbekir province

villages but especially the southeastern parts of the province. The mountainous region
around Midyat, also known as Tur Abdin, was a Syriac stronghold, with dozens of often
exclusively Syriac villages.15 Though these were only some of the ethnic and religious
groups in the province, because of the absence of reliable demographic data it is very
difficult to come to quantitative grips with even these. In general, it seems reasonable
to contend that approximately one-third of the province’s population was Christian
and approximately two-thirds were Muslim.16
The heterogeneous ethnic and social composition of the population of Diyarbekir
province was fueled by two additional intricacies: vagueness of identity and competing
loyalties. Identities were ethnic, not homogeneous-national in the modern sense. This
complex social reality of considerable overlap and indistinctness of ethnic delineation
defies simple categorizations, as many people lived at the margins of ethnicity.
For example, the Armenians of Mardin spoke Arabic and were mostly Catholic; many
Armenian villagers spoke Kurdish and adhered to a range of rural superstitions,
whereas the Armenians of Diyarbekir city spoke a local Armenian dialect and were
close to the official Apostolic church.17 Tribal cleavages and loyalties were another
issue. Even though Kurdish tribes had hereditary chieftains of Kurdish descent,
they treated their Muslim and non-Muslim subjects alike: religious interests and
loyalties were subordinated to tribal ones.
It is crucial to bear these anthropological subtleties in mind before engaging in
any historical analysis of this wide spectrum of peoples. Essentialist notions of
homogeneous national entities engaging in collective action or perpetual conflict are
utterly ahistorical and need to be subjected to thorough deconstructionist criticism.
The same is true for rosy images of a peaceful society in pre-nationalist conditions,
basking in multicultural coexistence.18 Nevertheless, it is possible to state that
the absence, or very feeble presence, of the state and its monopoly of violence in rural
areas allowed for the maintenance of many conflicts, whether tribal or ethno-social.
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Therefore, living conditions were relatively insecure, with arbitrary exertion of
(mortal) violence by certain powerful tribes and state agents. This insecurity
only added to the general atmosphere of distrust and generated anxiety and
vulnerability among the inhabitants of the province.

Preambles: War and Surveillance
The Committee of Union and Progress had not been idle in the provinces before the
war. The first CUP office in Diyarbekir, for example, was opened on 23 July 1908 by
Ziyâ Gökalp (1876–1924), who was a native of the region and became its representative
on the party’s Central Commitee in 1910.19 Gökalp began publishing the newspaper
Peyman, which adopted a relatively modest tone and emphasized coexistence of
the various Ottoman subjects.20 After the catastrophic defeats of the Balkan wars,
the atmosphere changed as relations polarized. The CUP dictatorship exerted its
influence in this province through a network of mainly Kurdish members. The most
influential CUP members in Diyarbekir were those related to the wealthy and
powerful Pirinççizâde dynasty, who owned large estates in the province, including the
rice fields west of Diyarbekir city.21
One of their kinsmen was Deputy Aziz Feyzi (1879–1933), who was known for his
coarseness and fanatic patriotism. He was the son of Pirinççizâde Arif, who passed
away in 1909 and had adhered to the Kurdish Assistance and Progress Society (Kürt
Teavün ve Terakki Cemiyeti). According to a German report, Feyzi had undertaken
a study trip to Germany in 1911.22 On behalf of many other Kurdish notables,
he vehemently protested in the Ottoman parliament against the proposed government
plan of expropriating land from Kurdish landowners. Feyzi was a CUP hard-liner.
He had held fierce and hostile discussions with an Armenian member of parliament,
Vartkes Serengulian (1871–1915), in which he uttered accusatory and pugnacious
comments.23 He became more and more fanatical in his anti-Armenian views
and reportedly had Ohannes Kazazian, a Catholic Armenian from Mardin and his
political rival in the elections, assassinated in 1913.24 At the outbreak of World War I,
the Ottoman civil inspector Mihran Boyadjian traveled to Diyarbekir and encountered
an energetic Feyzi on the way:
While travelling, we regularly spoke about politics. In his conversations, Feyzi Bey did
not fail to convey certain threats against my coreligionists. ‘‘The Armenians,’’ he
repeated, with bitterness, ‘‘have misconducted with regard to us, during the Balkan
wars in our days of distress. The Catholicos of Etchmiadzin, Patriarch Zaven, and
Nubar have resorted to foreign intervention; that will cost you dearly, my friend, your
future is in danger.’’25

Finally he threatened, ‘‘You will see now, what it means to demand reforms.’’26 Other
CUP sympathizers in Diyarbekir were Pirinççizâde Sıdkı (Tarancı), Yasinzâde Şevki
(Ekinci), his brother Yasinzâde Yahya (Ekinci), and Müftüzâde Şeref (Uluğ), among
others.27
The CUP’s policy toward the inhabitants of the eastern provinces varied between
containment and repression. On 4 April 1914, one day after the outbreak of the
Kurdish rebellion of Bitlis, the Central Committee of the CUP convened to review its
policy toward the eastern provinces. Mithat Şükrü (Bleda) pointed out that Russia was
gradually tightening its grip on many Kurdish tribes in both the Ottoman Empire and
Persia. According to him, another danger was that of Armenian revolutionaries
who were awaiting the right opportunity to revolt and could strike at any time. He
concocted a divide-and-rule strategy and maintained that on no account should
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Kurdish and Armenian politicians be allowed to unite. He suggested that the CUP
should now adopt a more sophisticated stick-and-carrot strategy, enrolling potentially
loyal chieftains through rhetoric and bribery while threatening potentially disloyal
ones with deportation and incarceration.28
The assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on
28 June 1914 stirred up acute international tensions. In the midst of this belligerent
atmosphere, the CUP sought to forge alliances with any of the Great Powers in
order to help the Ottoman Empire emerge from its diplomatic isolation. Cavid Bey,
the pro-British minister of finance, had appealed to Britain in 1911, but, apart from
Winston Churchill, the Foreign Office was not interested.29 Talât flirted with Russia in
May during his trip to the Crimea, where he spoke to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Sazonov about a possible alliance. The Russians expressed ambivalence in judgment
but, in essence, were not interested.30 Cemal Pasha approached France but left emptyhanded, lamenting the negotiations with the French as ‘‘a huge disappointment.’’31 On
28 July, the same day that Austria-Hungary declared war against Serbia, Enver Pasha
proposed a defensive alliance between Imperial Germany and the Ottoman Empire to
the German ambassador, Hans Wangenheim. In the next days Grand Vizier Said
Halim, Chairman of the Parliament Halil, Enver, and Talât launched intensive
negotiations with the Germans behind closed doors. Finally, on 2 August, one day after
the German declaration of war against Russia, a written agreement was signed
between the two states and a general mobilization was issued by the Ottoman general
staff.32 The discussions were top secret, and even Cemal Pasha had no knowledge of
them.33 Three days later Austria-Hungary joined the Turko-German alliance and
completed the Central Powers bloc, while Russia, France, and Britain united into the
Triple Entente. The Ottoman Empire was now officially allied to Germany and,
through the treaty, was inevitably obliged, in this political constellation, to prepare for
war. Following the succession of declarations of war in August 1914, the Germans
urged the Ottoman minister of war, Enver Pasha, at the end of October to act against
Russia. Without a formal declaration of war, Enver ordered the Ottoman navy to bomb
the Russian shore immediately, destroying oil tanks and sinking fourteen vessels.34
Though few politicians in Istanbul knew of Enver’s action, this fait accompli triggered
declarations of war by the Triple Entente powers. From 11 November 1914 on, the
Ottoman Empire was officially at war with Russia, France, and Britain.35
Although World War I immediately engulfed the Ottoman Empire, this was not
incidental. The CUP consciously headed in a belligerent direction, and by participating
in the war it hoped to find a radical solution to the empire’s many problems. From
the first day of the war, the CUP’s dictatorial rule became more repressive toward all
opposition groups. Discordant behavior of internal and external dissenters was dealt
with systematically and ruthlessly. The Ottoman Armenian community, suspected of
collective disloyalty, was one of the first targets. On 6 September 1914, Talât ordered
the Ottoman security apparatus to closely ‘‘follow and observe’’ (takib ve tarassud)
the local leadership of Armenian political parties that, according to Talât, had been
engaging in ‘‘agitation and disturbance’’ (mefsedet ve melanet) against the notion
of Ottomanism all along.36 Another perceived problem was the foreign capitulations, a
set of legal concessions under which foreign subjects enjoyed privileges such as
exemption from Ottoman taxes. The CUP regarded the capitulations as humiliating37
and did not wait long to confront them: all capitulations were unilaterally abrogated
on 17 September.38 The CUP’s bold policies not only directly caused the ranks to
close, they also led to an indirect form of Turkification, as some government officials
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simply left office voluntarily. On 12 November, Minister of Commerce Süleyman
Bustani, a Syriac Protestant, resigned from his cabinet portfolio in protest over what
he considered ongoing CUP aggression.39 This trend allowed the CUP to fill these
administrative positions with nationalists, and, although their Gleichschaltung40 was
never implemented perfectly, it was sufficient for effective rule.

Brutalizing War, Radicalizing Persecution
Meanwhile, the mobilization did not go unnoticed in Diyarbekir province. The city
_
streets swarmed with soldiers of the Second Army Corps, led by Ahmet Izzet
Pasha,
which was partly lodged in large mosques such as the Nebii Mosque.41 On 3 November,
the mayor of Diyarbekir made a public speech, explaining the conduct of the war to an
exclusively Muslim crowd. Upon hearing that the Russian army was pushing into the
provinces of Van and Erzurum, the frantic crowd yelled, ‘‘Praise to Mohammed! Death
to the Russians and their allies!’’ The non-Muslims of the city, frightened and cautious
because of this outbreak of mass rage, did not leave their homes in the following
days.42 The army began requisitioning goods from the population and drafting men
into the army. Daniel Thom, a missionary in Mardin, summarized these acts and wrote
that ‘‘the Govt. has robbed the city, and the country around, of its men, of its animals,
of its money,’’ leaving the people ‘‘pennyless, shops all closed.’’43 Gradually, the
Armenian elite of Diyarbekir was targeted and persecuted. Coinciding with his earlier
order, on 29 November Talât ordered the arrest of Thomas Muggerditchian, former
interpreter for the British consulate in Diyarbekir. Muggerditchian was accused of
espionage for the Entente Powers and was to be court-martialed.44 He escaped arrest,
fled to Egypt, and subsequently wrote his memoirs.45
From September 1914 on, the CUP began drawing up formations of irregular
brigands in order to invade Russia and Persia to provoke war. This secret military
organization was integrated into the existing Special Organization (Teşkilât-ı
Mahsusa).46 The cadre of these new guerrilla bands (çetes) was to be made up of
convicts, Kurdish tribesmen, and Muslim immigrants, and they were to be led by the
same gangsters the CUP had used in the Balkan wars and in prior political conflicts.
The convicts, called ‘‘savages and criminals’’ even by CUP officials,47 were very often
tribesmen, local outlaws, and bandits who had committed theft or manslaughter.
According to an Ottoman bureaucrat, they were drilled in Istanbul for one week before
being deployed in various regions.48 The entire operation was led by Dr. Bahaeddin
Şakir and was kept out of the control of the Ottoman army as much as possible.49 On
18 November, Talât personally ordered the drawing up of lists of names of ‘‘those
convicts who were able to exert influence on tribes.’’50 A week later, the Special
Organization was put together in Diyarbekir. Among the members enlisted in the
paramilitary organization was the Zaza brigand Alo,51 as well as the Chechen criminal
Hamid and his group of loyal warriors. Hamid was recruited by CUP Responsible
Secretaries who cabled the following notification to the Central Committee in Istanbul:
The courageous brigand Chechen Hamid, resident of the town of Reşadiye in the
Bergama district, has requested help to assist the army with some of his comrades and
if allowed, form a significant corps in Diyarbekir. Since we hope that aforementioned
gentleman is able to serve in this way, their dispatch will benefit the homeland.
We would like to request a telegraphic answer on whether their patriotic venture will
be necessary or not, and present our compliments, dear brothers.52

During the winter of 1914, the brigands began penetrating into Russian and Persian
territory to incite the Muslim populations to rise in rebellion and join the Ottoman
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forces. In this guerrilla war, Special Organization operatives such as Yenibahçeli Nail,
Deli Halit, and Topal Osman also attacked Armenian villages, plundering, raping, and
killing with impunity. Ambassador Wangenheim wrote to the German chancellor that
their anti-Russian actions across the Erzurum border frequently escalated into
‘‘encroachments and clashes’’ against Armenian villagers.53
The war on the eastern front gained momentum when warmonger Enver Pasha,
driven by expansionist designs toward the east, on 29 December attempted to attack
the Russian army in Sarıkamış. Enver insisted on waging an encirclement
campaign through the rugged Kars mountains. However, the Russian general
Nikolai Yudenich anticipated the outflanking maneuver, outsmarted Enver, and
delivered a heavy blow to his forces. Enver’s attack failed miserably, and as a result
the Third Army was effectively wiped out. Of the 90,000 soldiers who fought in
the battle of Sarıkamış, approximately 78,000 perished, mainly through frostbite.54
The CUP leadership was convinced that the disastrous defeat had been caused by
‘‘treacherous Armenian elements.’’ Retreating Ottoman soldiers took revenge
on Armenian villagers, massacring many and pillaging their goods. After returning
from the front, Enver wrote a letter to the Armenian prelate of Konya, expressing
his respect and admiration for the courage the Armenian soldiers had shown in
the Sarıkamış battle. Enver gave the example of Sergeant Ohannes, who had received
a medal for valor.55 This may not have been how Enver really felt. In a
personal discussion with publisher Hüseyin Cahit, Enver bitterly blamed the
Armenians for the fiasco and proposed their deportation to somewhere where they
wouldn’t cause trouble.56
The defeat triggered a new wave of persecution, especially in the front-line
provinces of Erzurum, Bitlis, and Van. On 26 December 1914 Talât ordered
‘‘the dismissal of all Armenian police officers, police chiefs, and government employees,
and the deportation of anyone who opposes these measures.’’57 Talât Pasha’s
involvement in the dismissal of Armenian government officials typifies his ‘‘micromanaging’’ qualities. In February he urged local officials to keep him abreast of the
developing situation with regard to Armenian civil servants.58 When he got the
impression that the firings were not proceeding quickly enough, he personally had
Police Chief Krikor and police officers Armenag, Boghos, and Shahin of the Van police
squad removed from their offices and deported to Mosul.59 Finally, in November 1916,
the Interior Ministry issued an official declaration sanctioning the dismissal of all
Armenian and Greek police officers.60 These official decrees marked an acceleration in
CUP suspicion of Armenian loyalty to the Ottoman state.
For the population of Diyarbekir, there was little to celebrate between Christmas
and New Year’s Eve 1914. The news of Enver’s losses reverberated in Diyarbekir
and had a detrimental effect on local morale. The war was experienced closely and
emotionally, since both Muslims and Christians had been drafted into the army and
many of them had perished in the Sarıkamış campaign. The bad news distressed
both communities and strained their relationships, sparking suspicion and enmity.
The Church of Saint Ephraim was vandalized and property was stolen, while
gendarmes beat up a Syriac village headman.61 The governor also prohibited the use of
all non-Turkish languages in some of the province’s institutions, such as the American
hospital and the French mission.62 In February 1915 the government initiated arms
searches in Christian houses in Diyarbekir. During these violent searches, the
inhabitants were accused of treason and espionage and of hiding guns in secret arms
stores. On 18 February, twelve young men of the large Syriac village of Qarabash were
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sentenced to death on charges of alleged desertion. Four of them were publicly hanged
in the central square in Diyarbekir in order to deter potential deserters.63 When their
compatriot villagers protested against the execution, gendarmes clubbed two men to
death and dispersed the group.64
March also saw the disarming of Armenian soldiers and their recruitment,
together with many other Christian men, into labor battalions.65 The cadre of these
battalions were deemed disloyal elements, as an official decree proscribed them ‘‘at all
costs’’ from taking up arms in the regular Ottoman army.66 The labor battalion
conscripts were deployed in road construction under dire circumstances in and around
Diyarbekir. Irrespective of weather conditions, every individual, including teenagers,
was forced to carry a daily load of fifty-five kilograms. Each battalion was
escorted by two dozen soldiers. Many conscripts in the labor battalions perished of
exhaustion, exposure, and maltreatment. On 5 March 1915 a Syriac native of
Diyarbekir, Abed Mshiho, was conscripted in a labor battalion numbering 1,100 men
and assigned to work on the Diyarbekir–Aleppo road. According to his account, the
maltreatments increased every other day, with bastinados and other beatings
becoming commonplace, and the violence escalating into sporadic murders of
individual conscripts by late March.67
March 1915 was perhaps the most fateful month for the future development
of the Ottoman Empire in general and of Diyarbekir province in particular.
The naval attacks upon the Dardanelles strait and the Russian move toward
Van sowed panic in the hearts and minds of the CUP leaders.68 This reinforced
their established fear of a nightmare scenario in which Armenian disloyalty would
pave the way for an Allied incursion into Anatolia. This apocalyptic suspicion led to
a series of meetings of the Central Committee in Istanbul in mid-March. As a result
of these gatherings, Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir was delegated substantial authority to
deal with ‘‘the inner enemies.’’ The Special Organization was reorganized, expanded,
and placed under his jurisdiction.69 The army was given more autonomy, on Talât’s
orders, to ‘‘turn to the Third Army for the application of measures aimed at Armenian
actions.’’70 Not much later, Talât imposed total censorship on the Armenian newspaper
Azadamart and sent Osman Bedri, police commissioner of Constantinople, to
confiscate their presses.71 This radicalization at the center metastasized to the
periphery as Diyarbekir saw the appointment of its new governor: Dr. Mehmed Reşid.

Center and Periphery: Minister Talât vs. Governor Reşid
On 25 March 1915 the governor of Diyarbekir, Hamid Bey, was relieved of his duties
and replaced by Dr. Reşid. Mehmed Reşid (Şahingiray) was born in a Circassian family
in Russian Caucasia on 8 February 1873. When the czarist government intensified its
campaign against the Circassians in 1874, his family fled to the Ottoman Empire.
Reşid grew up in Istanbul, where he enrolled in the Military School of Medicine and
joined other students to found the kernel of a secret political party that would later
adopt the name CUP. In 1897 the Abdulhamid regime exiled him to Tripoli for his
politically recalcitrant activities. Having made a career in the army and risen to the
rank of major, he wrote a book on the CUP revolution in 1908. He was never influential
in the CUP core, however, and his power did not compare to that of party bosses such
as Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir or Dr. Nâzım. In 1909 he relinquished his employment in the
military and went on to serve as district governor and mayor in several provinces
between 1908 and 1914. Along his professional path Reşid gradually radicalized and
scapegoated Christians as the reason for the empire’s erosion and wretched condition.
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By 1914 he was thoroughly convinced that the Ottoman Christians were abusing their
ostensibly privileged position and were thus to blame for the empire’s depressed
economy. He was delegated the task of secretary-general of the international reform
plan for the eastern provinces, which was annulled when the CUP engaged in war.
In 1915 he became governor of Diyarbekir, and in 1916 he was appointed governor of
Ankara. When the war was over, he was arrested and incarcerated in Istanbul. With
the assistance of his former henchmen, he escaped from prison and lived incognito at
various Istanbul addresses. Fed up with being forced to evade the law, and fearing
arrest and possible execution, he committed suicide when a police chief tracked him
down on 6 February 1919.72
When Reşid acceded to the governorship of Diyarbekir province, he brought with
him thirty, mainly Circassian, Special Organization operatives, including Çerkez
Harun, Çerkez Şakir, and Çerkez Aziz.73 They were joined in Diyarbekir by more
troops released from the local prison.74 In this way, Reşid absorbed more effective
power than the average Ottoman governor. For Reşid, it was certainly true that ‘‘in the
provinces party bosses of one kind or another often exercised substantial control,
amounting in some cases, [. . .] to virtual autonomy.’’75 Upon arrival in Diyarbekir,
Reşid and his men faced poor rule of law, a serious desertion problem, and an anxious
population. The bazaar, for example, was buzzing with rumors that the Russians had
invaded Istanbul.76 The Muslims feared an invasion of Diyarbekir by the Russian
army, whose reputation as a valiant fighting corps had preceded its offensive into the
south. The Christians were torn between fear and hope: whereas one moderate group
(including the clergy) was terrified that a Russian incursion might trigger reprisals,
another, discordant group (notably Armenian nationalists) expressed the audacious
belief that it was possible for Christians to defend themselves against the brutal
policies of the CUP dictatorship.77
The concerns of many young men were of a more pragmatic nature. They wanted
to avoid the possibility of being conscripted into the Ottoman army and sent off to
an almost certain death, either at the front or in the labor battalions. Therefore,
some had actually gone into hiding in the complex web of rooftops of Xançepek,
a neighborhood with a large concentration of Armenians. Some of these draft evaders
had acquired weapons.78 Dr. Floyd Smith, an American doctor on the American Board
of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM), reported that at the end of February,
the Armenian bishop Tchilgadian finally ‘‘went upon the roofs and lectured the men,
telling them that they were bringing ruin upon themselves and the whole Christian
quarter. As a result quite a number surrendered.’’79 Still, both Muslim and Christian
deserters remained when Dr. Reşid became governor.
In a post-war booklet titled Mülâhazât (‘‘Reflections’’),80 Reşid defended and
sought to legitimize his wartime policies as governor of Diyarbekir. These memoirs,
composed of two of his four wartime notebooks (the other two were lost), are
of extraordinary importance, as they allow a close look at his line of thought when he
was appointed governor. From the moment he set foot in Diyarbekir, Reşid found
confirmation of his expectations of a conspiracy of disloyal Christians. He wrote,
My appointment to Diyarbekir coincided with a very delicate period of the war. Large
parts of Van and Bitlis had been invaded by the enemy, deserters were transgressing,
pillaging and robbing everywhere. Yezidi and Nestorian uprisings in or at the border of
the province required the application of drastic measures. The transgressive, offensive
and impudent attitude of the Armenians was seriously endangering the honor of the
government.81
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In his memoirs Reşid especially targets the Armenians, accusing them of ‘‘high
treason’’ (hıyânet-ı vataniye) and of ‘‘pursuing the goal of an independent Armenia’’
(müstakil bir Ermenistan gayesini takib).82 In his paranoia and animosity Reşid
ignored the many Muslim deserters and imagined an army of Armenian deserters, who
in fact may not have been as countless and organized as he visualized. He believed
that the Armenian draft dodgers on the rooftops were all ‘‘formidably’’ (müdhiş)
organized revolutionaries and that they numbered more than a thousand.
Furthermore, according to Reşid, ‘‘there was not a single Armenian in the province
who was not participating in this national endeavor.’’83
In order to deal with these perceived problems, Reşid organized a committee for the
‘‘solution of the Armenian question.’’ This council was called the Committee of Inquiry
(Tahkik Heyeti) and had its own Militia Unit (Milis Alayı) at its disposal.84 According
to a German charity worker, the committee, made up of a dozen CUP loyalists, was
‘‘a sham committee for the solution of the Armenian Question’’ and served only one
purpose: to eliminate the Hunchak and Dashnak parties.85 It was headed by Colonel
_
Mustafa Bey (Cemilpaşazâde) and consisted of deputy Aziz Feyzi; postal clerk Ibrahim
86
Bedreddin; Majors Rüşdü Bey and Yasinzâde Şevki (Ekinci); the latter’s brother
Yasinzâde Yahya (Ekinci); representative of the Directorate for the Settlement of
_
Tribes and Immigrants (Iskân-ı
Aşâir ve Muhacirı̂n Müdüriyeti, or IAMM) and
director of the Diyarbekir branch of the Society for National Defense (Müdafaa-ı
Milliye Cemiyeti) Veli Necdet; police chief Memduh Bey; militia commander Şevki Bey;
and Şeref Uluğ, son of the mufti.87 On Reşid’s orders, they selected the following
civilians and appointed them to the rank of captain: Zazazâde Hacı Süleyman
(by profession, a Zaza butcher in the Diyarbekir bazaar); Halil (also a butcher);
Cercisaşazâde Abdülkerim; Direkçizâde Tahir; and Pirinççizâde Sıdkı (Tarancı). The
following volunteers were nominated to the rank of lieutenant: Halifezâde Salih,
Ganizâde Servet (Akkaynak), Muhtarzâde Salih, Şeyhzâde Kadri (Demiray),
Pirânı̂zâde Kemal (Önen), Yazıcızâde Kemal, Zaza Alo Efendi, and Hacı Bakır.88
At that time, a certain Hacı Zeki of Lice, a fanatical activist, incited the locals of
Mardin to take up arms against the Christians. Zeki convened groups of Muslims at
his house in Mardin city, where he made inflammatory political speeches, openly
calling for pogroms. The district governor of Mardin, a moderate man by the name of
Hilmi, was displeased by Zeki’s aggressive vilification. Since the outbreak of the war
Hilmi had shown consistent efforts to restrain conflict and to maintain relative
stability and moderate rule. He reprehended Zeki and expelled him from Mardin.
Zeki then took off to Diyarbekir, where he found willing partners among the CUP elite
who were just consolidating their rule in the provincial capital.89 On 6 April 1915 Talât
_
ordered Reşid to ‘‘appoint a capable, loyal, and devout Ittihadist
for the vacant position
90
of mayor’’ in Diyarbekir. Reşid immediately fired the relatively mild Cemilpaşazâde
Dr. Fuad Bey and replaced him with the rabidly anti-Armenian Sıdkı.91 Police chief
Dersimli Hüseyin Bey was replaced by IAMM boss Veli Necdet, who had previously
occupied the office of provincial secretary.92 All the key positions in Diyarbekir were
now occupied by CUP loyalists.
In Diyarbekir, Reşid now embarked on a relentless campaign to find and punish
deserters. On 1 April he issued a proclamation demanding the surrender of all arms
to the police.93 When this failed to produce the results he had expected, he intensified
the arms searches from 5 April on. Aided by his gendarmerie commander, Major
Rüşdü, he personally supervised and participated in the warrantless searches of
churches and houses.94 While district governor Hilmi in Mardin visited the Christian
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clergy to congratulate them on Easter,95 Reşid’s roundups of Armenian men became
more and more arbitrary and categorical. As he wrote, ‘‘On a certain day I had the
three or four most important streets in the Armenian neighborhood barricaded
and ordered surprise searches on every single house in the early morning, arresting
more than 500 armed deserters.’’96 By 15 April Reşid had already had more than
600 Armenian notables and artisans arrested and put in jail. There he had them
tortured to exact confessions on the locations of hidden arms depots. The prisoners
were beaten and burned with hot irons, had their nails pulled out with pliers,
and suffered prolonged bastinado.97 Even so, Reşid was not satisfied with what had
been accomplished and wired Istanbul twice to request the deployment of more
manpower to assist his force of 300 gendarmes and policemen. The Interior Ministry
did not comply with his requests, frustrating and galvanizing him into more severe
measures.98

The Cultural Side of Persecution: Book Burnings
Heinrich Heine’s drama Almansor contains a passage in which a fifteenth-century
Spanish Muslim named Hassan, upon witnessing the burning of the Koran by
Catholics, pronounces the following sentence: ‘‘That was only a prelude: there where
books are burned, ultimately people are burned.’’ The destruction of books considered
hostile cultural property seems to be a feature of practically all state-sponsored
violence. A peculiar aspect of the operation in the Ottoman Empire was the hunt
for ‘‘recalcitrant’’ books and other texts, generally written in non-Ottoman languages.
In Ottoman political jargon, unpatriotic material was branded ‘‘harmful documents’’
(evrâk-ı muzırre)99 and had to be dealt with through counter-propaganda or violence.
During their nationalist rule, the CUP confiscated and destroyed an unknown
but undoubtedly large number of non-Turkish-language works.
The example of the dismissal of Ottoman Armenian government officials
demonstrates Talât’s close involvement in the supervisory process of the antiArmenian persecutions. It is therefore not surprising to come across evidence of his
micromanaging, with surgical precision, the bureaucratic excision of Armenian culture
from Ottoman society. A striking example is the fate of the books in the library of the
Armenian lyceum of Sivas. In October 1916 Talât was disturbed by the idea that the
library kept ‘‘important volumes on the condition of the Ottoman Empire in French,
German, English, Russian, and Kurdish,’’ and he ordered ‘‘the immediate seizure of
these books and their dispatch to Istanbul by post.’’100 Five months later, when the
books still had not been sent, he repeated his order, requesting that the books be sent
‘‘urgently.’’101 Although one can only speculate as to the fate of these books, examples
from Diyarbekir province demonstrate that it is most likely they were destroyed.
In Diyarbekir it was common for the authorities to target and destroy books.
As Floyd Smith wrote, ‘‘Books and papers were sure to bring condemnation to a
household.’’102 On 22 April Reşid’s men went from door to door in the Xançepek
and Fatihpaşa neighborhoods to find books. The Syriac tailor Habib had warned the
inhabitants to hide their books, especially books in the French and Armenian
languages. The militia also paid a visit to the Armenian bishop Tchilgadian
and accused him of hiding arms in secret niches in the large Armenian church of
St. Sarkis. They raided his room, took away all his books and documents, and sent
them to Reşid for examination. The next day the books were publicly burned.103
Vahram Dadrian was a young boy keeping a diary when he was deported with his
family from Çorum. After many trials and tribulations, they arrived in the Syrian
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desert and met an Armenian man named Pakrad, who had just escaped from
Diyarbekir. Pakrad told them that his father, Abraham, had been caught up in the
book searches. A corporal took two of their books and walked out of the house, facing
a frantic crowd of Muslims:
The corporal gestured to the crowd to shut up. ‘‘Listen! Look here. Look what we found
in his home,’’ he yelled, lifting a geography book into the air. ‘‘You don’t know how to
read, so you don’t know how dangerous this book is. But I won’t have to say much before
you can draw your own conclusions. In the hands of our enemies this book is a more
terrifying weapon than all the guns and cannons of the army. This book gives the
locations of all the cities, villages, rivers, and roads in Turkey. All of them meticulously
portrayed. Anybody who goes through this book can find not only the plan of every city,
but also the location of every house and whether it belongs to a Christian or a Muslim.
They have marked each one with a cross or a crescent, so that one day when they rebel
it will be easy for them to tell a Muslim household from the others.’’ Grumbling from
the mob—arms into the air in defiance! ‘‘Oh, oh, oh . . . clobber him, kill him, let him rot,
the traitor.’’ ‘‘Please, calm down. Not so fast,’’ the corporal ordered with authority,
‘‘I haven’t finished yet. Look. Here’s another book.’’ He held up another book—a physics
text. ‘‘It tells you all you need to know about how to make gun-powder, bullets, and
dynamite. These conspirators’ homes are filled with books like this. Both the young
and the old read these books and learn what to do to destroy our country.
But thank God and the Sultan that we have been vigilant and were able to uncover
their plot at the last minute. Now it’s we who will destroy their homes and put their
children to the sword.’’ The policemen had a hard time clearing a way through the
violent crowd. They finally succeeded and, pulling and pushing their victim, they took
him off to jail.104

Together with other owners of targeted books, Pakrad’s father Abraham died in jail,
where the chances of either escape or survival were very slim.
One of many examples of book burnings during the Armenian Genocide is
the destruction in July 1915 of the library of Addai Sher, the Chaldean Bishop of
Siirt, which contained thousands of books.105 The library of the Saint John Church
in Mardin was also confiscated106 and the books given away to stores in Mardin or
sold for practically nothing.107 A teacher at the Syriac monastery of Deyrulzaferan
noted in his memoirs that, thanks to the government’s carte blanche to certain Kurdish
tribes to attack Christians, the other important Syriac monastery, Mor Gabriel,
was attacked in the fall of 1917 by the Kurdish brigand Şendi, who massacred
inhabitants and destroyed the library.108 However, attacks on books and libraries
were generally coordinated by the government. In the 1920s, Hasan Reşit (Tankut)
oversaw the confiscation of ‘‘many books written in foreign languages,’’
including minority languages such as Kurmanci, Zazaki, Syriac, and Arabic, during
the post-war campaign to continue homogenizing Anatolia.109 Government agents
often stumbled over books when dealing with recalcitrant elements. When Alişêr,
a Kurdish chieftain-poet famous for inciting the Eastern Kizilbash population
against the authorities, was killed, a coffer of his books was confiscated by the
Kemalists.110

Targeting the Elite and Experimenting with Mass Violence
In late April, the Diyarbekir city prison was swarming with prisoners. Reşid ordered
the large caravanserai of Diyarbekir evacuated, as every day several dozens of
prisoners were locked up and tortured in that khan.111 But these violent persecutions
were not limited to Diyarbekir. In April a gradual shift occurred from discerning
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between combatants and non-combatants to not differentiating them anymore. This
momentum is exemplified by the crucial battle of Van, which had very high stakes for
all parties. The Van front saw mutual indiscriminate massacring of Muslims by the
joint Russo-Armenian forces and of Christians by Ottoman forces.112 The antiArmenian measures at the national level now became more and more categorical as
well. Moreover, inspired by the brutalizing war in Persian Azerbaijan and in
Transcaucasia, they were also gaining ‘‘total’’ traits: more and more violence was
applied to more and more people. Fear of Allied landings on the western coasts added
fuel to the fire. As a result, the CUP began incarcerating dissidents and assailing
the Armenian community all over the Ottoman Empire. Beginning on 24 April 1915,
the political and cultural elite of the Ottoman Armenian community was targeted
for arrest and deportation to the interior. With very few exceptions, these men
were tortured to death over the next several months. Simultaneously, deportation
convoys to the interior were rerouted to Der el-Zor in the Syrian desert. The
persecutions soon increased in intensity and were extended to larger parts of
the Ottoman Empire.113
In Diyarbekir, Reşid had not been distinguishing himself at all since his arrival.
His intensive arms searches of the first three weeks of April had delivered some results
for his militia, as, indeed, arms were found. The scope of armament and the extent of
its organization were blown out of proportion, and photos were taken of the armaments
and of the culprits.114 On 27 April Reşid wired an elated telegram to Talât
summarizing and evaluating his work in Diyarbekir:
For ten days, the pursuit of deserters has been carried out with utmost severity.
As a result of yesterday’s purges a significant amount of explosives, fifty bombs,
lots of ammunition and various arms, and a great deal of dynamite powder were
found. One hundred and twenty leaders and operatives of the villages were taken into
custody. Until now, in the city alone more than 1,000 deserters of different regions
have been apprehended, many of whom are party members. Searches and pursuit are
continuing.115

Having incarcerated the bulk of the political elite of the Diyarbekir Christians, Reşid’s
militia now targeted their religious leaders. Blanket arrests of priests and monks were
carried out, and their houses were ransacked. In Mardin, where Reşid’s persecutions
had not yet taken hold, the news from Diyarbekir nevertheless caused fear. The
Armenian Catholic bishop Ignatius Maloyan had become anxious about the worsening
situation and seems to have written a letter to his co-religionists, lest something
happen to him. Maloyan’s letter urges his parish to remain calm and loyal to the
government; he wrote, ‘‘Above all, never lose your faith in the holy trinity.’’ The letter
was sealed and entrusted to the Syriac Orthodox Bishop Gabriel Tabbuni on the first
of May.116
While the war was raging with great intensity on the eastern front, the CUP
began questioning the loyalty of the Ottoman Armenians even more. On 5 May 1915
Talât authorized the Third Army to disarm all Armenian gendarmes in Diyarbekir.117
This way, even loyal Armenians were categorized as disloyal and treated as such.
The next day the Directorate for Employment and Supplies of the Ministry of
Economy ordered all its offices to fire their Armenian staff and ‘‘deport those of
whom it is necessary to areas where there are no Armenians.’’118 Having already
arrested these men in Diyarbekir, Reşid proceeded to persecute the city’s clergy
and extend the arrests to the villages. On 9 May he summoned the Chaldean priest
Hanna Soha in Mardin to come to Diyarbekir for interrogation. Upon his arrival,
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the militia publicly maltreated him before killing him in broad daylight in the
street.119 The absence of constraints in this murder emboldened the militia and
triggered a new wave of arrests and violence, this time targeting the surrounding
villages as well. The predominantly Christian villages of Kabiye, Qarabash, and
Qatarbel, all situated on the plain of Diyarbekir, were subjected to brutal arms
searches by Yasinzâde Yahya and Pirinççizâde Sıdkı between 10 and 20 May.
The village men were tortured by bastinado, and dozens were taken away to
the capital, filling the prison and the caravanserai.120 German charity worker
Friedrich Schuchardt wrote that ‘‘between the 10th and 30th of May another 1,200
of the most notable Armenians and other Christians of Diyarbekir province
were arrested without distinction between the religious denominations.’’121 Reşid
then imposed the death penalty on any Armenian going outside the city walls.122
Diyarbekir had become an open-air prison and its Armenian neighborhood a de
facto ghetto.
The persecutions also spread into the countryside, most notably to Mardin city,
which was still ruled by Hilmi Bey, who had stalled and resisted anti-Christian
persecutions in his district. On 15 May Reşid sent Aziz Feyzi to organize the round-up
of the Christian elites of Mardin. During a secret meeting in which dozens of Muslim
notables participated, a plan was laid out for the crackdown on the Mardin elite;
however, this was practically impossible to carry out with Hilmi in office.123 Talât was
still busy micromanaging the national persecution of the Armenian elite. On 19 May
he ordered the Hunchak leader Paramas court-martialed in the Diyarbekir prison and
inquired into the whereabouts of one Krikor Nalbandian.124 On 22 May he requested
information on the Armenian politicians Agnouni and Rupen Zartarian, and their
colleagues.125
A critical event in Diyarbekir was the first large massacre involving the total
destruction of entire village populations. On the morning of 20 May 1915 Reşid ordered
Yahya and Sıdkı to disarm Qarabash, a village just northeast of Diyarbekir. The
village was invaded with fifty men and thoroughly disarmed; even bread knives were
seized. Its men incarcerated, its weapons confiscated, Qarabash was now completely
emasculated. That same evening Yahya and Sıdkı visited neighboring Kurdish
villages, inciting them to attack Qarabash and explicitly giving them fiat to plunder.
Two days later, on 22 May, the village was invaded by mounted Kurds, who massacred
its population with daggers, axes, and swords. Its two priests, Paulus and Behnam,
were trampled to death under the horses’ hooves. The women were raped, the
houses were burnt, and valuables were seized.126 The few survivors fled to Diyarbekir,
where some of them were treated by Floyd Smith. Smith reported the arrival of the
Qarabash survivors as follows:
May 21, 1915, there came to our compound in Diarbekir from the village of Karabash,
three hours to the east, three or four wounded and the following day (May 22) over a
score of wounded Armenian and Syrian women and children. They, the villagers, told
of a night attack by the Kurds three days previous and that the next morning the
government had sent gendarmes who refused to allow anyone to come to Diarbekir.
Some managed to get away and finally all who could walk or be carried came on the
dates mentioned. The wounds were practically all infected and I have classified them
as follows: [. . .]
(c) Wounds made by heavy cutting instruments, probably axes. [. . .]
2. Two children about seven and nine years and one woman; attempted decapitations.
Deep incised wounds of the nape of the neck (just below the skull), 5–8 inches long and
of a depth equal to the thickness of the muscles of this region.127
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On that same evening, the 160 families of the village of Kabiye were targeted.128
The terrified villagers—some remaining men but mostly women, children, and the
elderly—had taken refuge in the Mor Kiryakos church. Sıdkı had persuaded Ömer,
Mustafa, and Emı̂n, three sons of Perı̂xan, matriarch of the Reman tribe, to cooperate
in the raid. They brought with them dozens of tribesmen, who combed the village for
hemp rope to tie the men together. On Sıdkı’s orders, the men were tortured with hot
iron pins, while women and girls were raped in the church. Within five hours, the
militia and the tribesmen had hacked the villagers to death with axes. Many were
crammed into haylofts and barns and burned alive. After the massacre, the Reman
brothers loaded two saddlebags with money and gold and carried the goods away.129
The few survivors escaped to Diyarbekir, where some were killed by gendarmes. One
woman stated that she survived the massacre ‘‘between the corpses of her relatives’’
(men bayn lashat herbo). When she fled to Diyarbekir city, a Zaza family proposed to
take her into their home, but she refused out of fear. Another survivor, a boy, escaped
death by hiding in a vineyard, which was overgrown by that time of the year. He was
the only male survivor of the Kabiye massacre.130

Five to Twelve: The Beginning of the End
In April 1915, some Armenians had already been sporadically deported from their
native regions, though this was not an empire-wide campaign. The deportation of the
entire Armenian millet was officially organized from 23 May 1915 on, when Talât
issued orders for the wholesale deportation of all Armenians to Deyr-ul Zor, starting
with the northeastern provinces.131 That same day he urged the Fourth Army
Command to court-martial any Muslim who collaborated with Christians.132 The
Third Army had been put under the command of General Mahmud Kâmil Pasha,133
who had issued a similar order. His orders instructed ‘‘any Muslim who protected
an Armenian hanged in front of his house, the burning of his house, his removal
from office, and his appearance before a court-martial.’’134 These massive arrests
and persecutions prompted the Entente Powers to make a joint declaration on 24 May,
denouncing CUP policies against the Armenians. The declaration vehemently
criticized these ‘‘new crimes of Turkey against humanity and civilization’’ and
promised ‘‘that they will hold personally responsible . . . all members of the Ottoman
government and those of their agents who are implicated in such massacres.’’135
The CUP leaders, especially Talât, panicked and attempted to disguise the
deportations, requesting permission from the Grand Vizier on 26 May to issue a
temporary deportation law. Although the deportations had already begun, the
Grand Vizier endorsed Talât’s law on 29 May, rushing the bill through Parliament
the next day. This legislation gave a legal veneer to the official inception of
the deportation of all Ottoman Armenians to the Syrian desert, authorizing the
army to proceed with this project and delegating its daily implementation to
the Directorate for the Settlement of Tribes and Immigrants.136
The Armenian Genocide had now officially begun.

By Way of a Conclusion
The persecution process of the Ottoman Armenians was an internal campaign that
ran parallel to the external war effort with the Great Powers, especially on the
eastern front against Russia. It was no coincidence that most of the direct killing of
non-combatant Ottoman Christians would occur in the eastern provinces, where the
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threat of a Russian invasion backed by ‘‘Armenian insiders’’ was most immediate in
the paranoid minds of the CUP dictatorship. However, the persecution was mostly
an autonomous process and was only partly linked to the ebb and flow of the war.
The initiation and conduct of the persecutions were in the hands of civilian
bureaucrats in the Ministry of the Interior, not those of military personnel in the
Ministry of War. The Ottoman province Diyarbekir has served as a platform for
exemplifying these policies at the local level. The following two main arguments of
this study may provide benchmarks for future research.
First, in the historiography of the Armenian Genocide, Talât Pasha’s role has not
yet received the attention it deserves. His role as a micromanaging dictator operating
from the center crystallizes from a detailed inquiry into archival documents of
the Ottoman Ministry of the Interior. From the most sweeping of categorical macromeasures to the micro-level dismissals of hundreds of individuals, Talât was very
much personally involved in the persecution. The overall direction of Ottoman
government policies toward Armenians may seem incongruous and contradictory at
times,137 and more research on the nature of the CUP dictatorship would clarify this
issue. The relationship between center and periphery can be illustrated by counterposing Talât’s leverage as minister to Reşid’s executive power as governor. In the
period between January and April 1915 Talât ordered the surveillance of Armenians to
be accelerated. Eager to satisfy his superior, the overachieving Reşid took local
initiative and applied considerable overkill in dealing with the issues at stake.
Once the governor began experimenting with wholesale killing and demonstrated its
efficiency, he also transgressed a moral boundary. From then on, Talât would not
hesitate long to authorize the expansion of murder from individuals to groups.
Second, the Armenian Genocide did not fall from a clear blue sky. As in all
instances of genocidal violence, it is difficult to pinpoint the exact timing of the
initiation of the mass violence. As Donald Bloxham has pointed out, the Armenian
Genocide arose incrementally out of the mechanism of cumulative radicalization: local
radicalization was conveyed back to Istanbul, which in turn triggered new phases of
persecution.138 In other words, the output of the system was returned to its input in
order to regulate further output. Therefore, it is practically impossible to speak of
an absolute starting point. Nevertheless, two stages represent critical turning
points in the entire process as points of no return: the general arrests of 24 April
1915 and the general deportation orders of 23 May 1915. Without these
policy directives at the central level, the massive scale of the ensuing genocide
would not have been reached.
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133. On 12 February 1915 Mahmud Kâmil replaced General Hafız Hakkı, who had died in a
spotted typhus epidemic. Erickson, Ordered to Die, 104.
134. Takvim-i Vekâyi, no. 3540, 7.
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‘‘When the Cannons Talk, the Diplomats
Must Be Silent’’: A Danish Diplomat in
Constantinople during the Armenian
Genocide
Matthias Bjørnlund
Copenhagen, Denmark
The envoy Carl Ellis Wandel was the sole Danish diplomatic representative
in Constantinople before, during, and after World War I, and between 1914
and 1925 he wrote hundreds of detailed reports on the destruction of the
Ottoman Armenians, as well as on related subjects. This article analyzes and
contextualizes some of his most important reports, showing how these hitherto
unknown sources contribute to the understanding of vital aspects of the
Armenian Genocide, not least concerning the ongoing scholarly debate between
‘‘intentionalist’’ and ‘‘structuralist’’ interpretations of the event and concerning
the destruction of the Ottoman Armenians as a particularly radical part of a
Young Turk project of Turkification.

From the time of the Abdul Hamid massacres of 1894 to 1896—the systematic
annihilation of some 100,000 to 300,000 Ottoman Armenians,1 combined with the
forced Islamization or displacement of several hundred thousands more2—the
persecution of this Christian minority had a significant impact on a broad range of
leading public figures, as well as on the general public, in the Western world.3 This
was also true in Denmark, where public figures raised awareness of the Armenian
atrocities and their political implications through speeches, articles, books, and
organizations: secular Danish-Jewish intellectuals Georg Brandes (1842–1927) and
Åge Meyer Benedictsen (1866–1927) exposed the indifference of the European
governments to the sufferings of the Armenians4 and founded Danske
Armeniervenner (DA, ‘‘Danish Friends of Armenians’’), respectively, as a direct
consequence of the massacres.5 From the other end of the spectrum, bishop
and minister of cultural affairs H.V. Styhr (1838–1905), in 1897, denounced what he
called Abdul Hamid’s ‘‘holy war of extermination.’’6
Also, from 1900 onward, a number of Danish missionaries and relief workers went
to work among Ottoman Armenians, in close cooperation with German, American,
and Scandinavian colleagues, and some of these Danes became important witnesses to
the extermination of the Armenians. One such person was Karen Jeppe (1876–1935),
a schoolteacher and DA relief worker in Urfa from 1903–1919, who in 1921 became
one of three members of the Commission of Inquiry for the Protection of Women and
Children in the Near East from her base in Aleppo, Syria. This League of Nations
commission was established in 1920 to deal with the problem of the tens of thousands
of mainly Armenian women and children who had survived the genocide, many of
them only to be forcibly converted to Islam, and were still kept in captivity in the
Matthias Bjørnlund, ‘‘‘When the Cannons Talk, the Diplomats Must Be Silent’’: A Danish Diplomat in
Constantinople during the Armenian Genocide.’’’ Genocide Studies and Prevention 1, 2 (September 2006):
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Turkish and Arabic areas of the former Ottoman Empire.7 Another such person
was Maria Jacobsen (1882–1960), a missionary and nurse working for Kvindelige
Missions Arbejdere (KMA, ‘‘Women Missionary Workers’’), who was stationed in
Harput (Kharpert) in the vilayet of Mamouret-ul-Aziz from the fall of 1907 until
1919. Both women witnessed every aspect of the Armenian Genocide—death marches,
massacres, starvation, resistance, forced Islamization—from their respective
geographical positions in the Ottoman Empire; and still, under these extremely
difficult conditions, they managed to save the lives of literally thousands.8 Persons like
Jacobsen and Jeppe were thus in an ideal position to give accurate accounts of
the implementation of the genocide on the local and regional levels, but when it
came to giving accounts of the overall political, economic, and ideological framework
for the genocide, no Western observers was better suited than the diplomats
in Constantinople.

A Danish Diplomat in Constantinople: Carl Ellis Wandel
At the outbreak of World War I in August 1914, Denmark declared neutrality. But, the
fear among the government and the general population that Germany would occupy
some or all of the small country as a preventive measure to secure access through the
Danish straits led to the Danish neutrality policy toward Germany being declared
‘‘benevolent.’’ It also had the effect of temporarily diverting interest from matters
concerning, for instance, the plight of the Ottoman Armenian population some
2,000 miles away. But for Danes stationed in the Ottoman Empire during the war,
the organized persecution of the Armenians was a tangible reality from the very
beginning. One unknown, but important, Danish observer was Carl Ellis Wandel
(1871–1940), who made up the entire diplomatic staff of the Danish legation in
Constantinople (Istanbul) from 1914 to 1925.
Carl Ellis Wandel was born in Copenhagen and was commercially trained
as a merchant in the family wine-importing business. When he was appointed
minister (i.e., envoy) and head of the Danish legation in Constantinople in the
summer of 1914, he was already an experienced diplomat. While running the
family’s wine cork factory in Lisbon, he had served as consul general in that city from
1904–1909, and when he moved to Argentina in 1909, he went within a few years from
consul general in Buenos Aires to minister and full-time diplomat there until 1913,
when it was decided that he should be transferred to the Ottoman Empire.9 Wandel
took over the responsibility of dealing with official Danish relations from the Swedish
legation, most likely as part of a drive for Danish trade interests in an area that was
gaining increasing significance in Europe as a producer of raw materials as well as a
purchaser of Western products. Judging by the hundreds of confidential reports
he sent to the Danish foreign ministry from 1914 onward, now held in the Danish
National Archives in Copenhagen, Wandel was a thorough and conscientious diplomat,
analyzing the social and political developments in the Ottoman Empire in a
knowledgeable, usually detached, and often very detailed way, with a constant
eye to the possible effects these developments could have on Danish trade interests
in the region.
What makes Wandel an especially important and credible witness to developments
in the Ottoman Empire during World War I, including the Armenian Genocide, is
a combination of several factors. First, he was a neutral observer from a neutral
country—or, more precisely, a country whose government, not least its powerful
foreign minister, Erik Scavenius, insisted on upholding the abovementioned
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‘‘benevolent neutrality’’ toward neighboring Germany and her allies.10 Scavenius’s
general stance was to not blame anything on any of the warring parties, since he saw
the war itself as an ‘‘uncontrollable machine that crushes everything.’’11 He was
certainly not a person to let potentially ‘‘controversial’’ considerations, such as a bias
toward a persecuted minority in the Ottoman Empire, influence Danish foreign policy.
In fact, when the Danish, Swedish, and Norwegian foreign ministries, through their
respective royal courts, received an official request from the national Armenian
delegation in Paris in April 1918 to intervene on behalf of the surviving Armenians
in Armenia, who were being severely persecuted by Turkish troops following the
withdrawal of the Russian army, the apparently unanimous answer from these neutral
nations was that ‘‘nothing would be done.’’12
Second, Wandel’s status as a diplomat from a ‘‘harmless’’ country (i.e., a small,
neutral country without imperialistic ambitions) undoubtedly further enhanced his
ability to gain the trust of the large number of influential political players he had
access to. Apart from the obvious differences in economic and military strength, and
therefore in diplomatic leverage, this status is somewhat reminiscent of the status of
the United States in the Ottoman Empire before 1917.13 Also, most of Wandel’s reports
and analyses were confidential, and they were drafted with the purpose of giving
accurate and reliable information to the Danish foreign ministry, a ministry that
an experienced diplomat like Wandel is unlikely to have expected would actually be
moved to make even a symbolic gesture toward the Ottoman Armenians or, for that
matter, toward any other Ottoman minority. Neither did Wandel at any point suggest
or expect that any action should be taken in this direction. Indeed, at one point he
states in a report, ‘‘When the cannons talk, the diplomats must be silent.’’14 Unlike the
legations of other then-neutral nations, such as the United States, Greece, and
Bulgaria,15 the Danish legation does not seem to have been approached in the summer
of 1915 by Ottoman Armenian representatives seeking diplomatic intervention on
behalf of their fellow Armenians. But, Wandel agreed with his colleagues that
only Germany, as the Ottoman Empire’s most powerful ally, had the potential
to significantly influence the Young Turks, although during the genocide he came to
believe that the Young Turks had become so thoroughly radicalized that even a
forceful German intervention could no longer help the Ottoman Armenians.16
This does not mean that Wandel was indifferent to the sufferings of the
Armenians. On the contrary, as both a moral and a rational human being, he was
highly affected by the genocide and wrote extensively about it in his reports, in which
he could also, at times, point approvingly to objections raised by diplomats from other
neutral countries against the persecutions of the Armenians. In his capacity as a
diplomat, however, he adhered to strict neutrality. This was the case, when, in 1917,
he was strongly urged by the American ambassador, Abram I. Elkus, Henry
Morgenthau’s successor, to protest against the continued persecution of the Ottoman
Pontic Greeks living on the Black Sea coast. Wandel simply noted this fact in his
report to the foreign ministry, and apparently neither he nor the ministry took
any action.17
Also, even though Wandel was kept well informed of the increasing persecution
and subsequent genocide of the Armenians by his connections in, for instance, the
German, Spanish, Persian, Vatican, Dutch, American, and other embassies and
legations,18 as well as in the Ottoman Turkish establishment,19 among missionaries
from Denmark and other countries,20 and among Armenian and other Ottoman
Christian circles, his reliability as a witness is further shown by the fact that he
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was not immediately ready to think the worst of the Committee for Union and Progress
(CUP) regarding its policy toward the Armenians. During the summer of 1915, Wandel
did realize that the Young Turk dictatorship had both the desire and the means to
pursue its genocidal policy to its conclusion. But still, as shown below, it was not before
4 September of that year that he finally realized that the authorities would not stop
short of a policy of outright extermination of the Armenian population. He came to this
realization considerably later than most other Western observers, who had already
recognized and reported this fact in June or July.
Best known are the reports from well-placed contemporary diplomats, missionaries, and rescue workers, such as the German theologian Johannes Lepsius,21 the
German ambassador Hans von Wangenheim,22 and the American ambassador Henry
Morgenthau.23 But also the very experienced Swedish ambassador to Constantinople,
Per Gustaf August Cosswa Anckarsvärd, reported on 6 July 1915 that
The persecutions of the Armenians have taken on appalling proportions, and
everything is pointing toward the idea that the Young Turks have wanted to
take advantage of an opportunity where, for various reasons, no effective pressure
from the outside needs to be feared to once and for all terminate the Armenian question.
The method is simple enough and consists of the extermination of the Armenian
nation.24

This policy of extermination was a policy that, for Wandel and other observers, was not
only cruel and unjust but also irrational, since they believed that the Empire would
thus deprive itself of some of its ablest, most industrious, and best-educated citizens.25

Background and Motivation for the Genocide: Ideology and the CUP
One of the key points of disagreement in the historiography of the Armenian Genocide
concerns whether the Young Turk policy of extermination was conceived for political,
ideological, and/or economic reasons in advance of World War I or whether the actual
decision was made mainly as a consequence of (incidents and radicalization related to)
the war.26 This debate between what could be dubbed, in somewhat simplistic terms,
‘‘intentionalist’’ and ‘‘structuralist’’ interpretations is still ongoing. I will touch upon it
only briefly here, but to me there is no doubt that scholars explaining the Armenian
Genocide as the result of a mainly (but certainly not exclusively) ‘‘structural’’ process
of cumulative radicalization have provided the most convincing interpretations, by
which I mean simply that I have yet to see any truly convincing evidence that the
physical destruction of the Ottoman Armenians had been planned before the spring
or summer of 1915.27
Two things must be stated concerning this debate, however. First, it is a purely
academic debate, in the sense that the Armenian Genocide is of course a genocide
whether it was decided upon years or months before World War I28 or as late as the
spring or summer of 1915.29 The destruction was profoundly intentional as opposed to,
say, ‘‘accidental’’: real people were systematically and intentionally annihilated by
other real people, not by faceless ‘‘structural forces.’’ Second, the debate is not finished.
The matter has yet to be settled, especially since it is generally difficult, and sometimes
impossible, to decide whether increasingly genocidal actions during wars or
revolutions are mainly the results of such events, premeditated results of atrocities
committed under the cover of the events, or, as has become an increasingly more
common interpretative model within genocide studies, a ‘‘twisted road’’ (i.e., the results
of a dynamic combination of premeditation and circumstances).30 As in other cases
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of genocide, in the case of the Armenian Genocide more evidence and more sources
need to be taken into consideration.
What ‘‘structuralists’’ as well as ‘‘intentionalists’’ do agree on is that it is clear
that the radicalization of the Young Turk policy toward the non-Turkish minorities of
the Ottoman Empire began not only before the outbreak of World War I but also before
the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913. As early as 1908, the year of the Young Turk
revolution, the CUP paper Tanin declared that ‘‘the Turkish nation is and will remain
the ruling nation,’’31 and in July 1910, a pro-Turkish, French-language journal based
in Saloniki, Progre`s de Salonique, wrote on the growing Japanese and Turkish
nationalist movements that ‘‘at the head of these movements will be found the peoples
belonging to the same race—the Mongolians. Each one possesses the unquestionable
title to the moral and intellectual supremacy of the great countries over which their
influence extends.’’32
That same year, at the Young Turk congress in Saloniki, it was declared outright
that the ‘‘Ottomanization’’ of the population of the empire—that is, the replacement of
(for instance) a primarily ethnic Armenian identity with an Ottoman one—could not
be achieved by persuasion but had to be achieved through forcible measures.33
And, according to the memoirs of the renowned Danish Orientalist and former rector of
the University of Copenhagen, Johannes Østrup, at least one crucially important CUP
member had simultaneously, before rising to the very top of the Young Turk hierarchy,
expressed such distrust toward the Ottoman Armenians that he had called for their
extermination. In 1937 Østrup almost casually recalls a series of business meetings
with Mehmet Talât Pasha in 1910:
It had really been Talat’s plan to exterminate all of the Armenian people, and the plan
did not originate as the result of a war psychosis. I spoke with Talât on several
occasions in the autumn of 1910, and among many other things we also talked about the
Armenians. ‘‘You see,’’ he said, ‘‘between us and this people there is an incompatibility
which cannot be solved in a peaceful manner; either they will completely undermine us,
or we will have to annihilate them. If I ever come to power in this country, I will use all
my might to exterminate the Armenians.’’ Six years later he fulfilled his promise; the
persecutions which were effectuated in the years of 1915 and 1916 cost—according
to the lowest counts—the lives of more than 1.5 million persons. And yet one could not
but like Talât; he was a barbarian or a fanatic, whatever one wants to call it, but his
soul was free from deceit.34

It must be noted that Østrup, a conservative and a rather cynical realpolitiker
who admired Kemal Atatürk as well as Talât, generally had no liking for either the
Armenians or the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire, sharing as he did the popular
prejudice among members of the Turkish elite,35 as well as among many European
Orientalists and other observers at the time, that these peoples were ‘‘deceiving,’’
‘‘cowardly,’’ and ‘‘mercantilist.’’ This view was opposed to that of Turks, Kurds, and/or
Arabs, who were often considered ‘‘pure’’ and ‘‘rural’’ and were thought to possess a
more ‘‘warlike’’ spirit.36 Ottoman Armenians were a relatively well-educated, socially
mobile minority, and, together with the Ottoman Greeks, they made up a
comparatively large part of the empire’s small middle class. Whereas some 70–80%
of the Armenians were in fact peasants, and many Armenian city-dwellers were
relatively poor, they, like the Jews in Europe, were seen as the incarnation of the
despised, Westernized ‘‘mercantile spirit.’’ This view is illustrated in a contemporary
account of the ‘‘racial’’ characteristics of Entente prisoners in German POW camps,
in which Russian Armenians are described as being a ‘‘cunning race of merchants.’’37
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At the same time, Armenians were also seen by Turkish nationalists as hindering the
development of an ethnic Turkish mercantile class.38
But even though Ottoman Armenians were generally disliked and distrusted by
many Westerners and Muslims alike, and even though, as Johannes Østrup recalls it,
the main instigator of the Armenian Genocide desired their extermination as early as
1910, it does not follow that there was an actual Young Turk plan of genocide before
World War I. It does suggest, however, that there is some truth in the notion shared by
‘‘intentionalist’’ scholars, such as Vahakn Dadrian, that a desire to seek a thoroughly
radical solution, including extermination, to a perceived problem existed in influential
Young Turk circles even before the beginning of the Balkan Wars.39 The loss of
Ottoman territory, the massacre or forced migration of hundreds of thousands of
Muslims from the Balkans and Caucasus, and the World War, with its instances
of initial Turkish defeat, Armenian resistance, and so on, were most likely among
the main events necessary to radicalize large parts of the Turkish establishment
and population to such an extent that they were willing to carry out an overtly
exterminatory policy against Armenians and other, mainly Christian, Ottoman
minorities. But, a perhaps rudimentary, but certainly radical and influential, ideology
that was just as necessary for traditional anti-Armenian sentiments to develop into
a genocidal policy did already exist before these developments, as Wandel also
points out (see below).40 As Taner Akçam has noted, Turkish nationalism came late
compared not only to the nationalisms of Western Europe but also to the nationalisms
of other Ottoman groups, and, like other ‘‘delayed nationalisms,’’ it was aggressive and
belligerent, determined to revive past glory and right perceived wrongs.41
Generally, whether or not one as a Western observer before World War I knew or
believed that there was a radical segment of the CUP that desired a radical solution
of the ‘‘Armenian question,’’ the official Young Turk policy of creating a multicultural
‘‘Ottoman’’ identity instead of the various more or less developed national identities
in the empire was regarded as unrealistic. Although some observers were, at least
initially, optimistic to various degrees, others were much more cautious.42 The
Norwegian KMA missionary in Mush, Bodil Biørn, though hopeful that the 1908
revolution would lead to reforms benefiting the Ottoman Armenians, was at the same
time skeptical as to how such reforms would be implemented in a world ruled by
‘‘inequality, corruption, violence, and murder.’’43 In 1932, a member of the Danish
KMA, Elise Bockelund, summed up in plain language the missionaries’ view of the
CUP revolution: ‘‘The Young Turk rule was a disappointment; they did not keep their
promises, and, though they themselves were irreligious, they still gave preference
to Islam, so the Armenians were not safe.’’44 Wandel exemplified the Young Turks’
pre-war discriminatory policies by reporting that the electoral system was designed
to discriminate heavily against Christians and that the authorities, despite their
promises, did not want to give back Anatolian land to Armenians driven away during
or after the Abdul Hamid massacres.45
A 1911 report from the Danish embassy in Rome analyzing the ongoing uprising
in the Muslim Ottoman province of Albania points out that, in spite of the promises
and stated ambitions of the Young Turks, there was a fundamental discrepancy
between those ambitions and the political and ethnic realities of the Empire. According
to the report, well-informed observers did not believe that the Young Turks would
succeed in ‘‘fusing the various, differing elements of the population in the vast, loosely
connected Turkish Empire into a truly Turkish nation,’’46 a view fully shared by
the contemporary Turkist ideologist Yusuf Akçura.47 All the recent changes made by
202

A Danish Diplomat in Constantinople during the Armenian Genocide

the Young Turks, which cut deeply into what the anonymous author(s) of the report
describe as ‘‘the century-old habits of a completely immature population,’’ would only
bring confusion and rebellion throughout the empire.48 In 1913, after the coup by the
Triumvirate, the British foreign ministry even predicted that one of the consequences
would be widespread massacres of Ottoman Armenians.49 There was a sense that
the perceived problems with the non-Turkish national and religious minorities of the
Ottoman Empire would eventually be ‘‘solved’’ in a violent manner.50 The question was
when and how this ‘‘solution’’ would come about.

Background and Motivation for the Genocide According to Wandel
The most well-placed Danish observer of high-level Young Turk policy, Carl Ellis
Wandel, tried in September 1915 to analyze how the Young Turk ideology had evolved
from seemingly democratic Ottomanism to the current mix of xenophobia and extreme
nationalism, a change he believed was partly ideologically and economically driven
and, partly dictated by circumstances:
The CUP took the reins of power with a motto saying ‘‘equal rights for all Ottoman
citizens.’’ But to create the unity mentioned in the title of the Committee in the vast and
ethnically diverse Empire, there had to be created a sense of Ottoman solidarity that
included all the peoples of the Empire, while simultaneously guarantees had to be
created that this new ‘‘Ottomanism’’ would also in the future be led by Young Turk
members of the Committee; that is, at the same time creating equal rights for all
Ottoman citizens, without regard to nationality and religion (the idealistic demands of
the revolution), and making sure that this new Ottomanism would still be a purely
Turkish movement. The struggle between these two demands lasted a while, until the
Committee, immediately after the end of the Balkan War, resolutely discarded the first
demand (equal rights for all Ottomans) and decided to pursue the road of Turkification,
the road characterized by the boycott in the spring of 1914 that struck Greeks who were
Ottoman subjects as well as Greek subjects, the simultaneous persecutions of Greeks in
Asia Minor and Thrace, and, later that year, favoured by the World War and the
subsequent annulment of the Capitulations [and] the declaration of Jihad—with
German assistance—[Turkification] finally led to the xenophobic and nationalist
policy, the recent consequences whereof I have several times closely examined, and
which at the moment has as its main purpose the extermination of the Armenian
population in the Empire.51

In the months after the 1913 coup, the new, more radical Young Turk leadership
did try to give the appearance of continuing efforts to ‘‘Ottomanize’’ and centralize
the empire in a peaceful and democratic manner. But, as Wandel and other observers
have noted, if this had ever in reality been CUP policy, such was no longer the case.52
In fact, as Feroz Ahmad has put it, ‘‘repression and violence became the order
of the day.’’53 This process of radicalization Wandel considered so vital and intriguing
that he made it the theme of a number of further reports. But, though he
acknowledged that the extent of the radicalization was partly caused by events
outside the control of the CUP, he also emphasized that radicalization was not simply
the result of various defensive ad hoc measures against, say, Western imperialism, but
was in fact an integral part of an active, deliberate policy, rooted in pre-revolutionary
Turkist supremacist beliefs, whose basic goal was the preservation of power.
Since it was no longer believed that this goal could be reached by a multiethnic,
multireligious, Turkish-dominated union, it would be reached by somehow creating
a ‘‘Turkey for the Turks,’’ economically, politically, linguistically, and ethnically,
increasingly combined with the more expansionist Pan-Turkist vision of Turan,
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a Turkish Empire uniting ethnic Turks from all over Asia and Russia.54 In a report
from 22 September 1915, Wandel accordingly describes the nature of the CUP by
describing the members of the CUP
not as great idealists or founding statesmen but as organizers using every means to
further their organization .. . . It is not the ideals, but the frame, that is, the power, that
they have fought and are fighting for . . .. For some there is no doubt about their
integrity, but it is the general understanding that [the CUP] will continue to pursue the
policy it has already initiated, a policy which has led to so many conflicts.

Wandel believed, mistakenly, that this policy would eventually lead to ‘‘national
suicide.’’55 In fact, though the costs were immense, it was an important initial step
leading to the creation of the relatively homogeneous, if unstable, nation-state that is
the modern Turkish Republic.56
But, as Wandel also emphasized, even though the Young Turks generally were
not ‘‘great idealists,’’ they did share some broad ideals—ideals that, if nothing else,
served to legitimize their own power monopoly in particular, and the power monopoly
of ethnic Turks in general, as well as serving to secure the centralization and
homogenization of a disintegrating empire.57 The nation, beginning with the areas
of trade and language, was to be cleansed from what were deemed to be ‘‘foreign
elements’’ in order to establish the desired national culture and economy.58 Thus
began the systematic, still ongoing process of nation building by marginalizing or
destroying the non-Turkish components of, first and foremost, the age-old Anatolian
multicultural make-up, a process that required both the rewriting of history and the
definition of non-Turks as the ‘‘Other.’’59
In a lengthy report from January 1915, titled ‘‘Political Events in Turkey in 1914,’’
Wandel describes how it was only after the Young Turk dictatorship had come to power
that one could see Turkish shops in Constantinople advertising that ‘‘This Is a Muslim
Business.’’60 The fact that, according to the Danish diplomat, the Armenians and
Greeks of the Ottoman Empire were at this point generally wary but loyal even toward
a dictatorship made no difference. Already on 24 July 1914, Wandel had reported
that ‘‘the Christian electorate is generally opposed to the CUP’s favored system of
centralization and to the principle ‘Turkey for the Turks,’ but when it comes to
improving their living conditions, they see it as necessary to work with the Committee,
rather than to break with it.’’61 This despite the fact that the Christians of the empire
were subjected to what Wandel describes as a repressive and xenophobic regime that
systematically discriminated against them.62
On 6 December 1915, Wandel elaborated on how the CUP elite and Turkish
intellectuals had increasingly become radical nationalists. Apart from pointing to
the genocide itself, his report exemplifies this by mentioning the preceeding
attempted ‘‘cleansing’’ of Greeks from Western Anatolia and of Greeks and
Armenians from politics and trade; the government-controlled, xenophobic press; the
nationalist schools’’ and the ban on street signs and so on written in ‘‘foreign,’’ that is,
non-Turkish, languages.63 Wandel refers in this report to an article in the Turkish
daily Tesfiri Efkiar from 11 November 1915, which emphasized that
the Turkish language is the foundation of our national development. At the moment we
are engaged in a war for our very existence, and the first result of this victorious war
ought to be that it is confirmed that the Turkish language reigns supreme in Turkey.64

Furthermore, in what Wandel dubbed the ‘‘Germanized-chauvinistic’’ Turkish
press, Armenians were often described as ‘‘greedy exploiters’’ by journalists
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who willingly participated in the forefront of the regime’s xenophobic campaign.65
One such example was Agaoglu Ahmed Bey, the editor of the French-language Young
Turk daily Hilal, which functioned mainly as a propaganda organ in the West, as well
as among Westerners in the Ottoman Empire. Ahmed Bey, who had ‘‘Turkified’’ his
name Ahmed Agaieff, thus hiding his Azeri (Tatar) background, was a Turkist
ideologist who, according to Wandel, had long been known for his extreme hatred
of Armenians as one of the organizers of massacres of Armenians in the Caucasus in
1905.66 Leading Young Turks even went so far as to openly describe Armenians and
other Ottoman Christians as ‘‘tumors,’’ a cancer that had to be removed so that the
Turkish nation could be ‘‘cured.’’67
For Wandel, as well as for other observers, it was obvious that the economic and
linguistic discrimination, together with other official discriminatory and repressive
initiatives, created a society without room for opposition or minorities. These
initiatives included the establishment of a nationwide, Turkish-nationalist, militarized
‘‘scout movement’’; the establishment of ethnic Turkish transport and trade
companies; and the calling out of Turkish schoolchildren and workers to celebrate
newly created national (i.e., exclusively Turkish) commemoration days and
celebrations.68 Although Wandel was rightfully doubtful whether these ‘‘nationbuilding’’ initiatives actually had any significant impact on the general population, for
the Young Turks this whole process, and its acceleration during the war, was part of
the Turkish people’s ‘‘wonderful awakening, which the government has long been
struggling to bring about, and which had to come sooner or later, but which has
now been accelerated by the war,’’ as the otherwise moderate vali of Adrianople
(Edirne), Hadji Adil Bey, expressed it in a speech given in his capacity as speaker at
the opening of parliamentary sessions in the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies in
November 1916.69
The deliberate and ‘‘rational’’ nature of this Young Turk nationalist ideology
was also clearly expressed by the experienced diplomat Djevad Bey, Turkish minister
to Copenhagen and a diplomate de carrie`re with close connections to the Young
Turk government. In an interview given to leading Danish newspaper Politiken in
February 1916, he stated that
We have now introduced the Turkish language in Turkey. This is the first result
of a national awakening: Turkey for the Turks . . .. When we change old signs and
street names, our enemies claim that we tear down the European inscriptions
out of hatred and malice. There is no truth in that. We only do what all nations
have done before us. They call us chauvinists and rebels. I assure you, we only want one
thing: our economical and political independence. This we all agree upon. There are
no longer both old and young Turks. There are only Turks. And during the war we
are all young.70

Paradoxically, chauvinist Turks had come to believe that in order to become truly
‘‘European’’—perceived as being effective, competitive, homogenic, assertive, powerful,
expansive, rich, modern, and so on—they must eliminate the perceived European
elements of the Empire, that is, the Ottoman Christians, who had become an obstacle
to reaching this goal. The fact that, by targeting Christians, the Young Turks also
pleased the conservative, Islamist opposition was, according to Wandel, another, more
opportunistic reason for this policy.71
It is contested whether the ideology of a ‘‘Turkey for the Turks’’ can be directly
related to the subsequent ‘‘cleansing’’ and massacre of Ottoman Armenians and
other minorities, or whether the Armenian Genocide in particular was, rather,
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a ‘‘perverse and extreme security measure based in an ethnoreligious framing,’’
as Ronald Grigor Suny expresses it.72 To me, first, these explanations are not
mutually exclusive; rather, they complement each other, showing the ‘‘twisted’’
(i.e., ideological and deliberate as well as circumstantial and opportunistic) nature
of the Armenian Genocide. Second, the reports Wandel sent to his superiors in
Copenhagen help underline that no matter the circumstances, the extremely
chauvinist ideology of the Young Turks was a main reason that, from the outbreak
of World War I, the Armenians immediately and violently came to be ‘‘ethnoreligiously framed.’’ Because of the paranoid fear expressed by Talât that the
Armenians as former allies knew, and therefore could destroy, the Young Turk
organization, and the fact that many Armenians lived near the front lines in Eastern
Anatolia, Armenians were perceived, both before and during the war, to be the most
dangerous internal threat.73
The war itself was most likely a crucial factor leading to the decision in favor
of genocide, as it gave rise to both the opportunity of ‘‘settling scores’’ and the need
for a scapegoat to divert criticism for the initial losses of the Ottoman army. The war
also resulted in atrocities against Muslim civilians, as well as in scattered Ottoman
Armenian nationalist activity and resistance that, through official campaigns
of propaganda and misinformation, served to further legitimize, brutalize, and
dehumanize. In 1915, if not before, the Turkish national identity was influenced
by the loss of territory and prestige to an extent that resulted in a willingness to use
exterminatory measures against those societal groups who were now thought to be
threatening not only the traditional hegemony of ethnic Turks but the very survival
of the Turkish nation.74 This Young Turk ‘‘siege mentality’’ was heightened by
the fact that Turks were themselves still a minority among minorities—the Kurds,
Arabs, Armenians, Greeks, Assyrians, Jews, Circassians, and other groups of the
Ottoman Empire.
But the cleansing from Ottoman soil of Armenians became not only a goal in itself
but also an integral part of a grand project to create a Turkish nation. The regime
initiated the above-mentioned simultaneous measures (‘‘national holidays,’’ etc.) aimed
at imprinting a Turkish national identity upon the large majority of the Turkish
population that had traditionally identified themselves mainly along (ethno-)religious
lines.75 But the removal of potential challenges to Turkish hegemony was believed to
be a precondition for these ‘‘positive’’ measures to succeed, as expressed by Wandel in
March 1916:
If the Young Turks have their way, the time will never come back when the Arabs,
Armenians, and Greeks made up the majority in the Ottoman parliament, because they
realize that such a majority sooner or later would demand that the Caliphate be
replaced by a confederation, and that they would soon lose their power. The Turks have
therefore chosen the only means available to them to preserve their control over
Turkey—which is the complete extermination of the peoples who had the greatest
possibilities to evolve after the introduction of the constitution, and with whom they
have no way of competing in a peaceful struggle.76

The Persecution of the Ottoman Greeks in 1914: The Beginnings
of Violent Turkification
Before the outright exterminatory policies of World War I were initiated, the first
attempts at violently homogenizing the ethnic and religious make-up of Anatolia
had already begun. In the spring and summer of 1914, when attempts at removing
206

A Danish Diplomat in Constantinople during the Armenian Genocide

non-Turkish influences from the Ottoman economy had just been initiated in
earnest, this policy was supplemented with the ‘‘cleansing’’ and massacre of more
than 100,000 ethnic Ionian Greeks from the Aegean region.77 This was the result of
careful deliberations and preliminary research by the CUP, accompanied by a decision
to hide the connection between the government and the Special Organization, the
organization in charge of the operation.78 This conclusion is confirmed by a June 1914
report to Wandel from the Danish consul in Smyrna (Izmir), Alfred van der Zee, that a
large-scale, systematic, and violent banishing of what he, Van der Zee, describes as the
generally very peaceful Greek population was carried out on the orders of the central
government.79
According to Van der Zee, in March 1914, the valis of Smyrna and the nearby
regions had made tours of inspection to the coastal towns and villages of the vilayets,
‘‘advising’’ the local civil servants to force the Greek population out, first by economic
boycotts, then, when this did not have the desired effect, by violent persecution:
‘‘Armed ‘bashibozuks’ [Turkish irregular troops] attacked the Greek population,
raped the Greek women, killed the children, etc. Finally, the gangs also violated
non-Ottoman citizens.’’80 These bashibozuks, alternatively called ‘‘Turkish gangs’’
in the reports, numbered 8,000 to 10,000 in the vilayet of Aidin (Smyrna) alone and
were financed and run by the state. Many of these gangs consisted of members of
the Special Organization and/or Muslim refugees from the Balkans or the Caucasus,
the so-called muhadjirs, who, according to Wandel, carried out the persecutions,
plundering and murdering ‘‘as many of the hated Greeks as possible.’’81 Aside
from economic, ethnic, and political motives, there was a military rationale behind
this policy, in the sense that the Young Turk government wanted to prevent
the Greeks along the coastline from eventually becoming as a fifth column, a
danger believed to be particularly imminent because Greece had come to control
the nearby islands of Chios and Mytilene, which, it was claimed, could be used
to launch attacks.82
Despite attempts to keep this policy a secret, and despite attempts to
deny both the existence of and the responsibility for the policy, the Young Turk
government soon had to change course, facing pressure from, especially, the French
government. The Young Turks were also aware that they were not ready for the
war with Greece that would most likely result if the persecutions did not stop.83
But after consultations with the Austrio-Hungarian ambassador to the Ottoman
Empire, Count Johann Pallavicini, Wandel was convinced that a war between
Greece and the Ottoman Empire was bound to break out soon and that the Greek
population of Anatolia would then ‘‘be worse off than ever before.’’84 This prediction
was accurate, since, during World War I, the persecutions of the Ottoman Greeks
were taken up again on a regular basis, sometimes on German initiative, and
hundreds of thousands of Greeks from Anatolia and Thrace, including the Pontic
Greeks from the Black Sea coast, were either killed or expelled from 1914 through
1918. In June 1917, too, Greece did join the war against the Ottoman Empire and
her allies.85
In 1914, the aim of this policy was most likely not to exterminate but, as it has been
put, to ‘‘thin out’’ (and thereby significantly weaken) the Ottoman Greek population,
as an extension of the policy of economic and cultural Turkification, while at the same
time creating living space for the muhadjirs.86 This policy was, as stated above,
not only economically but also politically and ideologically motivated. Whatever the
rationale, it was a cruel and murderous policy. As Wandel expressed it, the losses
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resulting from the persecutions were obviously irreparable, since ‘‘an industrious
class of people have been expelled, despite the fact that the province was
already thinly populated. It can be predicted that the province will suffer from the
results of this failed policy for years to come.’’87 But the practical experiences, the
impunity of the perpetrators, and the relative political ‘‘success’’ of the persecutions—
thousands of Greeks fleeing in terror, leaving their homes and possessions to be
taken over by Muslim refugees88—meant that even more radical and violent measures
during World War I could be seen as not only possible but also as yet another
extension of a policy of ‘‘social engineering’’ already decided upon. Besides, as Talât
told Morgenthau during the Armenian Genocide, ‘‘We care nothing about the
commercial loss.’’89
For the Young Turks, one of the major advantages of such a policy of
homogenization was that the Western powers, particularly Britain and Russia,
would be presented with a fait accompli, in that the mainly Christian groups would be
gone, groups that historically had served as an excuse for these powers to interfere
with what the Young Turks regarded as the internal matters of the Ottoman Empire.
The persecutions of the Greek minority from 1914 onward therefore point toward
an actual policy of extermination, if not in the sense that these policies were planned to
be continuous parts of a ‘‘grand scheme’’ of partial and total genocides (see note 86),
then certainly in the sense that both policies were the result of xenophobic
deliberations that were inherently genocidal and in the sense that the two
policies were closely connected, ideologically, politically, and bureaucratically.90
This connection is perhaps most strikingly personified by the decidedly racist
founding member of the CUP, Dr. Mehmed Reşid. In 1914, as mutasarrif (governor)
of the sub-province Karesi in the province of Balikesir, he was heavily involved with
the persecution of the Aegean Greeks, while as vali of Diyarbekir he was responsible
for the extermination of the Armenians and Assyrians in that region in 1915
and 1916.91
With respect to the developing Young Turk policy of denial, official reactions
to the 1914 persecutions also point forward toward a vital aspect of the early denial
of the Armenian Genocide—the claim from Constantinople that the central
government, when it came to outright killings, had no control of the regional
governments or of the designated killer gangs. The interior minister, Talât Pasha
himself, declared in June 1914 that the occurence of what he called ‘‘regrettable
incidents’’ in the Smyrna region was because ‘‘many Turkish civil servants in the
provinces still believe that the orders they receive from the imperial government
in Constantinople [to protect the Greek population] have been issued under
pressure from the Great Powers, and therefore not issued in earnest.’’92 Therefore,
according to Talât, all responsibility for wrongdoing rested with the vali of Smyrna.
The interior minister even went on what Van der Zee calls a farcical tour of the
Smyrna region, traveling from city to city, making speeches promising ‘‘complete
security,’’ while the local Greeks had to stay at home, day and night, to avoid
being beaten up or shot.93
There are clear indications that while the persecutions of the Ottoman Greeks was
the first major step toward the ethnic, religious, and economic Turkification of the
Empire, and the genocide of the Armenians the most important and radical such step,
other steps were planned or desired—for instance, concerning the Ottoman Jewish
minority. By December 1914, hundreds of Jews had been deported from Jaffa in
Palestine to Egypt before this particular operation was stopped because of concerted
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protests from ambassadors Morgenthau and Wangenheim. It is believed that
the Ottoman authorities generally distinguished between Jewish nationalists
and the general Jewish population, perhaps as a result of such external pressure.94
But Wandel and other observers, including some Ottoman Jews, were convinced that
the process of Turkification was meant by the Young Turks to be total. For instance,
on 16 November 1915, Welsh MP Aneurin Williams stated during a parliamentary
debate on what was called ‘‘the Armenian atrocities’’ that ‘‘it is not only Christians.
Apparently this process of exterminating all the progressive elements of the country—
what is called Ottomanising the country—extends far beyond the Christians. The
Zionist Jews, for some reason, have been suspected of being an enlightening force, and
they, too, have been in terror.’’95 Similarly, Wandel stated that ‘‘the goal of the Zionist
movement can . . . hardly be reconciled with the policy of the present Turkish
government, which aims at removing from Turkey all foreign elements.’’96 It was
feared that the policies of extermination and/or deportation would, if unchecked,
sooner or later come to include the Ottoman Jews, even though, according to Wandel,
this group was generally known to be particularly ‘‘well integrated’’ into the Turkishdominated Ottoman society.97
The massive deportations of Ottoman Kurds in 1916–1917 are yet another
indication that the ideology of a ‘‘Turkey for the Turks’’ was to be realized to the fullest
possible extent and that the homogenization of Anatolia was the result of a bold,
criminal, highly organized, and deliberate policy. Though there are many examples
showing that, during the genocide, Kurdish tribes and individuals (as well as many
other Muslims) did help Armenians hide or escape from the Turkish authorities,98
generally, Kurdish militias and villagers played a significant role as executors of the
genocide. But when the vast majority of the Armenians had been cleansed from
Anatolia, the Young Turks began concentrating on what they regarded as the no less
troublesome Kurds.
Since it was believed that it was generally possible to assimilate Muslim
minorities,99 the Kurds were not systematically massacred but, rather, were deported
to the western parts of Anatolia to be forcibly assimilated among ethnic Turks, who
now began to constitute the majority in cities and regions, quite often thanks to the
‘‘disappearance’’ of the Ottoman Christians. Still, tens of thousands of Kurds were
killed outright, and hundreds of thousands died of diseases and starvation100 and they
were not the only Muslim Ottoman citizens being persecuted. In 1918, George
E. White, in an article titled ‘‘Some Non-conforming Turks,’’ wrote that
Those rumors of impending events in Turkey, which anticipated the deportation of
Armenians and similar treatment for the Greeks and other Christians of the Empire,
carried the foreboding that the next step taken by the governing clique would force
the Alevi Turks to abandon their Moslem nonconformity. The purpose of the ‘‘Party of
Union and Progress’’ is alleged to be to create a uniform state, one in Turkish
nationality, and one in Moslem orthodoxy.101

From Persecution to Total Genocide: The Report
of 4 September 1915
Back in August 1915, as shown above, Wandel was still hoping that the CUP would not
remain what he considered to be so daring and irrational as to take its chauvinist
and xenophobic policy—the massacres and persecution, the forced conversions
to Islam, and so on, which it pursued, as Wandel stated, under the pretext of
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‘‘military necessity’’102—to its final conclusion, which would be the extermination of
the Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire:
In my earlier reports, it has already been stated how the Young Turk government, with
the aim of strengthening its position internally, lately has made xenophobia and hatred
toward Christians a leading principle in its policy . . .. The aim of this policy is to force
foreigners and Christians to leave the country by making their existence in Turkey
intolerable, thereby at the same time satisfying the fanaticism that has become an asset
for the government, but it is of course not possible to speak of the rational completion of
this policy, at least not concerning the Greeks . . .. For Turkey’s own sake it is probably
about time that the persecutions are stopped. The fanatical Committee complains
that there is no patriotism in Constantinople, which it wants to transform into a
Turkish-Muslim capital, but it does not seem to realize that it makes a big mistake
in driving out the foreigners and the Christians, even seen from an academic point of
view, since it thereby drives out the entire intelligence of the country, the entire part
of the population that is in possession of spirit, insight, and means, the businessmen,
the scientists and the financiers, and that, if the principle of ‘‘Turkey for the Turks’’ is
to be carried through, there will be nothing but civil servants and peasants in
the country.103

But on 4 September 1915, less than three weeks after he had expressed his almost
desperate hope that the CUP would stop short of outright extermination, Wandel for
the first time informed his superiors in the Danish foreign ministry that a genocide
was indeed taking place:
I will briefly allow myself to give an account of the important and sad information
regarding the latest developments that has been given to me by a completely
trustworthy and truthful source, and which is of such a nature that it will be regretted
everywhere in the Christian world. The Turks are vigorously carrying out their cruel
intent, to exterminate the Armenian people.104

This was not just a statement. Wandel backed it up by giving numerous examples of
the nationwide ‘‘evacuation’’ of Armenians, a euphemistic expression that, he
emphasized, meant almost certain death by organized massacres and deprivation.105
For example, Wandel had received a letter from the Armenian Catholic bishop of
Erzerum, Joseph Melchisedechian, who informed him that the parish of Khodirtchour,
which consisted of twelve villages, had been completely evacuated, and that no one
knew what had happened to the vanished Armenian population.106 The Armenian
Catholic bishop of Harput, Stepan Israelian, had on 23 June informed the Patriarchate
that he had received orders to leave the city for Aleppo with the whole of his
congregation within twenty-four hours. Later it was discovered that Israelian and
approximately 1,700 other Armenians had been attacked and killed on the road
between Diyarbekir and Urfa.107 Wandel’s report furthermore mentions that the
archbishop of Mardin, Ignatius Maloyan, had been killed, together with approximately
700 Catholics from the congregation; that the Catholic population of Tel Armen had
been wiped out completely; that the cities of Tarsus, Hedzin (Hadjin), Mersina
(Mersin), and many others had been ‘‘completely evacuated’’; and that Armenian
women of Angora (Ankara) had been forcibly married to Muslims, while approximately
6,000 deported men, among them seventy clergy led by Bishop Gregoire Bahaban, had
been shot.108 In that same report, Wandel states that ‘‘even here in Constantinople
Armenians are kidnapped and sent to Asia, and it is not possible to get information of
their whereabouts.’’109 He ends the report by concluding that ‘‘the fate that has
befallen the Catholic Armenians has with even greater cruelty befallen all other
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Armenians, as the intention of the government, as I already have had the honour to
report, is to completely annihilate the Armenian people.’’110
As for the significance to the extermination project of the question of ‘‘Armenian
loyalty’’—in itself a rather meaningless phrase, since it implies some sort of general
Armenian organization, mindset, and pattern of actions that did not exist—according
to Wandel, it did not change significantly for the general Ottoman Armenian
population after the empire entered World War I by attacking Russia and began to
deport and massacre Armenians. In any case, as Wandel also pointed out, the question
of ‘‘loyalty’’ had little, if anything, to do with the persecution of the Armenians, since,
as his 4 September report emphasizes, the persecutions at this point took place with no
regard to whether the targeted Armenians could even theoretically be construed to
constitute any real threat to the Ottoman Empire. After having stated that the
slaughter of the Armenians continued ‘‘with great intensity,’’ in spite of promises to the
contrary that he and other diplomats had personally received from the Young Turk
government, Wandel mentions that even the Armenian Catholics, who, he states,
never had any political aspirations, and the Gregorian Armenians, ‘‘who have
distanced themselves from nationalist ideas to such an extent that they have given
up their mother tongue and adopted the Turkish language as their own,’’ were still
subjected to ‘‘the most stubborn persecution.’’111

The Economy of Genocide: The ‘‘Confiscations’’
of Armenian Property
Another central aspect of the genocide, the ‘‘legal’’ background for the deportation
of the Armenians and the confiscation of Armenian assets by the Young Turk
government, was also analyzed by Wandel. On 27 May 1915, only three days after
the Entente had threatened to hold Turkish civilians and military personnel
responsible for ‘‘crimes against humanity,’’ the CUP rushed the passing of a law
that basically gave the authorities carte blanche to deport any person they wanted.112
The authorities, Wandel emphasized, had only to ‘‘sense’’ treason to justify the
deportation of whole cities.113 On 26 September 1915, a second ‘‘temporary law’’
was passed, without the consent of the temporarily suspended parliamentary
chambers, concerning the confiscation of (Armenian) assets. It is described by
Wandel as follows:
The new temporary law prescribes that the possessions of the deported Armenians are
to be confiscated by the public administration. According to the law . . . it will be possible
to confiscate the land belonging to all of the deported Armenians, as well as Armenian
churches and schools. It is clear that the forced sale of the property, head over heels and
under the current conditions, will not come close to covering the actual value of the
property. The liquidation commission mentioned in the law can act completely
arbitrarily. It has been given authority to annul any claims of the deported without
consulting said persons, and to hand over property to other claimants without giving
the deported any right or possibility to set aside such a decision. Any surplus generated
by the liquidation of the possessions of the deported will, after deduction of expenses, be
deposited in the ministry of finance, without any mention of when it is supposed to be
paid back to the owners. Considering that the law of 27 May 1915 has laid the legal
foundation for the great deportations of the Armenians and for the connected
persecutions, it is easy to imagine the far-reaching consequences of an arbitrary
execution of the provisions of the new law, which practically could lead to complete ruin
for the Armenians of Asia Minor.114
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The Austrian military attaché to the Ottoman Empire, Joseph Pomiankowski, simply
stated that the law was a farce.115 Its aim was, in reality, to ‘‘legalize’’ and systematize
the widespread profiteering from the genocide by the state, officials, the army, Muslim
refugees, and local populations. In several reports Wandel mentions that the only real
high-level Turkish voice of protest against the plundering and persecution of the
Armenians came from Senator Ahmed Riza.116 This is perhaps somewhat surprising,
since the European-educated senator, formerly a leading Young Turk ideologue,
president of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies, chairman of the CUP, and still a
convinced and idealistic Turkist, had earlier displayed no particular sympathy toward
the Christian minorities of the empire.117 In fact, he was early on believed to belong to
the radical wing of the Young Turks, as can be discerned from the statement of a
person present at a lecture given by Riza in London in 1904:
I am not sorry that the gentleman has spoken, because it shows us how impossible it is
to expect any reforms in Turkey from the Young Turk party. They are only thinking of
themselves. The liberties of the Christians would be just as unsafe under a Sultan with
the sentiments of the gentleman [Riza] who has just sat down, as under the present
Sultan.118

But Riza definitely felt that, during the Great War, the Young Turk government
went much too far in carrying out its oppressive policies against minorities such as the
Armenians, a minority that, in large part, lived in provinces where Christians had
never experienced justice or security, as he stated during a parliamentary debate in
1916.119 Riza’s scolding criticism of Young Turk policies could even be seen as a logical,
if unusually principled, extension of his democratic beliefs, as well as of his earlier,
equally scolding criticism of Western imperialism and racism.120 He also tried
constantly to convince his colleagues in the Ottoman senate that the laws ‘‘legalizing’’
these Young Turk policies were unconstitutional and unjust.121 Although Ahmed
Riza’s protests were obviously in vain, and although he was frequently harrassed in
Parliament by his colleagues, he did not give up on a subject that was, to him, a matter
of conscience and principle.
As late as November 1917, Riza and the three other members of his small Young
Turk parliamentary faction (Orkhan Bey, Mahmoud Pasha, and Damad Ferid Pasha)
insisted on debating in the Ottoman parliament the unlawful confiscation of what were
euphemistically called ‘‘abandoned properties’’ and the connected persecutions of
Armenians, Greeks, and Arabs. This was highly unusual during the reign of the Young
Turk dictatorship, since no real debate was allowed either in the governmentcontrolled press or in Parliament; when a case was brought before the parliament, it
had already been decided upon by the CUP. But Riza was occasionally allowed to speak
out without being disciplined or punished, and he even made sure that the criticism he
raised in the Senate was, to some extent, printed in the official parliamentary record.
That record was not accessible to the public, but at least some of the legations managed
to get hold of it.122 The reasons that Riza was allowed to speak out were that he, a man
of integrity and some influence as one of the founders of the CUP, was still highly
esteemed among parts of the general population and the elite, and also that, because
he lacked a proper power base, he was regarded as relatively harmless, or even useful,
by the Young Turks, as they could point to his presence in the Senate to claim that,
since there was an opposition, the empire was ruled in a truly parliamentary
fashion.123
During the Senate meeting of 29 November 1917, the government proposed a
law that would grant an official commission two million piastres to administer
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‘‘the preservation of the abandoned properties.’’ This seemingly innocent proposition
would, if passed, be a de facto legalization of the Temporary Law of Expropriation and
Confiscation of 1915, which allowed the government to ‘‘confiscate’’—that is, steal—
Armenian cash and property and to resell the property for profit. In the preceding two
years the government had not dared to introduce that law to the parliamentary
chambers, and the introduction of the appropriation law was thus an obvious attempt
to obtain an indirect parliamentary blessing for an unconstitutional law. Orkhan Bey
started the debate by saying exactly this: that, as the provisional or temporary law
regarding the ‘‘abandoned properties’’ had not yet been introduced to and approved by
the Senate, granting the requested two million piastres would give the appearance
that the Senate was approving a law it had not been given the opportunity to properly
debate and approve. The Senate president, without directly commenting on Orkhan
Bey’s assertions, assured him that this would not be the case.
Then Riza spoke, echoing his protests in Parliament against the ‘‘temporary law’’
two years earlier, in the fall of 1915.124 Among other things, he pointed to the fact that
the very term ‘‘abandoned properties’’ was ridiculous:
We take responsibility by accepting an expression. In my opinion the expression
‘‘abandoned properties’’ means property that has been abandoned, left behind. But no
one has left behind their property of their own free will. We must find an appropriate
expression and say straight out, ‘‘Law for the Preservation of Possessions of Armenians,
Greeks, and Arabs, who out of Political Necessity have been Removed from their
Homes.’’ The expression ‘‘abandoned properties’’ is not accurate, and the Senate should
not accept such an inaccurate expression. In reality the population has been violently
driven from their homes and been abducted by force, and their property has been left
behind. This line of action is also unconstitutional, because the constitution protects the
inviolability of property. I will go further and say that if the rights of property do not
exist in a country . . ., no government exists either . . .. The government does claim that it
has had the right to such action. Since I have yet to examine the matter in its entirety,
I cannot for the moment give a definite statement thereof. The government publishes
brochures with its viewpoints. Let us assume that every word in these brochures is
absolutely true. Some Armenians and Greeks may very well, as the government says,
have been traitors. Those you find among the Turks and the Kurds, as well as among
the Armenians. But the law establishes punishment for the traitors, the criminals. You
execute them, shoot them; but you never deport their families or rob their fortune. This
is an outright reign of terror.125

The Senate president was of the opinion that all of this could be discussed only
when the law in question, the September 1915 law, was introduced to the Senate.
But, as Riza stated once again, that law had not been introduced, and there was no
sign that this would actually happen. The Senate president also remarked that the
Senate had earlier approved the expression ‘‘abandoned properties,’’ and he thought it
strange not to accept it this year. Riza answered that he himself had not accepted it,
nor would he. He once again demanded the introduction of the confiscation law, not the
‘‘auxiliary’’ appropriation law: ‘‘We have to know that the properties are not lost, that
they remain to be given back to their rightful owners, and that these are not all dead.’’
The president said that the confiscation law had been introduced to the Chamber of
Deputies, but that it had not been read because of that chamber’s workload, and that
the Senate therefore could not blame the government. After further protests from
Riza’s group, who knew this to be a phony explanation, the law was passed. Thus,
the Senate ended up indirectly sanctioning the bill that Riza and his small group
had fought so vigorously against, the bill that indirectly ‘‘legalized’’ what was,
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according to Jesse B. Jackson, American consul to Aleppo, ‘‘a gigantic
plundering scheme as well as a final blow to extinguish the [Armenian] race.’’126

Conclusion
Space permits only an introduction to some of the most important subjects covered
by Carl Ellis Wandel in relation to the Armenian Genocide. For instance, his often
long and analytical reports also deals extensively with subjects such as the question
of ‘‘German complicity,’’ the dynamics and relationships within the Young Turk
leadership, and the official Young Turk campaign of denial and falsification of their
crimes. But the sample of documents analyzed and contextualized above should leave
the impression that even an unknown diplomat from a small country has something to
offer when it comes to explaining important aspects of one of the largest exterminatory
projects of the twentieth century. For, as Wandel convincingly argued, this was
the nature of the Armenian Genocide: it was an extremely cruel, pragmatic, and
opportunistic political and economical project, fueled by a highly xenophobic,
nationalist (proto-)ideology, all in the context of war and of a ‘‘grand scheme’’ of
radical modernization by Turkification. Contemporary official justifications of the
persecutions—‘‘military necessity,’’ Armenian ‘‘disloyalty’’ or ‘‘provocation’’—were
dismissed as exaggerated, fabricated, or simply irrelevant. Wandel concurred
with most other contemporary and later observers that the Ottoman Armenians did
not bring their fate upon themselves.
In other words, pragmatic considerations, combined with a downward spiral of
more and more radicalized rhetoric and actions, as well as the opportunity created
by a world war, were, for Wandel, essential in understanding why the anti-Armenian
policies were intended and carried out as complete destruction and not, say, ethnic
cleansing or continued oppression. To him, it was what we today would call a
twisted road to the Armenian Genocide, which is probably why he did not attempt to
estimate the exact time of the conception of a Young Turk plan of actual genocide. This
does not mean that Wandel was taking sides, in 1915 and 1916, in a debate of
‘‘intentionalists’’ versus ‘‘functionalists,’’ as such a debate obviously did not exist at the
time. If it had, it would most likely not have seemed to be of even academic interest to
an eyewitness, in the face of the ongoing slaughter. Wandel simply reported on what
he saw, heard, and read, as the often seemingly chaotic events progressed, and he
came to conclusions about important aspects of the nature of the Armenian Genocide
that are quite similar to conclusions many (but not all) contemporary observers, as
well as many present-day scholars (myself included), have come to on the basis of
available evidence.
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